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It is the central argument of this thesis that the cost 
.-r medi cal care has been the most salient political 
;ideration in the evolution of certificate of public need 
virginia. certi f icate of need is a regulatory mechanism 
that public officials use to achieve health planning goals by 
controlling medical facility capital expenditures . This 
thesis sets the development and implementation of certificate 
of need in Virginia against the broad background of medical 
facility public policy in this country, as well as 
significant political movements in Virginia. 
Several themes are evident from this analysis. Over time, 
the center of medical facility planning and assistance has 
shifted from the private sector to state and local 
governments, and then to the federal government. More 
recently, governmental activity in this area has reverted to 
the states. Secondly, the nature of this activity has changed 
ii 
from health facility construction assistance to health 
planning, and finally to health facility regulation. Group 
interaction has played an important role in the 
overall development and administration of the certificate of 
public need in Virginia. The review process itself has 
numerous points of entry for public participation. Finally, 
several facets of the ever-changing healthcare environment 
have influenced and are influenced by Virginia's certificate 
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CHAPTER 1 
FORMATIVE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
Major changes in the provision of hospital services have 
occurred during the twentieth century. Gone are the days when 
visits to the hospital were remedies of last resort. Significant 
advancements in medical technology, and in the training of 
medical professionals have transformed the hospital into the 
centerpiece of the American medical system. 
Over the years, various social, political,and economic 
factors have led to greater governmental involvement in the 
hospital sector. What had once primarily been the domain of the 
nation's charitable and philanthropic organizations, hospital 
care has become increasingly influenced by all levels of 
government. Government's role in hospital care evolved in this 
century in response to the needs as perceived by various groups 
in society, and by the various levels of government. Hence, the 
goals of the various legislative remedies that have been put 
forth have changed to reflect the concerns prevailing at a given 
time. 
Just as the goals of governmental policy have changed over 
time, so too, have the policy instruments that government has 
developed. During the early decades of this century, governmental 
activity consisted primarily of the disbursement of construction 
and operating assistance funds by the federal government, while 
state and, especially local governments initiated local hospital 
1 
planning authorities to insure the viability of these 
institutions. With the end of World War II, health officials 
renewed their efforts to increase the nation's stock of hospital 
beds. At this time the federal government took the leading role 
by initiating a hospital construction program. By the mid-
1960's, the federal government instituted a comprehensive health 
planning program as a means of integrating medical facility and 
physician services. Also at about the same time, New York and 
several other states began to experiment with a little-known 
regulatory instrument known as certificate of need, which 
required prior state approval for medical facility capital 
expenditures as a means of implementing health planning goals.1 
By the early 1970's the costs for health care were rising 
dramatically. Federal and state officials were especially 
concerned because of their burgeoning fiscal burdens under the 
2 
Medicare and Medicaid programs. In an effort to stem the rise in 
costs Congress passed a national health planning program which 
included a certificate of need provision. Already concerned 
about rising medical bills, the Virginia General Assembly 
instituted its own certificate of need program. In so doing, 
Virginia and Congress transformed what had previously been 
1Most of the early hospital planning activities, and literature 
pertaining to those activities, focused on acute care, general 
hospitals. However, later medical facility planning and regulatory 
efforts in the post-war period incorporated other types of facilities, 
such as nursing homes and intermediate care facilities for substance 
abuse. Therefore, except when referring to a particular type of 
facility, the terms health care facility and medical facility 
shall refer to the range of facilities covered under a particular 
program. 
essentially private decisions regarding medical facility 
expansion and service changes into inherently political 
decisions. 
Certificate of need continued to be a federal, state and 
local health planning and regulatory mechanism through the early 
1980's. However the Reagan Administration's anti-regulatory 
posture resulted in the gradual reduction and ultimate 
dissolution of the federal health planning program. Virginia and 
other states are once again free to alter or abolish their 
individual health planning and regulatory programs, should they 
choose to do so. Indeed, the Virginia General Assembly is 
currently considering alterations to its certificate of need 
program. At issue is the proper role for government in the 
medical facility industry. What follows is essentially a case 
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study of medical facility planning and regulation through 
certificate of need in Virginia, set against the broader 
historical and political evolution of medical facility public 
policy in the U. S. generally. Particular attention will be paid 
in chapter 2 to the health care environmental factors that 
influenced the emergence and evolution of certificate of need in 
Virginia. The third chapter shall focus on Virginia's 
certificate of need review process and the opportunities for 
political influence that it offers. The fourth chapter provides 
an overview of the health care environment in which Virginia's 
certificate of need currently functions. And, the final chapter 
focuses on the broad political and social themes that have shaped 
4 
medical facility public policy nationally and in Virginia, as a 
means of ascertaining the current status of medical facility 
public policy in Virginia. 
Private Sector Initiatives in Hospital Planning and Assistance 
Private sector initiatives to render assistance to hospitals 
evolved at about the same time as local government efforts. 
Philanthropic foundations, such as the Commonwealth Fund, based 
in New York City, the Duke Endowment,headquartered in Durham, 
North Carolina, and the Kellog Foundation of Battle Creek, Michi-
gan, rendered financial and organizational assistance to 
hospitals. While they did act as a stabilizing influence to many 
institutions, the expansion of this experience on a wider scale 
was not considered feasible by health care professionals at the 
time. 2 
A number of voluntary affiliations arose by which smaller 
hospitals bepame affiliated with larger hospitals through 
interlocking directorates. These affiliations facilitated the 
flow of personnel and services from large hospitals to small 
hospitals, while patients tended to gravitate toward large 
hospitals. Voluntary affiliations also permitted the flow of 
information between hospitals of various sizes.3 These 
2commission on Hospital care, Hospital Care in the United 
States (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1947), p. 351. 
3commission on Hospital Care, p. 352. 
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arrangements appear to have been designed to instill a measure of 
stability. 
In spite of these efforts to improve the general condition 
of hospital care in the United states, it became apparent to 
professionals within the health care field, as well as concerned 
private citizens, that further action would be necessary. Hence 
in 1942, the American Hospital Association (AHA) organized the 
Commission on Hospital Care to analyze the then-current hospital 
situation,and to make recommendations for remedying these inade-
quacies4. The Commission's findings and recommendations would 
4v.M. Hoge, "Hospitals and Health Centers, the Federal 
Government Role in Providing Financial Aid For Hospital Construction 
Since 1946," Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science (January 1951) p. 35. Members of the Commission 
were: Thomas S. Gates of the University of Pennsylvania, chairman; 
vice-chair, Edward L. Ryerson, chairman of the board of Inland 
Steel co.; Sarah Gibson Blanding, president of Vassar College; 
Katharine J. Densford, R.N., Director of the School of Nursing, 
University of Minnesota; Albert W. Dent, president of Dillard 
University; Joseph W. Fichter, Master of Ohio State Grange; 
Clinton s. Golden, assistant to the president, United Steelworkers 
of America; Evarts A. Graham, chairman, Department of Surgery, 
Washington University School of Medicine; Wilton L. Halverson, M. 
D., Director of Public Health, State of California; Herbert 
Hoover, trustee, Stanford University; Charles F. Kettering, vice 
president and director, GMC; Ada Belle Mc Cleery, R.N., former 
administrator of Evanston Hospital, Evanston, Ill; James Alexander 
Miller, M.D., professor of Clinical Medicine, Columbia University; 
Leroy M.S. Miner, M.D., D.M.D., former dean, School of Dentistry, 
Harvard College; Claude W. Munger, M.D., director, St. Luke's 
Hospital, New York City; Rt. Rev. Msgr. Thomas O'Dwyer, director 
of Catholic Charities and Hospitals, Archdiocese of Los Angeles; 
William F. Ogburn, Ph. D., chairman, Department of Sociology, 
University of Chicago; Clarence Poe, editor,Progressive Farmer; 
Willard c. Rappleye, M.D., dean, College of Physicians, Columbia 
University; J. Barrye Wall, editor, Farmville Herald (VA), president, 
Southside Community Hospital; Frank J. Walter, administrator, 
Good Samaritan Hospital (Portland, OR); Matthew Woll, vice president, 
American Federation of Labor. 
set the tone for subsequent legislative developments. 
The Commission analyzed the status of American hospitals 
from a variety of perspectives, and the Commission's membership 
reflected this diversity. The Commission was composed of twenty 
experts representing the fields of hospital administration, 
medicine, nursing, farming and labor, the general public, and 
included a professional support staff .5 
6 
The primary focus of the study was the evaluation of the 
nation's hospitals at that time, and the recommendation of 
reforms. It was decided that a census of hospitals and public 
health facilities was necessary, in order to evaluate their 
condition. Criteria for evaluating the condition of and need for 
hospitals were also developed. A national hospital plan was 
devised, along with strategies to implement that plan. A review 
of historical and more recent trends in hospital development, as 
well as a survey of administrative procedures, was included as 
well.6 
The Commission on Hospital Care concluded that there were 
serious shortcomings with respect to the availability and quality 
of American hospitals. The study revealed that some hospitals 
were in poor condition, and that there was a general shortage of 
beds, particularly in rural areas. To remedy these problems, the 
Commission recommended the initiation of a federal hospital 
construction program, and the development of regional hospital 
5 Hoge, p. 36. 
6commission on Hospital Care, p. 5. 
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plans, within which hospitals would be constructed.7 The 
continuation of need surveys by the individual states was 
considered a means by which more accurate assessments could be 
made. Stimulating local, public support for this planning 
process was considered essential.a This was a tacit 
acknowledgement that, no matter how well planned whatever kind of 
system emerged would be dependent upon public support if it was 
to have a chance of being truly successful. 
State and Local Government Hospital Sector Activity 
· During the 1930's state and local governments became active 
in the medical facility sector of the health care industry. 
Activity at the state level consisted largely of providing funds 
for facility construction while localities, especially munic-
ipalities, experimented with hospital planning. 
Although there was little, if any, conformity among state 
agencies with respect to administrative responsibility for 
dispensing construction assistance, ·funds were made available. 
Often, states assigned responsibility for dispensing construction 
aid according to the types of facilities that existed. For 
instance, most states placed tuberculosis hospitals under the 
jurisdiction of state health departments, although Indiana 
assigned this responsibility to its welfare department and, 
7Hoge, p. 36. 
8commission on Hospital Care, p. 6. 
Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Louisiana, and 
New Hampshire created special commissions to oversee these 
facilities.9 The scope of duties assumed by these bodies ranged 
from regulation to the direct operation of facilities.lo 
There was also inconsistency among states with respect to 
the manner in which state funds were allocated to health care 
8 
facilities. In some cases, state legislatures made direct grants 
to hospitals, while other states funneled funds to facilities 
through local health or welfare departments. Hospital 
construction assistance represented the largest portion of state 
aid for health activities. over eighty percent of the funds for 
health activities came from state sources.11 
While state level activity in the hospital industry was 
largely confined to the distribution of funds, local, and 
especially, municipal governments, took the lead in hospital 
w. 
planning. Indeed, local planning efforts have their origin in 
the early 1930 1 s.12 Nationally, county governments contributed 
operating and construction assistance amounting to ninety-eight 
cents per capita in 1943. Large cities subsidized patient care 
9Joseph Mountin and Evelyn Flook, "Distribution of Health 
Services in the structure of State Government," Public Health 
Bulletin, 3d ed., no. 184, (Washington, D. c. : Government 
Printing Office, 1943), pp. 7-12. 
lOcommission on Hospital Care, p. 557. 
llcommission on Hospital Care, pp. 557-558. 
12u. s. Department of Health and Human Services, Health 
Resources an Services Administration, Bureau of Resources Development, 
Office of Health Planning, The Changing Role of Health Planning, 
(Washington, D. c. : Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 10. 
in voluntary, non-profit hospitals, with particular emphasis on 
providing funds for patients requiring specialized care.13 
Cities also created voluntary, city-wide hospital councils to 
improve hospital care. While successful on some fronts, these 
local planning efforts had their shortcomings. city-wide 
hospital councils improved communication between hospitals but, 
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they were not very effective at assuring high quality of care, or 
at attaining their planning goals.14 Nonetheless, it was at the 
local level of government that the first efforts at health 
facility planning occurred. 
National Hospital Policy Activity Prior to World War II 
Although the impetus for the health facility planning 
movement occurred at the local level of government prior to World 
War II, the federal government also played a role in medical 
facility industry. This role had consisted primarily of the 
provision of construction and operating assistance funds. The 
level of federal assistance during the pre-war period tended to 
ebb and flow with the level of economic prosperity of the times. 
During the first two and a half decades of this century, the 
number of hospitals grew considerably,as a result of rapid 
13cornrnission on Hospital Care, p. 563. 
14paul L. Joskow, Controlling Hospital Costs: The Role of 
Government Intervention (Cambridge: MIT, 1981), p. 77. 
10 
advances in modern medicine and general economic prosperity.15 
From 1909-1941 the number of all types of hospitals increased 45 
percent, while the number of beds increased 300 percent. The 
marked increase in the supply of beds was due to additions to 
existing facilities, and to the fact that most of the newer 
facilities were larger than those that existed previously.16 
However, a closer examination of the evidence indicates that 
these increases were not constant through this period. The 
number of public-sector hospital beds increased seventy percent 
over the period 1928-1941, while there was only a slight increase 
in the number of beds in private, non-profit hospitals. There was 
even a slight decrease in the number of beds in private,for-
profit(propriety) hospitals.17 In fact, from 1929-1937 over 700 
hospitals were forced to close their doors, largely due to a 
shortage of funds during the Depression,and to problems of 
duplication and poor distribution of facilities and services.18 
Thus, the Depression had a considerable negative impact on 
hospitals overall. 
That negative impact is also reflected in the levels of 
federal aid that were available to hospitals during this period. 
Prior to the onset of the Depression, federal aid was on the 
rise. From 1923-1928,total federal contributions to all types 
15commission on Hospital Care, p. 63. 
16commission on Hospital Care, p. 2. 
17commission on Hospital Care, p. 55. 
18Hoge, p.34. 
of hospitals averaged $200 million per year. By 1930, however, 
that average fell to $132.5 million. And, the total amount of 
federal aid for the period 1929-1933 was only $450 million.19 
Congressional appropriations for hospitals during this period 
tended to be directed toward specific facilities or specific 
types of facilities. For instance, Congress appropriated $10 
million in 1925 for Veterans' hospitals,20 and another $25 
million in 1931 for Veterans' hospitals.21 
Even though federal aid to hospitals during the Depression 
experienced a general decline, aid to non-profit hospitals 
actually increased. Under the auspices of the Public Works 
Agency, Works Progress Administration, and the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, the federal government made loans for the 
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construction of new hospitals, and for additions and renovations 
to existing facilities.22 Most of this aid resulted in the 
enlargement of existing facilities.23 Thus there appears to have 
been a bias in the distribution of federal aid during this period 
toward existing, voluntary, non-profit hospitals. Voluntary, 
19u.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical 
Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, pt. 2, 
Series N-60 (Washington, D.C.: U. s. Department of Commerce), p. 
621. 
20(P. L. 68-587) statutes at Large, vol. 43, 2nd sess., ch. 
469, pp. 1212-1213, (1925). 
21(P. L. 72-361) Statutes at Large, vol. 49, pt. 1, 3d 
sess., p. 1551, (1931). 
22commission on Hospital Care, p. 530. 
23Hoge, p. 35. 
12 
non-profit hospitals were largely dependent upon private 
contributions, and were therefore viewed in a more benevolent 
light than public or proprietary hospitals. 
National Hospital Policy Developments During the War Years 
Concern in the federal government about hospital care in the 
United States began to mount during the late 1930's and early 
1940's. It was during this period that federal involvement began 
to overshadow state and local medical facility planning efforts. 
Among the first concrete examples of this concern at the federal 
level is a message to the Congress from President Roosevelt in 
January 1940. 
There is still need for the Federal Government to 
participate in strengthening and increasing the health 
security of the Nation •.• I now propose for the consider-
ation of the Congress a program for the construction of 
small hospitals in needy areas of the country,especially in 
rural areas of the country not now provided with them. 
The provision of hospitals in the areas to which I refer 
will greatly improve existing health services, attract 
competent doctors, and raise the standards of medical care 
in these communities ••• These hospitals should only be 
built where most needed; in the poorest communities which 
cannot afford to maintain their own. The operation of these 
hospitals should be a local responsibility with the Federal 
Government holding the title. Treatment is to be made 
available to those unable to contribute to their own 
expenses.24 
24Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States, 
"Message From the President of the United States Transmitting 
Recommendations For Enabling Legislation and an Appropriation For 
the Public Health Service," H. Doc. No. 604, 76th Congress, 3d 
sess., 30 January 1940. 
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Although the bill that was under consideration at the time of 
this message was not enacted, this message laid important 
conceptual and ideological groundwork for future federal legisla-
tion. As shall be seen shortly, many of the ideas expressed in 
this communication, such as the emphasis on hospitals for poor, 
rural areas, would be incorporated into later legislation. The 
list of witnesses appearing before a subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Education and Labor attests to its wide appeal. 
Among those appearing before the subcommittee, or submitting 
documents in support of this bill were representatives of the 
various hospital associations, the National Education 
Association, and federal and state health officials.25 
The onset of World War II prompted the passage of an act 
which, although not focused on hospital services, did contain a 
provision related to the enhancement of hospitals in the u. s. 
Title II of the amendments to the Lanham Housing Act (P.L. 77-
137) provided for the construction of hospitals, as well as 
other community projects in those areas where the population was 
growing substantially during the war, as a result of population 
25u.s. Senate, Subcommittee of Committee on Education and 
Labor, 76th Congress,3rd, Hearings on A bill to promote national 
health and welfare through appropriation of funds for construction 
of hospitals. March 18-19, 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Governemnt 
Printing Office, 1940) III-IV. Some of the witnesses appearing 
before the subcommittee were Dr. Reginald M. Atwater, secretary 
of the American Public Health Association; Dora Barney, Director 
of Education, Oklahoma Farmers Union; Nelson H. Cruikshank, American 
Federation of Labor; D. K. Este Fisher, Jr., American Institute 
of Architects, Dr. George s. Stevenson, National Commission on 
Mental Hygiene; Dr. Thomas Parran, Surgeon General of the United 
States; Dr. Victor Johnson, secretary, Council on Medical Education 
and Hospitals, AMA. 
14 
relocation efforts.26 In this instance, then, hospital care was 
not only linked with the betterment of health for the medically 
needy, but also with national defense. 
The federal government played the major role in financing 
and administering P.L. 77-137 . Administered by the Federal 
Works Agency (FWA), the program required applicants for 
assistance (governmental or nongovernmental entities) to submit 
applications to the FWA. Upon receipt of an application, the FWA 
requested the Public Health Service to conduct a need study in 
the area to be served. The need criteria were based on the 
occupancy rate and the additional usable beds that were available 
in general and special (disease or condition-specific) hospitals. 
Final authority for the approval of requests was vested in the 
Executive Office of the President.27 
The federal government not only assumed administrative 
responsibility for Title III of the Lanham Housing Act, but most 
of the financial burden as well. The federal government assumed 
100 percent of the construction costs for federally-owned 
projects, while the hospital title was vested in the federal 
government, and leased to the applicant. Non-federally-owned 
projects were eligible to receive up to seventy-five percent of 
their construction costs from grants or loans made under 
26Lanham Hous ing Act Amendments,(P. L. 77-137) Statutes at 
Large, vol. 55, Title II, p . 363 (1941). 
27commission on Hospital Care, p. 534. 
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amendments to the Lanham Housing Act.28 
While assistance for the construction of hospitals was but 
one of the provisions of the Lanham Act, it had considerable 
impact on the hospital supply. From June 1941 when the law was 
enacted, through June 30, 1945, 810 hospitals were substantially 
or entirely completed. Total expenditures for these hospitals 
amounted to $118,063,638, of which the federal government 
contributed $91,327,540. By July 1, 1946, 851 hospitals were 
virtually completed.29 These figures indicate that while federal 
assistance languished under fiscal constraints during the 
Depression, the advent of World War II helped to spur significant 
federal activity in this area. 
The Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946 
At the end of World War II, the nation was able to devote 
more of its energy to domestic concerns. While the hospital 
construction that had been undertaken pursuant to the Lanham Act 
had resulted in some improvements in the supply of hospitals, it 
had become evident that still more needed to be done. Thus, the 
movement for a hospital reconstruction program was rekindled. 
Legislation was introduced in Congress in 1946, to address 
this very issue. There seems to have been a connection between 
the Commission on Hospital care study and the introduction of 
national hospital construction legislation. Although this 
28commission on Hospital Care, p. 535. 
29commission on Hospital Care, pp. 534-535. 
16 
legislation was introduced after the Commission had completed its 
report, the Commission attempted to anticipate federal 
requirements, sensing that federal legislation would be 
forthcoming. 30 
The Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946 (Hill-
Burton Act) established a federal-state partnership as a means 
of assisting states in determining their hospital needs, and in 
providing assistance toward addressing those needs. States were 
required to devise a comprehensive hospital plan to be approved 
by the U.S. Surgeon General, who,in conjunction with a National 
Advisory Committee, was responsible for devising a national 
hospital plan. Congress, in 1946, appropriated three million 
dollars in federal grants to fund the state surveys, to be 
allocated among the states according to a state's population. 31 
Factors that were often considered when determining the 
suitability of existing facilities included obsolescence, 
improper design, fire and health hazards.32 Once these surveys 
were conducted and the plans approved, states became eligible to 
apply for construction assistance. 
The initial federal hospital construction appropriations 
were considerable. Congress appropriated seventy-five million 
dollars for each of the first five years of the program. The 
federal assistance was apportioned so that the neediest areas 
30commission on Hospital Care, p. 12. 
31H oge, p. 37. 
32Hoge, p. 39. 
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received the greatest amount of money. The amount of money that 
each state received was determined by utilizing a weighted 
formula that took into account population and per capita 
income.33 
The U.S. Surgeon General of the Public Health Service 
developed a set of criteria for determining 11 need 11 • This formula 
was based on five-year population projections, current 
utilization and occupancy rates, and a predetermined standard of 
bed adequacy. Researchers generally established a figure of 
approximately four beds per 1,000 population as being adequate.34 
Congress hoped that this formula would ensure that the largest 
amounts of construction funds would be channeled to areas where 
the need was greatest. 
The federal government stipulated that funding priority was 
to be given to poor, rural areas, where the need was perceived to 
have been the greatest. Along with improving the distribution of 
hospital facilities, Congress hoped that the new facilities would 
help attract physicians to these underserved areas.35 
The Hill-Burton Act enjoyed wide, bipartisan support in 
Congress. The initial proposal for a hospital construction came 
from President Truman as part of a five-point national health 
33paul A. Brinker and Burley Walker, The Hill-Burton Act 
1948-1954, 11 Review of Economics and Statistics 44 {May 1962), p. 
208. 
34Hoge, p. 37. 
35Judith Lave and Lester Lave, The Hospital Construction 
Act: An Evaluation of Hill-Burton Programs: 1948-1973 (Washington, 
o. c. : American Enterprise Institute, 1974), p. 10. 
program that he transmitted to Congress on November 19, 1945. 36 
As was the case with the hospital construction legislation 
originally proposed by President Roosevelt in 1940, the list of 
witnesses appearing before the Senate Education and Labor 
Committee reveals a similarly wide base of support. This 
18 
support, while widespread, was not universal. There was a great 
deal of concern expressed during the hearings about the powers of 
the surgeon General and the Federal Advisory council. The size 
of federal expenditures was also worrisome to members of 
Congress.37 In general, the fear seems to have been that the 
federal government would dominate what was to have been a 
federal-state partnership. 
With the passage of the Hill-Burton Act, the nation embarked 
on a new era in health care policy. Federal aid to hospitals had 
been dispensed before. However, the Hill-Burton Act represented 
the first attempt to create a coordinated, national hospital 
plan.38 
over the next eighteen years, from 1946-1964, a number of 
amendments were made to the Hill-Burton Act. Most of these 
36congressional Quarterly (2) 4 (October-December 1946), 
(Washington, o. c. : Congressional Quarterly, Inc.), p. 658 
37u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Eduction and Labor, 
Hearing: A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to authorize 
grants to the states for surveying their hospitals and public 
health centers, and for planning construction of additional 
facilities, and to authorize grants to assist in such construction. 
Feb. 26, 27, 28, and Mar. 12, 13, 14, 1945. 79th Cong., 1st sess. 
,p. 21. 
38Grace Budrys, Planning For the Nation's Health (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1986) p.14. 
amendments expanded the scope of the program. In 1954, the Act 
was broadened to include outpatient diagnostic and treatment 
centers, chronic and long-term care facilities, and 
rehabilitation centers.39 An amendment enacted in 1964 
19 
prohibited funds from going to areas where the bed supply equaled 
or exceeded those which were needed, as determined by the Public 
Health Service formula. The 1964 amendment also permitted funds 
to be used specifically for facility modernization, in some 
cases. 40 This was an effort to allow greater flexibility in the 
allocation of Hill-Burton funds, so as to reflect changes in the 
nature of patient care. 
Impact of the Hill-Burton Act 
The Hill-Burton Act had a substantial impact on the 
provisionof medical services in this country, although the nature 
of these effects tended to change over time. Initially, general 
hospitals accounted for seventy-five percent of the Hill-Burton 
assistance applications, while public health centers claimed 
sixteen percent, and chronic disease centers accounted for less 
than one percent.41 By 1971, however, this relationship had 
39Medical Facilities Survey and Construction Act of 1954, 
(P. L. 83-482) Statutes at Large, vol. 68, secs. 641-654, p. 461, 
(1954). 
40Hospitals and Medical Facilities Amendments of 1964, 
(P. L. 88-443) Statutes at Large, vol. 78, sec. 602, p. 448 (1964). 
41H oge, p. 37. 
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changed. General hospitals' share of the total percentage of 
projects had fallen to almost fifty-four percent; although the 
proportion of Hill-Burton funds devoted to projects in this 
category (70.9 percent) was still quite high (see Figure 1.1).42 
These figures suggest that, while the reduction i n the number of 
general hospital projects was considerable, the dollar value of 
those projects was still much greater than the dollar value of 
projects for other facilities. This may have been due to the 
technologically sophisticated equipment found in g eneral hospital 
facilities, as compared to other types of facilities. 
The Hill-Burton Act was definitely a factor in the general 
increase in the number of hospital beds in this country. 
Brinkley and Walker observed that, by 1954, the total number of 
hospital beds had i ncreased to such an extent that the "percent 
of need met" ratio had increased considerably.43 This rati o 
represents the total number of acceptable beds in existence 
divided by the total bed need, as determined by need surveys. 
The 388,144 beds in existence in 1948 represented fifty-nine 
percent of the total bed need. By 1954, however, the total 
number of acceptable beds had risen to 515, 934, which 
represented seventy-three percent of the total bed need.44 
However not all of this increase was directly attributable 
to the Hill-Burton Act. During this period, Hill-Burton funds 
42Lave and Lave, p. 14. 
43Brinker and Walker, p. 210. 
44Brinker and Walker, p. 211. 
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accounted for twenty-three percent of the total value of all non-
federally-owned medical facility construction projects. Brinkley 
and Walker felt that " •.• it would be proper to conclude ..• that 
Hill-Burton money was an aid in the construction of more hospital 
facilities, and that such aid was partially instrumental in 
providing for a more adequate hospital system in 1954 than we had 
in 1948.1145 Thus, while the Hill- Burton Act did not contribute 
a majority of the hospital funds from 1948-1954, federal 
contributions still represented a substantial portion of hospital 
construction funds. 
Conclusions reached by observers of the hospital scene 
during the early 1970's also suggested that the Hill-Burton funds 
had a considerable impact on health facility construction. By 
1971, 10, 748 total projects, valued at $3.7 billion, had been 
approved (See Tables 1.1 and 1.2). While the initial emphasis 
had been on the construction of hospitals, the late 1960's saw 
greater emphasis on long-term care facilities, mental hospitals, 
and rehabilitation facilities. There was also a shift away from 
the construction of new facilities toward the modernization and 
renovation of existing facilities.46 These findings are further 
evidence of the flexibility of the Hill-Burton program. 
It will be recalled that another of the Hill-Burton Act's 
original goals was to focus on hospital and health facility needs 
in poor, rural areas. This goal appears to have been adhered to 
45srinker and Walker, p. 211. 
46Lave and Lave, pp. 13-14. 
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_HILL~BURTON PROJECTS APPROVED, BY . TYPE, 1 JULY 1947-30 JUNE 1971 
. . . 
· Outpatient and Cost 
Inpatient Care Other Health-Care 
Total Projects Beds Provided Facility Projects Hill-Burton funds 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Total Amount .Percent 
Type of Facility ($ thousands) ($ thousands) 
Total 10,748 100.0 470,329 100.0 3,083 100.0 12,765,900 3,717,979 .100.0 
. . 
-- -- -- --
Short-term hospitals 5,787 53.8 344,453 73.2 131 a 4.2 9,322,392 2,635,494 70.9 
Long-term .care 1,]'.33 16.1 97,358 b 20.7 - - ·1,s13,000 523,111 14.1 
u·nits. i.ri hospitals 1,097. 10.2· 51 ,98~ 11 .1 - - 904,409 312,499 8.4 
Nursing homes 528 . . 4.9 37,884 8.1 - - 511;051 171,648 4.6 
Chronic disea.se hospitals 
. 
1.08 1.0 7,491 1.6 
- -
138,342 38,964 1.0 
Mental hospitals 198 1.8 21,034 4.5 - - 246,734 78,493 2.1 
Tubercu losis ho~pitals 78 .7 7,484 1.6 - - 75,228 ?7,661 .7 
,Outpatient .f~cili ties c 1,078 10.0 - - 1,078 35.0 798,952 204,083 5.6 
. Rehabi litation facilities 552 5.1 - - 552 17.9 440,019 ·135,010 3.6 
Public health centers 1,281 11.9 - - 1,281 41.6 28~.649 99,689 2.7 
State health laboratories 41 .4 - - 41 1.3 69.,718 14,438 .4 
•Public health centers built in combination with short-term hosplt_als and not rep_orted as separate. projects. 
b Excludes 7,209 long-term care beds built in conjunction with · short-term and other hospital .. ·projects, tor which funds cannot be 
separated from ·total project costs. Th·ese beds are reporte('I . in the following categories of facilitie~: general hospitals:--7, 113 beds, 
mental hospitals-..60 beds, tuberculosis hospitals-36 beds. . 












HILL-BURTON AS A SOURCE OF CONSTRUCTION 





% of total financed 
Total financed by under 
cost Hill-Burton Hill-Burton 
($ millions) grants program 
679 6.0 18.2 
686 10.6 26.5 
879 8.9 28.8. 
1,005 15.5 47.2 
1,322 13.9 38.6. 





















Source: Hospitals data for 1949-62 from U.S. pepartment of Health, Education and 
Welfare, Trends (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 35; 
data for 1968 from R. Foster and 0. McNeil, "How Hospitals Finance Construction," 
Hospitals, Journal of the American Hospital Association, vol. 45 (July 1, 1971), 
p. 47, and for 1969 from "AHA · Research Capsules No. 5," Hospitals, vol. 46 
(March 1, 1972). The data for 1968 and 1969 were obtained from a survey of 
hospitals and underestimate the total value of hospital construction. The researchers 
asked for percent of total construction costs covered by federal grants, not 
necessarily Hill-Burton grants. The Hill-Burton grants program is, however, by far 
the most important federal grant program. 
Medical facilities data.were obtained directly from the Hill-Burton agency. 
Taken from: Judith Lave and Lester Lave, The Hos1ital Constru 
Act: .An Evaluation of the Hill-Burton Pro ram: 948-1973 
Washington, D.·c.: AEI , 197 4 ,p. 1 • 
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Further impetus was given to the movement toward the 
expansion of local health planning efforts in 1966. This 
movement was motivated, not only by concern about the provision 
of hospital services specifically, but also the improvement of 
health services general ly. Greater emphasis was placed on the 
need for a more centralized approach to health planning, in the 
wake of the rapid escalation of public-sector health care costs. 
Thus the Comprehensive Health Planning Act of 1966 (CHP) (P.L. 
89-749), was passed as an amendment to the Public Health Service 
Act. Also passed at about the same time was the Heart Disease, 
Cancer, and Stroke Act (P.L. 89-239). The passage of P.L. 89-
239 was prompted by recommendations of the President's Commission 
on Heart Disease, Cancer and Stroke. This Commission advocated 
the regionalization of medical services in an effort to combat 
these and other diseases. Each region was to be centered around 
a major university medical facility, which was to serve as the 
regional focal point for medical research and care. Fifty-six 
regions were created nationwide, and were sponsored by university 
institutions, non-profit organizations, and medical societies . 51 
However this program was largely overshadowed by the CHP . 
The primary intent of the CHP was to deve lop local health 
planning programs according to local and regional needs, subject 
51sudrys, pp. 16-17. 
to federal approval. 52 By passing this law, Congress hoped to 
address some of what it perceived to be inadequacies, such as 
lack of comprehensive health services coordination, and poor 
intergovernmental cooperation. To that end, the Act provided 
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for the establishment of a system of regional areawide planning 
agencies, statewide agencies, and a national advisory counci1.53 
The decision to create areawide agencies that did not conform to 
existing political boundaries was an acknowledgement that health 
related problems did not conform to political boundaries.54 
The areawide planning agencies were intended to be 
independent of other local political institutions. They were 
essentially independent, non-profit corporations, which were 
largely dependent upon federal funding. The areawide agencies 
received at least one-third but not more than two-thirds of their 
funding from the federal government, depending upon the area's 
per capita income.55 The rest of the money came from local 
sources, often hospitals themselves. 56 
52 West Publishing co., U.S. Comprehensive Health Planning 
and Public Health Service Amendments of 1966,U.S. Congressional 
and Administrative News, 89th Congress, 2nd session, vol. 3, p. 
3832. 
5342 u.s.c.A. sec. 246. 
54west Publishing co., Comprehensive Health Planninq and 
Public Health Service Amendments of 1966,p. 3833. 
55 Arthur Jacobs and Richard Froh, "Significance of PL 89-
749 and Comprehensive Planning," New England Journal of Medicine 
279 (12 December 1968) p. 1315. 
56Budrys, pp. 52-53. 
During the early years of the CHP program,lawmakers and 
health officials paid a great deal of attention to the 
composition of the state and areawide policy-making boards. 
Budrys asserts that the social agitation for greater political 
participation during the late 1960's was a factor in the 
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stipulation that consumers be represented on the areawide 
councils.57 Lewi observed that lawmakers made a conscious effort 
during the 1960's to include ordinary citizens and the poor in 
the political process.SS While there were concerns that consumers 
might be intimidated by providers, due to consumers' lack of 
expertise, there were also fears that health care professionals 
might feel threatened by apparent challenges to their expertise 
and interests.59 In spite of these concerns, however, there 
appears to have been a conscious effort by Congress to create a 
planning system based on group participation as part of a larger 
political movement to expand participation in the political 
process. 
Before long, interagency conflicts surfaced at the state and 
local levels of government, involving the areawide agencies. In 
many states, planning under the CHP was subordinate to the state 
health department's overall planning agenda. Other states placed 
57Budrys, pp. 52-53. 
58Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Co., 1969), p. 69. 
59william Curran, "Present at the Creation: Health Planning 
and the Inevitable Reorganization," Health Care Management (1) 1 
January 1976), p. 35. 
CHP responsibility within the domain of comprehensive state 
planning agencies. Disputes often arose between state health 
departments and the planning bodies.60 
While state and local government relations were, at times, 
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tense, the federal government also added to the confusion. Under 
the CHP, federal authorities were inclined to place greater 
emphasis on the needs of metropolitan areas, so as to maximize 
the impact of its support. However metropolitan areas frequently 
experienced difficulty in organizing their local planning 
efforts, and in raising the necessary share of local funds. This 
difficulty may be attributed to a lack of commitment to health 
planning among various groups, especially in light of vague goals 
and limited federal funding.61 
Impact of the Comprehensive Health Plan on Hospitals 
In addition to the problems noted above, there were a number 
of other factors that combined to mitigate the impact of the CHP 
on hospital planning and regulation. Vague federal guidelines 
hampered the efforts of the areawide agencies. Indeed, federal 
officials of the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare still did not feel that the states 
and localities had the capacity to plan effectively; a fact which 
60curran, pp. 36. 
61symond R. Gottlieb, "A Brief History of Health Planning 
in the United states" in Regulating Health Facilities Construction, 
Clark c. Havighurst, ed. (Washington, D.C. : American Enterprise 
Institute, 1974), p. 21. 
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resulted in the stipulation that these agencies be established on 
a voluntary basis, and that their approval of projects was not 
mandatory.62 This weakened the areawide agencies' authority 
considerably. That lawmakers and health officials focused much 
of their attention on the structural aspects of the CHP program 
diverted attention away from the specification of health planning 
activities and goals.63 
Relations between health facilities and the area CHP 
agencies were often close. However, the areawide agencies' 
control over the supply and distribution of health facilities was 
essentially limited to the allocation of Hill-Burton funds to 
applicants. It will also be recalled that these agencies were 
partially dependent upon local funding sources, many of whom were 
hospitals. This dependency provided a major justification for 
health facilities to strengthen ties with the area CHP agencies. 
Additional factors that diluted the impact of this law were the 
dominance of providers on the planning boards, and the absence of 
sanctions against those who violated areawide health planning 
decisions.64 
While it would be tempting to conclude that the 
Comprehensive Health Planning Act of 1966 was largely 
ineffectual, certain factors should be borne in mind. In 
addition to poorly articulated federal guidelines, a frequent 
62curran, p. 34. 
63Gottlieb, p. 19. 
64Joskow, p. 78. 
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criticism was that federal funding for the area and statewide 
agencies was woefully inadequate, given the enormity of the 
task. 65 That there was little federal interest in area health 
planning efforts also hindered the CHP.66 Finally, it should be 
realized that the CHP was not intended to supplant existing 
planning efforts, such as the Hill-Burton program. Rather, it 
was to provide a means for the imposition of order in the 
provision of health care services.67 Thus, the focus of this 
legislation was still on the provision of adequate health 
services for as great a number of people as possible. 
However the rapid escalation of public outlays for health 
care toward the end of the 1960's raised the issue of health care 
cost control. The growing concern over health expenditures, 
especially incurred under the Medicaid and Medicare programs, 
provided the impetus for the passage of the Social Security Act 
of 1972 {PL 92-603).68 Of particular relevance to the hospital 
sector was section 1122 of this act. This legislation provided 
for an optional mechanism for the review of hospital capital 
expenditures, under the belief that unnecessary capital 
expenditures were at least partly to blame for the rapid rise in 
medical costs. Those services not receiving prior approval from 
65curran, p. 35 
66Joskow, p. 78. 
67Budrys, p. 18. 
68social security Act of 1972,(P. L. 92-603) Statutes at 
Large vol. 86, Title III, p. 1386 (1972). 
29 
area and statewide health planning agencies were denied capital 
cost reimbursement for services rendered under the auspices of 
the Medicare, Medicaid, and Maternal and Child Health programs.69 
States were still not required to adopt section 1122. 
By the late 1960's a relatively new regulatory and planning 
scheme was emerging at the state level that would ultimately 
influence national health care cost control efforts - especially 
hospital costs. This new regulatory scheme came to be known as 
the certificate of need. By the early 1970's fifteen states had 
already enacted their own certificate of need statutes. 70 
Discussion of Certificate of Need 
General nature and scope 
Certificate of need (CON) is a mechanism by which 
government may control the supply, cost, quality, and 
distribution of health facilities, their services and equipment. 
Such control is maintained by requiring prior approval from a 
regulatory/planning agency for any construction of new 
facilities, modifications to existing facilities, purchases of 
equipment, or addition of new services,the cost of which exceeds 
a statutorily prescribed threshold, or expands the bed capacity 
of existing facilities beyond a threshold. Those projects that 
69social security Act of 1972, sec.282, PP· 1386-1388. 
70chayet and Sonnereich, P.C., Certificate of Need: An 
Expanding Regulatory concept (Washington, D. c. : Medicine in 
the Public Interest, 1978), p. 5. 
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do not meet or exceed the statutory threshold are not required to 
undergo review. CON is a regulatory mechanism with which health 
officials strive to achieve health planning goals. 
All of this is not to say that a great deal of uniformity 
has existed among the various state CON programs. Initially, CON 
laws applied to hospitals, nursing homes, diagnostic 
laboratories, and outpatient clinics.71 However the breadth of 
coverage generally expanded over time, covering a wider range of 
facilities. 
Since these CON reviews are regulatory in nature, and occur 
in a planning setting, the process is one in which various groups 
have a voice in the approval and disapproval of projects.72 
As shall be seen shortly, this fact forms the basis for one of 
the central criticisms of the CON process. 
Theoretical perspectives 
At the heart of the debate over the merits of the 
certificate of need process is the question of whether health 
care resources would be most equitably, efficiently, and 
inexpensively allocated in a market setting, or in the 
regulatory/planning arena. In a free-market setting, consumers 
would be able to choose from among various providers and 
71oavid s. Salkever and Tim w. Bice, Hospital Certificate-
of Need Controls: Impact on Investment, Cost and Use (Washington, 
D. c. : American Enterprise Institute, 1978), p. 5. 
72salkever and Bice, p. 5. 
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services, based on their individual needs and resources. In a 
regulatory or planning setting, individual choice is reduced, as 
the regulatory or planning process becomes the arbiter for 
reconciling the differences between competing interests. 
Proponents of the certificate of need process argue that, 
unlike many goods and services, medical services do not respond 
to traditional market forces. The existence of substantial 
third-party payment systems, which rest on cost-based 
reimbursement is said to insulate hospitals and health facilities 
from the consequences of inefficient, uneconomical, or 
ineffectual investment decisions.73 It has also been postulated 
that the mere existence of hospital beds and sophisticated 
technology generates its own demand - the so-called "Roemer 
effect. 11 74 In their attempts to lure physicians' services, 
hospitals have become overly concerned with facility size and the 
acquisition of extravagant services and equipment. 75 This 
insulation of hospitals and health facilities from market forces 
provides the principal rationale for certificate of need 
programs. If, through certificate of need, medical facility 
resource expansion can be controlled, then government officials 
would be able to check the unwarranted growth of facility 
73clark c. Havighurst, Deregulating the Health Care In-
dustry, Planning for Competition (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Co., 
1982), p. 54. 
74c1ark c. Havighurst, "Regulation of Health Facilities and 
Services By Certificate of Need," Virginia Law Review 59 (October 
1973), pp. 1158-1159. 
75Havighurst, "Regulation of Health Facilities," p. 1162. 
resources, and thereby exert some measure of control on medical 
facility care costs. 
Advocates of CON hope that certificate of need programs 
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will address these deficiencies. By placing the authority for 
the location of health facilities and services within the public 
policy arena, health care providers should become more sensitive 
to consumers' needs, and the needs of the community as a whole. 
Regulatory control over the supply of facilities and services may 
result in the more efficient use of existing facilities, by 
rationing them to the neediest patients, and providing incentives 
for other consumers to utilize less expensive alternatives.76 
Even opponents of the CON process concede that resources would be 
diverted away from poorly conceived, or unnecessary plans.77 In 
essence, then, proponents of CON regulation and planning argue 
that the political arena will allocate health facilities and 
services more efficiently and equitably than an unfettered free 
market. 
However, it is the political nature of the CON process that 
its opponents find most disturbing. There is an implicit 
assumption in the arguments for certificate of need that the 
political arena will gravitate toward optimal solutions. 
However, dominance by health care providers, and the incremental 
nature of the political bargaining process would supposedly 
result in the maintenance of the status quo; or at best, 
76salkever and Bice, pp. 11-13. 
77Havighurst,"Regulation of Health Facilities," p. 1221. 
incremental changes.78 
An even more fundamental criticism of the CON process is 
that it combines two mutually incompatible tasks - planning and 
regulating. Planning is said to require the "authoritative use 
of authority, law, choice, priorities, and moralities 11 ,79 while 
"regulation is a political process involving political actors 
seeking political ends. 11 80 If CON agencies become dominated by 
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health care providers, they may become overly concerned with the 
welfare of existing providers, or "captured 11 .8l If this were to 
occur, new providers could experience difficulty in entering the 
market, and regulators/planners may lose sight o f the public 
interest. 
In addition to concerns about the political ramif ications of 
the CON proces s, there are also concerns about the costs that 
this mechanism imposes. Perhaps the most obvious cost is that 
which is incurred in the administration of the program. Project 
delays resulting from the various stages of the CON process are 
said to inhibit the rate of technological innovation, and the 
responsiveness of providers to changes in market forces will be 
reducea.82 These arguments depict a cumbersome, stifling,and 
78Havighurst, 11Regulation of Health Facilities," p. 1215. 
79Havighurst, "Regulation of Health Facilities," pp. 1197-
1198. 
80Kenneth J. Meier, Regulation: Politics, Bureaucracy, and 
Economics (New York: St. Martin's, 1985), p. B. 
8lsalkever and Bice, pp. 14-15. 
82Havighurst,"Regulation of Health Facilities," pp. 1221-1225. 
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sluggish process whose potential for rationalizing the health 
care industry would seem to be outweighed by inhibitive effects 
on health care. However, as shall be seen below, certificate of 
need did indeed become a part of the public health policy fabric 
of this country. 
Emergence of Certificate of Need 
The emergence of the certificate of need was not the result 
of a momentous piece of federal legislation. Instead, it was the 
product of a movement at the state level in the late 1950's 
toward health planning with regulatory sanctions. The 
culmination of this early movement was the passage of the 
Mccloskey-Metcalf Act of 1964 by the New York legislature. This 
law required mandatory certificate of need approval prior to any 
new construction, renovation, or modifications to new or existing 
hospitals or nursing homes. In making decisions on CON 
applications, the Health Commissioner was to consider the 
availability of alternatives, the possibility of joint ventures, 
and existing utilization rates.83 
At its inception, certificate of need was warmly received 
by medical and political leaders. Regulating hospitals and 
health facilities was regarded as a stabilizing influence, and a 
means of assuring the orderly development of physical plants and 
83Edward H. Forgotson, "1965: the Turning Point in Public 
Health Law," American Journal of Public Health 57( June 1967) p. 
942. 
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equipment.84 Certificate of need was also regarded as a radical 
departure from prior concepts related to the organization and 
regulation of health services,85 since many governmental 
interventions in health care were organized to combat specific 
diseases or conditions. 
Certificate of need gathered momentum during the late 
1960's. In 1968 and 1969 Connecticut, Rhode Island, California, 
and Maryland also enacted CON statutes.86 The spread of the 
certificate of need concept was largely due to increasing concern 
over the growth of state health care budgets.87 However CON was 
hardly met with unbridled enthusiasm within the health planning 
community. Some health planners feared that this regulatory 
scheme would result in a litigious atmosphere, as providers and 
consumers would contest agency decisions. Of equal concern was 
the idea that this process would divide the agencies' attention 
between planning and regulation.88 In spite of these concerns, 
however, the movement toward a new health planning and regulatory 
apparatus featuring CON continued to grow. 
By the late 1960 1 s, changes in the utilization of health 
care began to emerge. Ambulatory (outpatient) facilities became 
increasingly popular with consumers. Tensions had also been 
84Forgotson, p. 942. 
85Forgotson, p. 943. 
86Havighurst, p. 1151. 
87salkever and Bice, PP· 4-5. 
88salkever and Bice, pp. 4-5. 
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growing between urban and rural areas over the allocation of 
Hill-Burton funds. As a result of these changes in the health 
care environment, Congress amended the Hill-Burton Act in 1970. 
These amendments stipulated that impoverished areas, and requests 
for assistance in the construction of diagnostic and ambulatory 
facilities be given the highest priority.89 
Changes were also occurring within the CHP and RMP programs. 
In 1970, Congress enacted legislation that encouraged 
"cooperative arrangements" between these two programs, by 
permitting the CHP agencies to review RMP proposals.90 There 
seems to have been an effort to consolidate these programs by 
allowing the CHP to, at least partially, absorb the RMP. 
However the impression that these programs were not 
effectively addressing the health facility cost, accessibility, 
and quality issues become more evident to members of Congress. 
In 1972, the Government Accounting Office and the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) concluded that federal 
guidelines and oversight efforts of the CHP agencies needed to be 
intensified, and the staffing and funding levels of these 
agencies needed to be increased. 91 Presidential regard for the 
89Public Health Service Act Amendments, Statutes at Large 
vol. 84 Title I, sec. 101-102, p.337 (1970). 
90west Publishing Co., National Health Planning and Resources 
Development Act of 1974, U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative 
News, vol. 4, 93d Congress, (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 
1974)' p. 7854. 
9lwest Publishing co., National Health Planning and Resources 
Development Act of 1974, pp. 7852-7853. 
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RMP was clearly on the wane, when, in preparing his budget for FY 
1974, President Nixon failed to request renewed funding for the 
RMP. Although Congress appropriated funds sufficient to continue 
the program into 1974, HEW recommended phasing out the RMP in 
1975.92 
These events suggest that federal policy-makers were 
becoming increasingly cognizant of the problems in the health 
care industry, and particularly, the hospital sector. Even 
though programs existed to correct the imbalances and 
inadequacies within the hospital industry, it had become clear to 
Congress that these measures alone would be insufficient. A 
renewed emphasis in Congress was placed on the creation of a 
strong, centralized planning and regulatory apparatus to correct 
deficiencies within the health care industry. The stage was set 
for the creation and enactment of the next major piece of heal1 
legislation. 
The National Health Planning and Resources Development 
Act of 1974 
The effort to create a newer, stronger health planning and 
regulatory apparatus attracted support in both houses of 
Congress. In fact, both the House and the Senate passed similar 
bills that had to be reconciled in conference committee. 93 The 
92west Publishing co., National Health Planning and Resources 
Development Act of 1974, p. 7854. 
93 Curran, p. 38. 
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final outcome was the National Health Planning and Resources 
Development Act of 1974 (PL 93-641). 
The legislative history of P. L. 93-641 suggests that many 
of the concerns mentioned above surrounding the provision of 
health care in this country impelled Congress into action. While 
bills were introduced in each house of Congress, it was the 
Senate version that was finally adopted. The Senate Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare's fundamental justification for this 
legislation was the concern that"··· the health care industry 
does not respond to marketplace forces. 11 94 The highly technical 
nature of health services, the prominence of third-party payers, 
and the notion that high-technology services create their own 
demand, all contributed to the Committee's finding. While a 
longer-term trend toward increased use of outpatient facilities 
was evident, the Committee was alarmed by more recent indications 
of a reversal of this trend.95 Economic factors clearly played a 
major role in prompting Congress to take this legislative action. 
Added to the economic arguments for new legislation, was the 
acknowledgement of the shortcomings of previous federal 
legislative efforts in this area. The inadequacies in health 
planning activities at the time were attributed to vague 
congressional mandates, insufficient funding, and inadequate 
implementation authority. Also, a number of evaluative studies 
94west Publishing Co., National Health PLanning and Resources 
Development Act of 1974, p. 7878. 
95west Publishing co., National Health Planning and Resources 
D.evelopment Act of 1974, pp. 7897-7898. 
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conducted during the late 1960's and early 1970's provided 
evidence of rising health care costs.96 While all of these 
factors provided the most conspicuous justifications for renewed 
legislation, members of Congress had also hoped that a strong 
national health planning system might ultimately lead to a 
national health insurance program.97 Health care was once again 
a national issue. 
As enacted, PL 93-641 provided for a three-tier health 
planning system that was to control the distribution, quality, 
and cost of health facility services, in addition to coordinating 
a variety of other health activities. Agencies were created at 
the federal, state, and regional levels to perform these 
functions. This new plan supplanted the Comprehensive Health 
Plan, Regional Medical Plan, and the Hill-Burton Act.98 P. L. 
93-641 also altered the conception of the health care problems by 
declaring that its purpose was to ensure "equal access to quality 
health care at a reasonable cost. 11 99 This marked the first time 
that health care costs had factored explicitly into federal 
health planning legislation. 
The legislation even went so far as to establish a list of 
96Budrys, pp. 56-59. 
97west Publishing co., National Health PLanning and Resources 
Development Act of 1974, p. 7879. 
98west Publishing co., National Health Planning and Resources 
Development Act of 1974, pp. 7842-7843. 
99National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 
1974, Statutes at Large, vol. 88, pt. 2, sec. 2, p. 2226 (1974). 
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national health priorities. A review of these priorities reveals 
that the emphasis on meeting the basic health needs of those 
citizens in economically depressed areas was still a major 
concern to Congress. For instance, the statute specifically 
identifies the provision of medical services for rural or 
economically depressed areas.100 There was also considerable 
interest in consolidating and coordinating existing health 
resources through voluntary arrangements between institutions, 
promoting preventive education, the training of physicians' 
assistants, and the establishment of a geographically-centered 
strata of health activities. This appears to have been a major 
effort to construct a unified health planning system. 
In order to achieve such a goal, the law created a three-
tiered planning system. At the national level, the National 
Council on Health Planning and Development was created to advise 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare(HEW) on matters 
pertaining to the development and implementation of national 
guidelines.101 The Council's function was largely advisory, 
since policy-making authority was vested in the HEW Secretary. 
Council membership included federal officials (all non-voting 
members), health providers, areawide agency representatives, and 
representatives of the state Health Coordinating Councils. There 
seems to have been an effort to create a body representative of 
lOONational Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 
1974, sec. 1502, p. 2227. 
101National Health Plannina and Resource Development Act of 
1974 sec. 1503, p. 2228. 
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the national health care community. By mandating a diverse 
membership for the commission, Congress realized that health care 
concerns affect people in different settings and people are 
affected by health care issues in many different ways. 
At the state level, the Act contained provisions for 
creating a policy-making body and an advisory body. The governor 
in each state were authorized to designate State Health Planning 
and Development Agencies (SHPDA), which were governmental bodies 
charged with administering state plans pertaining to the quality, 
cost, and distribution of health facilities, and to gather and 
analyze data from the areawide agencies. These state plans were 
to be submitted annually to the HEW Secretary for approva1.102 
This law established a system of accountability to the federal 
government by authorizing the HEW Secretary to withhold federal 
health planning funds until he had received and approved each 
state health plan. 
The SHPDAs were assisted in their tasks by the State Health 
Coordinating Councils (SHCC). These councils served in an 
advisory capacity, and were comprised of health care providers 
and consumers from within the state, as well as representatives 
from each areawide agency within the state.103 The SHCCs were 
responsible for annually reviewing and coordinating Annual 
Implementation Plans so as to realize the goals set forth in the 
102National Health Planning and Resource Develo2ment Act of 
1974, sec. 1523, p. 2246. 
103National Health Planning and Resource Develo2ment Act, 
1974, sec. 1524, p. 2248. 
42 
State Health Plan.104 Essentially then, two statewide bodies 
were created to review and coordinate area plans, so as to affect 
a balanced statewide health resources plan. 
At the focal point of the new health planning system were 
205 regional health systems areas whose health plans were 
developed by health systems agencies(HSA). These areas did not 
necessarily conform to existing political boundaries, except in 
the case of some of the larger metropolitan areas. Instead, the 
health systems areas were drawn by the governor of each state to 
conform to the geographic characteristics of each state, just as 
the areawide agencies under the CHP had been. 
Congress intended that the HSA's assume the place of the CHP 
areawide agencies. However, the governor of each state was given 
the authority to alter these boundaries if it were deemed 
necessary to do so.105 HSA boundaries were drawn to include from 
one-half to three million people, and a major medical 
facility.106 HSAs were charged with developing five-year Health 
System Plans, as well as yearly Annual Implementation Plans, 
based on a survey of the area's health care needs and 
104National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 
1974, sec. 1524 (b) (2) (A), p. 2248. 
105west Publishing Co., National Health PLanning and Resources 
Development Act of 1974, p. 7883. 
106National Health Planning and Resources Development Act 
of 1974, sec. 1511 (a) (3), p. 2232. 
resources.l07 HSAs were conceived as public or private, non-
profit entities that were independent of any other political 
body, and whose sole purpose was health planning.108 congress 
did not want the HSAs to become co-opted by local or state 
governments. 
Each HSA was supported by a professional staff .109 The 
statute provided for governing bodies in each HSA, ranging in 
size from fifteen to thirty members, to oversee the individual 
HSA's operation.llO In some respects, then, the new program 
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retained some of the features of the CHP program. However, there 
were important differences. The most important difference was 
the provision for certificate of need program. CON was intended 
to be a tool with which to achieve state health plans. 
Therefore, Congress vested authority for administering state CON 
programs in the SHPDA.111 Approvals or denials of CON requests 
were to be made within the context of each area plan, and the 
penalties for violating CON decisions were left up to the states. 
Failure to enact a CON statute would result in the HEW Secretary 
withholding federal funds for health programs. By allowing for 
107National Health Planning and Resources Development Act 
of 1974, sec. 1513 (b) (2), p. 2236. 
108National Health Planning and Resources Development Act 
of 1974, sec. 1512 (b) (1)-(2), p. 2232. 
l09curran, p. 40. 
llONational Health Planninq and Resources Development Act 
of 1974, sec. 1512 (b) (3), p. 2232. 
lllNational Health Planning and Resources Development Act 
of 1974, sec. 1523 (b) (4) (A), p. 2246. 
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the imposition of sanctions, and by threatening to withhold 
federal funds, Congress sent a message that the health care 
industry's problems had become too severe to allow for laxity. 
While the new health program was not mandatory, states had to be 
willing to forego federal assistance if they chose not to 
participate in the health planning program. 
Whereas the federal guidelines under the CHP were vague, 
general standards for the construction and maintenance of 
facilities and equipment, and for triggering the CON review 
process were more explicit. Initially, a threshold of $150,000 
for capital projects, or a ten percent change in bed supply were 
established for triggering the CON review process.112 States 
were free to strengthen these standards by lowering the 
thresholds, but were not allowed to raise them. 
As was the case with the CHP, the composition of the various 
planning boards attracted much attention. Once again, Congress 
feared provider dominance on these committees. To address this 
issue, Congress stipulated that there be consumer majorities on 
all HSA and SHCC boards. "Providers" were defined as any medical 
care provider, or anyone receiving at least ten percent of their 
income from a provider.113 Provider dominance was one of the 
oft-cited weaknesses of the CHP program. Providers were still 
fearful of a loss of autonomy under the new health planning 
112Budrys, p. 20. 
113National Health Planninq and Resources Development Act 
of 1974, sec. 1512 (b) (3) (A), p. 2232. 
program, however.114 In fact, medical interest groups lobbied 
Congress quite heavily on substantive and structural issues, 
such as HSA governing board composition.115 
Another departure from the CHP relates to funding. Under 
the CHP, area agencies were partially dependent upon private 
sources for their funding, often resulting in hospitals 
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supporting the very bodies that were responsible for local health 
planning. Under PL 93-641, HSAs could still get private sector 
funding. However, the new law precluded them from receiving funds 
from individual or institutional providers.116 The Act 
established federal funding for HSAs at a minimum grant of 
$175,000 and a maximum grant of $3,750,000 per HSA, depending 
upon the population of the HSA.117 HSAs were to be as free as 
possible from undue provider influence, in terms of funding as 
well as membership. 
P.L. 93-641 was intended to address many of the perceived 
deficiencies that had existed in prior health planning 
legislation. State and local health officials had made Congress 
aware of many of the problems that existed in the provision of 
114curran, p. 42. 
115G. Gregory Raab, "National/State/Local Relationships in 
Health Planning: Interest Group Reaction and Lobbying," in Institute 
of Medicine, Health Planning in the United States: Selected 
Policy Issues, vol. 2, (Washington, D.C.: National Academy 
Press, 1981), p. 122. 
116National Health Planning and Resources Development Act 
of 1974, sec. 1512 (5), p. 2235. 
117National Health Planning and Resources Development Act 
of 1974, sec. 1516, p. 2241. 
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health care, and especially health facility services. Rather 
than let one level of agencies assume all of the burden, respon-
sibility was shared among federal, state, and local health 
planning bodies. This division of responsibility in pursuit of a 
national health planning agenda marked yet another milestone in 
the development of American health and health facility planning 
as all three levels of government and the quasi-public HSAs 
collaborated and cooperated to form a national health planning 
program. 
Conclusion 
Public sector intervention in the provision of health care 
facilities and services underwent a number of phases in this 
century. Each phase represented a change in the way in which 
policy-makers and interested groups perceived the deficiencies 
within the hospital and health facility industry at a given time. 
Initially the problem was simply characterized as inadequate 
health facility resources. The subsequent legislative response 
was a major infusion of medical facility construction funds. 
Some twenty years later lawmakers redefined the relevant 
issues. Health facility resources were still considered 
inadequate. However, the issue of health facilities resources 
was placed within the context of health planning generally, as 
consumers began to change their utilization patterns. 
The locus of medical facility planning and construction 
assistance activity also shifted over time. Private sector 
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philanthropic organizations and voluntary hospital planning 
bodies defined early hospital planning and construction efforts. 
During the war years, the federal government assumed the leading 
role in hospital sector activity as large amounts of federal 
funds were allocated for medical facility construction. The 
Hill-Burton Act represented the first governmental attempt to 
provide an orderly hospital planning and construction system. 
Amendments to the Hill-Burton Act in the 1960's, and the federal 
Comprehensive Health Planning Act gave new credence to the notion 
of comprehensive health planning at the local level, although the 
CHP's implementation was hampered by such factors as vague 
federal guidelines, and minimal federal funding. Section 1122 
and the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 
1974 provided a health planning enforcement mechanism through 
certificate of need and concentrated health planning and 
regulatory authority at the state level. 
The evolution of the certificate of need helped to reshape 
the public policy debate once again. People were no longer 
solely concerned with the quality and distribution of hospitals 
and health facilities. Health care costs had become a major 
factor by the late 1960 1 s. In an effort to restrain these 
escalating expenditures, and to impose a sense of order and 
stability on the health care industry, Congress included a 
certificate of need provision, as part of a national health 
planning program. states developed their own certificate of need 
programs within federal guidelines. 
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It is beyond the scope of this study to examine CON programs 
in all of the states. Therefore the remainder of this paper 
shall be devoted to an examination of Virginia's CON program from 
its inception to the present. 
CHAPTER 2 
ENACTMENT OF VIRGINIA'S CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC NEED LAW 
The high cost of health care began to overshadow concern for 
the provision of health care during the late 1960's. With the 
implementation of Medicare and Medicaid, federal health 
expenditures rose dramatically from approximately $40.5 billion 
in 1965 to $71.5 billion in 1970.1 Expenditures for these 
programs helped shift public discussion away from simply the 
provision of health care, toward health care cost containment. 
Concern over the high cost of health care was not limited to the 
federal government. 
State governments also served as forums for public discourse 
relating to health care costs. Not only was there an increase in 
public expenditures, but also in the sums spent by individuals 
and private insurers. Private sector expenditures, including 
direct, out-of-pocket expenditures and health insurance benefits, 
rose from $27.47 billion in 1965 to $40.4 billion in 1970.2 It 
was in this environment that the Virginia General Assembly 
confronted the issue of high medical costs in the Commonwealth. 
Although not intended by Virginia lawmakers to deal 
lu.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical 
Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to the Present 
pt. 1, Series B 221-235, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 1975) p.73. 
2 Bureau of the Census, series B 236-247, p. 74. 
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exclusively with health care costs, or to be the sole instrument 
with which to comb~t high medical costs, certificate of need 
(CON) was one of a number of public policies designed to address 
problems within the health care industry. Utilizing the existing 
health planning administrative framework, certificate of need was 
incorporated into the health planning system, with authority con-
centrated in the Virginia Health Commissioner's office. 
The Commission to Study Prepaid Health Care Plans 
and Costs of Medical, Surgical, and Hospital Services 
The operations of Virginia Blue Cross gained national 
attention in 1971. In January 1971 the U. s. Senate Judiciary 
Committee, subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly held hearings 
to investigate alleged improprieties in the operation of the 
nation's Blue cross plans. At the center of attention were 
questionable practices by officers of Virginia Blue Cross. 
Congressional investigators contended that there was considerable 
waste and mismanagement, which contributed to soaring 
administrative costs for the plan. 
Some of the practices directly involved high-ranking Blue 
Cross officials, while other abuses were of a more general 
nature. In one instance, a rental car fleet contract bid that 
was $30,000 higher than the low bid was accepted over the low 
bid. Blue Cross of Virginia also bought furniture from a company 
in which a Blue cross board member had a major financial 
interest. The subcommittee also found that Blue Cross board 
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members charged private club membership dues to Blue cross.3 
Chaired by Senator Philip Hart (D-Michigan), the 
subcommittee members also sought to discern the effect that Blue 
Cross had on hospital costs. There appears to have been a bias 
during the hearings toward the enhancement of competition. Said 
Senator Hart at the outset of the hearings:" ... the general thrust 
of these hearings is to see how competition can be put to work to 
lower the almost staggering costs, costs that went up almost 
fifteen percent last year. 11 4 Thus the subcommittee was not only 
investigating alleged improprieties at Blue Cross, but also, the 
relationship between Blue Cross and rising hospital care costs. 
Indeed, Congress may have used the administrative scandal as a 
vehicle for exploring Blue Cross' effect on health care costs. 
During the hearings, doubts were raised on the notion that 
Blue Cross played a significant role in constraining hospital 
costs. The fact that Blue Cross routinely paid whatever 
hospitals charged, and that the boards of directors of local Blue 
Cross plans were dominated by physicians and medical facility 
administrators undermined claims of cost containment potential. 
Also disclosed during the hearings was the fact that 
hospitalization costs had risen approximately thirty-eight 
3u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee 
on Antitrust and Monopoly,The High cost of Hospitalization, pt. 
2-i.. Blue Cross, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 26 January 1971, pp.31-33. 
4u.s. Congress, Senate 1971, p. 2. 
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percent over the five years prior to 1971.5 senator Hart went so 
far as to suggest that "when the Blue Cross board is heavily 
loaded with hospital-oriented representatives ••• one wonders if 
those boards can go into a bargaining session with the 
aggressiveness that consumers would expect if indeed they were 
representing the consumer. 11 6 Concern over Blue Cross practices 
was not limited to the national stage, however. 
Revelations during the Senate Subcommittee hearings about 
improprieties in the operation of Virginia Blue Cross prompted 
Virginia lawmakers to more closely examine Virginia Blue Cross. 
On January 28, 1971, Governor Linwood Holton ordered a staff 
investigation of the charges made before Senator Hart's 
subcommittee. Virginia General Assembly members were anxious to 
take action. Strong sentiment existed in both houses for 
extending the regulatory jurisdiction of the State Corporation 
Commission to include Virginia Blue Cross, and Governor Holton 
also gave this idea consideration.? 
In February, 1971, the General Assembly passed Senate Joint 
Resolution 20, This resolution created a commission "to study 
certain organizations such as Blue Cross-Blue Shield and the 
rates of insurance therefore. 11 8 There is little doubt that the 
5u.s. Congress, Senate 1971, p. 2. 
6u.s. Congress, Senate 1971, p. 263. 
7Hank Burchard and Helen Dewar, nstricter Blue Cross Control 
Proposed", Washington Post, 29 January 1971, B-1. 
8 Virginia Acts of Assembly (1971) Senate Joint Resolution 
20, p. 557. 
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General Assembly was at least partly motivated by the activities 
of Senator Hart's subcommittee. 11 ••• Recent events have raised 
serious questions as to whether such plans [Blue Cross] operate 
on an efficient and economical basis ..• 11 9. The General Assembl y 
was clearly sensitive to the notion that operational 
irregularities within insurance plans impacted upon medical 
costs, and that these costs were on the rise. 
The General Assembly regarded the stabilization of the 
health care industry as an important task. To that end, the 
Commission to Study Prepaid Health Care Plans and Costs of 
Medical, Surgical and Hospital Services (hereafter referred to as 
"the Commission") was empowered by legislators to review not only 
administrative practices, but the means by which health care 
costs were established, as well.lo The members of the General 
Assembly seemed to be sending a signal to the health care 
industry that the price increases of recent years had become 
intolerable. 
Commission membership consisted of three members from each 
house of the General Assembly, as well as three members appointed 
by the Governor, who could be state or local officeholders.11 
9virqinia Acts of Assembly (1971) Senate Joint Resolution 
20,p. 557. 
lOvirginia Acts of Assembly (1971) Senate Joint Resolution 
20, p. 558. 
llThe following individuals served on the Commission: 
Senator Edward E. Willey (D-Richmond); Senator Adelard Brault (D-
Fairfax); Senator Henry E. Howell, Jr. (D-Norfolk); Delegate 
Junie L. Bradshaw (D-Richmond); Delegate Donald Mc Glothlin, Sr. 
CD-Grundy); Delegate Richard J. Ryder CR-Annandale); E. Leo 
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The Insurance Commissioner was an ex officio member, and was 
responsible for providing support staff. A sum of $10,000 was 
appropriated from the General Assembly contingency fund to cover 
expenses. SJR 20 directed the Commission to complete its 
investigation, and to present its findings and recommendations to 
the Governor and the General Assembly by December 1, 1971.12 
Throughout 1971, the Commission held a series of meetings 
and hearings in an effort to obtain as many opinions and points 
of view as possible regarding perceived deficiencies within the 
Virginia health care industry. Present at these hearings were 
representatives of Medicare, Medicaid, Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 
private insurance companies, and health care providers.13 While 
Blue Cross was the focal point of attention, the Commission 
addressed a range of issues relating to the provision of health 
care services. 
Most of the Commission's recommendations dealt with 
enhancing consumer participation and administrative 
responsiveness with respect to health care reimbursement 
practices. These recommendations included the establishment of 
voluntary hospital rate review boards, the introduction of health 
Burton (Roanoke); Frank A. Schwalenberg (Newport News); Robert 
Carter (Richmond). 
12virginia Acts of Assembly (1971) Senate Joint Resolution 
20, p. 558. 
13virginia General Assembly, Commission to Study Prepaid 
Health Care Plans and Costs of Medical, Surgical and Hospital 
Services Therefor, The Cost and Administration of Health Care 
Services in Virginia, Senate Document No. 14, in Senate Journal 
(Richmond, Virginia: Commonwealth of Virginia, 1972) ,p. 3. 
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maintenance organizations (HMOs), the submission of quarterly 
financial statements by health insurance plans to the state 
Corporation Commission, the stipulation that consumer majorities 
exist on health care plans' boards of directors, and "the 
establishment of certification of need prior to the establishment 
or extension of hospital facilities. 11 14 Viewed in this context, 
it seems that lawmakers perceived CON as but one policy 
instrument to be implemented in a series of health policy 
initiatives intended to correct problems within the health care 
industry. The most significant of these problems was the high 
cost of medical services. 
The Commission relied upon arguments similar to those 
espoused by CON proponents, summarized in chapter 1, in reaching 
its conclusions. The central factor influencing the Commission's 
recommendations seems to have been that "in many areas of 
Virginia there are hospital beds in excess of those needed," and 
that excess beds contributed to high costs.15 The city of 
Richmond had one of the highest ratios of hospital beds to 
population in the nation at that time. The Commission found that 
excess beds were often filled with patients not requiring 
hospitalization, thereby raising the cost of care for the public 
at large. Since excess beds existed, the Commission reasoned, 
administrators and doctors had no financial incentive to release 
14commission Report, p.3. 
15commission Report, p. 8. 
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patients at the earliest possible date.16 Although the existence 
of excess hospital beds was a source of concern to commission 
members, they also seem to have been influenced by experience 
with CON elsewhere. 
Certificate of need had been implemented in a number of 
states by 1971. In its report, the Commission observed that: 
Other states have solved this problem [excess beds and 
high costs] by enacting legislation providing for certi-
fication of need prior to the establishment or ex-
pansion of hospital facilities . . . It is critical that 
Virginia enact such legislation.17 
This statement suggests that the Commission placed considerable 
weight on the experience of other states that had CON regulation. 
Certificate of need was only one of a number of measures 
promoted by the Commission to address problems within the health 
care industry. Each recommendation addressed a particular facet 
of the industry. However, all of the issues and concomitant 
recommendations revolved around the themes of greater efficiency 
and cost control in the health care industry. By this time, the 
cost of health care had begun to overshadow concerns about the 
quantity and quality of health care resources. Although created 
in the aftermath of the Blue Cross scandal, the Commission 
addressed issues well beyond the administrative improprieties at 
Blue Cross. 
16commission Report, p. 5. 
17commission Report, p. 6. 
Enactment of the Virginia Medical Care Facilities 
Certificate of Public Need Statute 
The debate in Virginia surrounding the high cost of health 
care did not take place in a vacuum. The federal Hill-Burton 
and Regional Medical Plan programs were still in existence. In 
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addition, Virginia had voluntarily implemented health planning at 
the state and regional levels as part of the federal 
Comprehensive Health Plan. All of these programs were designed 
to ensure that adequate, accessible health facilities were 
available to the public. While medical facility resource 
planning was gaining prominence under these programs, they were 
not concerned ostensibly with cost containment. 
Of course, one federal program that was concerned with cost 
containment was the federal Economic Stabilization Program. 
Price controls were established by the federal Cost of Living 
Council for a wide range of goods and services throughout the 
economy, including health care. A national Committee on the 
Health Services Industry was appointed by President Nixon to 
formulate price control guidelines that would not stifle 
innovation.18 
18c. Jackson Grayson, Chairman of the Cost of Living Council, 
Washington, D. c., letter to Governor Linwood Holton, Richmond, 
Virginia, 17 January 1971, Executive Papers, Virginia State 
Archives, Richmond. The Economic Stabilization Program was implemented 
pursuant to Title II of the Defense Production Act (Statutes at 
Large, 1970, 9lst Congress, 2nd sess., vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 799-
800), which authorized the President to sign Executive Order No. 
11615, Providing for Stbilization of Prices, Rents, Wages, and 
Salaries, u. s. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 92nd 
Congress, 1st session, 1971, vol. 2, pp. 2575-2577. 
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In spite of the federal programs in existence, Virginia 
lawmakers seized the opportunity to implement their own cure for 
the high health care costs that plagued Virginians. To that 
end, Senator Adelard Brault (D-Fairfax co.) and Senator Edward 
Willey (D-Richmond) introduced CON legislation in the Virginia 
Senate during the 1972 session. The CON bill passed the Senate 
by a vote of 24-12. Upon reaching the House of Delegates, the 
General Laws Committee voted to carry the bill over to the 1973 
session.19 
Support for CON in Virginia was widespread. Organizations 
in favor of a CON program included the Virginia Medical Society, 
Virginia Hospital Society, Virginia Nursing Home Society, 
Virginia Nurses Society, and Virginia Blue Cross-Blue Shield. 
However the Virginia Comprehensive Health Planning Council, the 
state's highest health planning council, expected opposition from 
some private physicians.20 The State Comprehensive Health 
Planning Council had itself voted unanimously to endorse CON 
legislation as early as January 1972.21 
Having passed the Senate during the previous session with 
19senate Journal (1972) vol. 1 (Richmond, VA: Commonwealth of 
Virginia, 1972), p. 485. 
20virginia Comprehensive Health Planning Council, meeting, 
Minutes, 6 December 1972 (Richmond, Virginia), p. 5. Executive 
papers of Governor Linwood Holton, Virginia State Archives, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
2lvirginia Comprehensive Health Planning Council, meeting, 
Minutes, 12 January 1972, (Richmond, Virginia), p. 6. Executive 
papers of Governor Linwood Holton, Virginia State Archives, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
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relative ease, the certificate of need bill encountered more 
strident opposition in the House. Opponents of the bill viewed 
CON as an unreasonable extension of state authority. Delegate 
Edwin H. Ragsdale (D-Richmond) felt that certificate of need 
created a monopoly for existing hospitals. Sharing this 
sentiment, Delegate George F. Allen,Jr. (D-Richmond) argued that 
there was not a problem of excess capacity, and he felt that new 
development should be encouraged. While Delegate Samuel 
Glasscock (D-Nansemond) conceded that the bill might restrict 
free enterprise, CON was still a reasonable approach "because 
empty beds drive up medical costs. 11 22 
When put to a floor vote in the House, the CON measure was 
defeated by a vote of 49-49. However, the bill was not to be 
defeated. Exerting his considerable influence as president pro 
tempore of the Senate, Senator Willey helped resurrect the 
moribund CON bill by directly confronting a number of delegates 
after the vote was taken. one of those delegates to change his 
mind was Delegate Allen, who later commented that he would have 
voted in favor of the bill initially "if I had just known it was 
the Senator's [Willey's] bill. 11 23 In the end, the measure passed 
the House by a vote of 50-44, and the Senate agreed to the House 
amendments, having already passed the measure by a margin of 23-
13. Although CON in other states tended to pit urban areas that 
22c1aude Burrows, "Deadlock Defeats Hospital Bill," Richmond 
Times-Dispatch, 16 February 1973, A-8. 
23nsenator Willey Aids House Passage of Hospital Bill", 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, 17 February 1973, B-1. 
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generally opposed CON against rural areas which favored CON, the 
voting on this bill in both houses did not reflect such a 
pattern.24 Legislators from rural and urban regions in both 
houses were rather evenly divided on the bill. 
Virginia's Original Certificate of Public Need Statute 
The enactment of the Medical Facilities Certificate of 
Public Need (COPN) law provided the Commonwealth with an 
additional policy instrument to facilitate health planning and 
constrain health care costs.25 Whereas the other health 
planning mechanisms that existed in Virginia as of 1973 were of 
federal origin, this program was a creature of the Commonwealth. 
While the General Assembly could have created an entirely new 
administrative apparatus, it did not. Instead, authority was 
vested in existing agencies created pursuant to the federal 
Comprehensive Health Plan, thereby signalling a desire to 
incorporate COPN into the existing health planning framework. 
Administrative authority under the COPN law was quite 
24 11urban" and "Rural" designations are based on 1970 U.S. 
Census Bureau data as applied to Virginia senatorial and delegate 
districts. The record of the initial House vote may be obtained 
from Journal of the House (1973) vol. 1, p. 809-810. The second 
vote in the House may be obtained from Journal of the House (1973) 
vol. 1, pp. 826-827. The roll call vote record for the Senate 
vote may be obtained from Journal of the Senate, (1973) vol. 1, 
p. 485. 
25For the purposes of this and subsequent chapters the 
acronym COPN shall refer to the Virginia certificate of public need 
program specifically, while CON shall refer to the certificate of 
need as it applies to the general concept. 
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centralized. This centralization of authority was in keeping 
with the general thrust of Virginia government reorganization 
efforts that were underway during the early 1970's.26 Virtually 
all decision-making authority was vested in the office of the 
Commissioner of Health. Statewide and areawide health planning 
bodies were given little more than advisory status. The 
Commissioner was authorized to prescribe rules and regulations, 
and to require any reports or investigations deemed necessary by 
him to administer the program. It was the Commissioner's respon-
sibility to designate a statewide body to administer the program 
at the state level. The Commissioner was also directed to 
consult with the State Comprehensive Health Planning Council and 
the Advisory Hospital Council. However these bodies could only 
perform advisory and consultative functions.27 
In contrast to the broad powers conferred upon the Health 
Commissioner, the five areawide planning councils received only 
the briefest mention in the enabling statute. The areawide 
councils were directed to provide "advice or assistance" to the 
Statewide Comprehensive Health Planning Council, which, in turn, 
26Thomas R. Morris and John T. Whelan, "Gubernatorial Management 
of State Government in Virginia," in Virginia Government and 
Politics, Thomas R. Morris and Larry Sabata, eds. (Charlottesville, 
VA: Virginia Chamber of Commerce and the University of Virginia, 
1984), p. 130. See for this piece for a more complete discussion 
of the move to consolidate gubernatorial authority in Virginia. 
27virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol. 1, ch. 419, sec. 32-
211.6 (8) (a). 
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was to render advisory recommendations to the Commissioner.28 
Responsibility for the determination of COPN applications rested 
with the Commissioner of Health. 
The scope of the initial statute was quite broad. 
Institutions which were within the purview of the COPN program 
included general hospitals, sanitaria and sanitoria, intermediate 
and extended care facilities, nursing homes, health maintenance 
organizations, and mental health and mental retardation 
facilities. However, physicians' offices and emergency first aid 
stations were specifically exempted from review.29 
Not every project undertaken by a health facility was 
subject to review. Only those projects that could legitimately 
be classified as capital expenditures were within the scope of 
the COPN program. Furthermore, a project had to have resulted in 
a capital expenditure in excess of $100,000, or a change in the 
facility's bed capacity, or a significant change in the clinical 
services offered by a facility, in order to warrant a COPN 
review.30 Taken in total, the statute's scope appears to have 
been sufficiently broad to encompass a wide range of medical 
facilities and services. 
To guide the Commissioner in reaching decisions on COPN 
28virginia Acts of Assembly:, (1973) vol. 1, ch.419, sec. 
211.7. 
29virginia Acts of Assembly:, (1973) vol. 1, ch. 419, sec. 
211.5 ( 6) • 





applications, the General Assembly enumerated seven decision-
making criteria in the statute. The Commissioner was directed to 
take into consideration the recommendation of the State 
Comprehensive Health Planning council regarding a COPN 
application, although he was not legally bound by this 
recommendation. The Commissioner was to determine that the 
proposed project would contribute to the "orderly development and 
proper distribution of adequate and effective health services in 
the area to be served. 11 31 In order to help the Commissioner 
determine the needs of the area to be served, the Commissioner 
was directed to take into account the "size, population, and 
growth of the area to be served by the proposed project. 11 32 
The final four decision-making criteria were concerned 
primarily with the integration of a proposed project with 
existing health care resources. The number and type of existing 
or planned facilities similar to the proposed project, and the 
availability of existing or planned resources which may serve as 
alternatives or substitutes to the proposal were also to be 
factored into the Commissioner's decision.3 3 
While there was considerable attention paid to existing 
health resources, the Commissioner had to determine the 
31virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol.1, ch. 419, sec. 
32-211.6 (b) 1-2. 
32virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol.1, ch.419, sec. 
211.6 (b) 3. 
32-
33virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol. 1, ch. 419, sec. 
32-211.6 (b) 4-5. 
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availability of qualified manpower to staff a prospective project 
when considering a COPN application.34 After all, there was no 
sense approving a project if qualified personnel to staff it were 
unavailable. Whereas the preceding criteria dealt with the 
proposed project's impact on the area to be served, the final 
criteria were more concerned with the project's impact at the 
statewide level. Specifically, the Commissioner was to ensure 
the "compatibility of the proposed project with the comprehensive 
State plan including the State Hospital Construction program. 11 35 
Health planning seems to have been of particular importance to 
the General Assembly. The statute placed special emphasis on the 
goal of integrating proposed projects with the existing health 
care environment. However the areawide agencies were given 
little opportunity for input into the planning process. 
Responsibility for the administration of the COPN program 
rested with the Health Commissioner. Anyone wishing to initiate 
a health facility project was required to submit an application 
to the Health Commissioner. Determining what information would 
be necessary for the completion of the application form itself 
was left to the commissioner's discretion. It was then the 
Commissioner's responsibility to see that copies of each 
application were forwarded to the State Comprehensive Health 
Planning Council (State CHP Council). The statute provided that 
34virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol. 1, ch. 419, sec. 
32-211.6 (b) 7. 
35virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol.1, ch. 419, sec. 32-
211.6 (b) 6. 
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the State CHP Council had forty-five days during which to review 
the application, and make its recommendation to the Commissioner. 
In doing so, the CHP Council was permitted to solicit "advice and 
assistance" from the area-wide health planning council in whose 
area the project was to be located. These recommendations were 
not binding on the Council or the Commissioner. Once the 
Commissioner received the CHP Council's recommendation, he was 
required to reach a decision regarding the application within 
forty-five days of receiving the CHP Council's recommendation. 
However, no more than ninety days were to elapse from the date 
the application was initially submitted until a final decision 
was rendered.36 
The centralization of administrative authority that was 
referred to earlier seems to be evident here also. The Health 
Commissioner was responsible for establishing administrative 
procedures not enunciated in the statute. Although the statute 
gave the State CHP Council the task of reviewing COPN 
applications, the Council had no authority to enforce its 
conclusions. Area-wide health planning agencies were to assist 
the CHP Council, but could only render advisory assistance. So 
as not to be unduly burdensome to applicants, a time frame of 
ninety days was established for the completion of the entire 
review process. As a result, applicants would have a definite 
timetable around which to formulate their own plans. 
36virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol. 1, ch. 419, sec. 
23-211.7. 
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Further accommodations were afforded applicants to ensure a 
fair hearing, and adequate opportunity for judicial review, if 
necessary. Hearing procedures were to be governed by the 
Virginia General Administrative Agencies Act, and the 
Commissioner was to preside over the hearings. An applicant who 
was denied an application could appeal the Commissioner's 
decision to the State Board of Health.37 If, however, an 
applicant was dissatisfied with the State Board of Health's 
ruling, there was yet another avenue of recourse. 
An applicant dissatisfied with the decisions of the Health 
Commissioner and the State Board of Health was entitled to seek 
judicial relief. In order to be eligible for appeal, an 
applicant had to file for an appeal with the Circuit Court in the 
City of Richmond, or in a circuit court whose jurisdiction 
encompassed the area where the project was to be located, within 
thirty days after receipt of the Board of Health's decision. It 
was then the Board of Health's responsibility to forward all 
appropriate papers and records to the court having 
jurisdiction.38 Upon examination of the appropriate documents 
and materials, courts were free to affirm, overturn or modify the 
Board's decision. Should a court find that sufficient need 
existed to warrant the granting of a certificate, the Health 
Commissioner was then obligated to grant a certificate. If any 
37virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol.1, ch.419, sec. 32-211.8 
38virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol.1, ch. 419, sec. 32-
211.9. 
party to the appeal wished to do so, a further appeal to the 
Virginia Supreme Court was provided for in the statute. The 
Supreme Court was the court of last resort, however.39 
Procedural fairness seems to have been a primary component 
of the original COPN statute. To the extent that certain 
administrative provisions were mandated by the Virginia General 
Agencies Act, the authors of this statute had little choice but 
to provide for administrative hearings. The COPN statute went 
much further, however, providing ample opportunities for 
judicial, as well as administrative relief. 
Of course, the certificate itself was not an ambiguous 
document, allowing for open-ended interpretations. Indeed, the 
COPN statute established very definite parameters to govern the 
form and the issuance of individual certificates. Each 
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certificate was to be valid for the specific project for which it 
was requested. Once the Health Commissioner granted a COPN, it 
was valid for a period lasting no longer than two years, at which 
time the applicant could request a renewal of the certificate.40 
Even though there were ample provisions to ensure that review 
proceedings were fair, and that certain administrative procedures 
were adhered to, the authors of this legislation took a less than 
benevolent view of those who failed to comply with the statute. 
Hence the statute also contained provisions for sanctions against 
39virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol. 1, ch. 419, sec. 
32-211.9. 
40virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol.1, ch. 419, sec. 
32-211. 11. 
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those who violated the law. Any legal entity which chose to 
undertake a project without first obtaining a COPN was guilty of 
a misdemeanor, and subject to a fine ranging from $50 to 
$1,00o.41 Upon petition by the Health Commissioner, Board of 
Health, or the Attorney General, the court having jurisdiction 
over the area where the project was to be undertaken was given 
the authority to enjoin "any project which is constructed, 
undertaken, or commenced without the required certificate of 
public need as referred to herein. 11 42 
Although the COPN statute was drafted ostensibly to control 
health facility expansion, the final section of the Act had very 
little to do with this purpose. Instead of discussing health 
facility expansion, this section addresses the issue of 
unjustifiable termination of, or exclusion from, employment of 
qualified personnel in a licensed health facility. Failure to 
provide adequate justification that the action in question was 
related to institutional rules and regulations, or the quality of 
patient care, was considered unacceptable under the statute. 
Therefore, institutions found to be in violation of this 
provision were subject to license suspension or revocation, 
pending appea1.43 That such a provision was included in a 
measure designed to regulate health facility expansion may 
41virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol. 1, ch. 419, sec.32-
211.13. 
42virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) ch. 419' sec. 32-211. 12. 
43virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) ch. 419, sec. 32-211. 16. 
possibly be attributed to efforts occurring nationally during 
this period to prohibit employment discrimination. 
Amendments to the Statute 
The original COPN statute has undergone numerous changes 
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since its enactment. Many of the amendments to the statute were 
undoubtedly the product of federal requirements stemming from the 
federal CON statute, passed in 1974. over time, the regulatory 
scope and administrative structure has been altered, as has the 
character of the decision-making process. Changes that have 
occurred with respect the decision-making process have generally 
streamlined the process while providing greater opportunities for 
input from the public than had existed under the original 
statute. 
Final authority has remained at the state level. Although 
the Health Commissioner retained decision-making authority, other 
entities were given more prominent roles. For instance, the 
General Assembly required that areawide health planning agency 
recommendations be considered by the Commissioner when rendering 
a COPN application decision. 44 In the initial statute, the 
Commissioner's consideration of these recommendations was 
optional. In 1982, the General Assembly transferred 
responsibility for the promulgation of COPN rules and regulations 
44virginia Acts of Assembly, (1975) vol. 1, ch. 220, sec. 
32-211.6-8. 
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from the Health Commissioner to the state Board of Health.45 
Beginning in 1977, the General Assembly incorporated changes 
in the COPN program that were mandated by the federal National 
Health Planning and Resource Development Act (P. L. 93-641). 
Although retaining their functions, the designation of the 
areawide health planning agencies was changed to Health Systems 
Agencies, and the geographic areas that they represented were 
henceforth referred to as Health Systems Areas, and the Statewide 
Health Cooordinating Council replaced the State Comprehensive 
Health Planning Council as the executive branch body responsible 
the statewide health and medical facilities plans.46 It was also 
the SHCC's responsibility to review and make recommendations to 
the Commissioner regarding individual COPN applications. However 
the General Assembly rescinded this vestige of responsibility in 
1984.47 A year later, the Virginia Department of Health was 
designated as the State Health Planning and Development Agency 
(SHPDA), with responsibility for administering the COPN 
program.48 The General Assembly made two attempts to 
strengthen statewide health planning capabilities by enhancing 
the tools that were at the Commissioner's disposal. In the 1977 
4 5virginia Acts of Assembly:, (1982) vol. 1, ch. 388, sec. 
32-102.2. 
4 6virginia Acts of Assembly:, (1977) vol.1, ch. 575, sec. 32-
211.5 (a) . 
47virginia Acts of Assembly:, (1984) ch. 740, sec. 32-102.6. 
48virginia Acts of Assembly:, (1978) vol.1, ch. 454, sec. 
32-211.21. 
amendment to the COPN statute, the SHCC was given the task of 
formulating the State Health Plan (SHP), and the more specific 
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State Medical Facilities Plan. Also, the standard review period 
for reaching decisions on COPN applications was extended from 90 
to 120 days.49 The number of criteria that the Commissioner used 
as a guide in determining the suitability of proposed projects 
was expanded from seven to twenty factors.50 These changes seem 
to have been designed to integrate local needs and statewide 
concerns. For instance, the relationship of a project to local 
support and ancillary services, as well as the project's 
relationship to training programs and facilities for health care 
professionals in the area, were to be taken into consideration by 
the Commissioner. 
Amendments to the original COPN statute also altered the 
scope of the COPN program. The types of facilities subject to 
COPN review were expanded in 1977 and 1982. 51 Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs) and non-profit nursing homes were also 
exempted in 1982.52 And in 1985, COPN requirements were lifted 
49virginia Acts of Assembly, (1977) vol. 1, ch. 575, sec. 
32-211.6 ( 6) • 
50virginia Acts of Assembly, (1982) vol. 1, ch. 388, sec. 
32.1-102.3 (B) • 
51virginia Acts of Assembly, (1977) vol.1, ch. 575, sec. 32-
211.5-9, 12, 17. Also, Virginia Acts of Assembly, (1982) vol. 1, 
ch. 388, sec. 32- 102.1. 
52virginia Acts of Assembly, (1982) vol. 2, ch. 659, sec. 
32.1-96.1. 
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from home health agencies.53 The capital expenditure thresholds 
for triggering the COPN review process were raised in 1977, 
1982.54 Thus while some amendments expanded the types of 
projects subject to COPN review, other amendments raised the 
thresholds and exempted certain types of projects, essentially 
restricting the program's coverage. 
Conclusion 
Certificate of need in Virginia was a policy borne of a 
perceived crisis. Skyrocketing health care costs and an excess 
of hospital beds, accentuated by questionable administrative 
practices at Virginia Blue Cross-Blue Shield helped provide the 
catalyst for change in the health care arena. Of course, public 
policies relating to the provision of health care were already in 
effect. The federal Hill-Burton program had been providing 
hospital construction funds for twenty-five years, and the 
Regional Medical Plan and the Comprehensive Health Planning Act 
established a health planning framework at the regional and 
statewide levels of implementation. 
It was within this environment that certificate of need in 
Virginia evolved. Rather than create wholly new, independent 
53virginia Acts of Assembly, (1985) vol. 1, ch. 513, sec. 
32.1-102.1 (11). 
54virginia Acts of Assembly, (1977) vol. 1, ch. 575, sec. 
32-211.5(5)., Virginia Acts of Assembly, (1982) vol. 1, ch. 388, 
sec. 32.1-102.1 (6) (a). 
planning bodies, the authors of this legislation chose to 
delegate responsibility for its implementation to the Health 
Commissioner, and to the state- and areawide health planning 
councils created pursuant to the Comprehensive Health Planning 
Act. COPN was thereby incorporated into the existing health 
planning structure. 
73 
Administratively, attention was focused at the state level. 
In fact, most of the authority was vested in the Health 
Commissioner's office through relatively broad delegations of 
authority and responsibility. This concentration of authority 
may well have been part of a larger movement occurring in 
Virginia government at the time which stressed the consolidation 
of authority at the cabinet level of government. Meanwhile, the 
areawide planning councils and the state Health Planning Council 
occupied largely advisory roles. Nonetheless, regional as well 
as statewide needs were to be taken into account when rendering a 
decision on a COPN application. If the Commissioner's decision 
regarding a particular COPN application resulted in a denial, 
there were ample provisions for appeal. These procedures were 
clearly enumerated in the statute, in contrast to the broad goals 
and delegations of authority that were to guide the program. 
Several themes are evident in this legislation. First, 
there is the emphasis on the utilization of health planning in 
the furtherance of other goals, such as cost containment. By 
doing so, the authors of this legislation lent credence to the 
stated goal of enhancing health planning capabilities in the 
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Commonwealth. Secondly, the concentration of authority at the 
state level suggests that statewide health planning goals were 
to take precedence over area needs, since the areawide agencies 
were to act only in an advisory capacity. Applicants were to be 
treated fairly, and violators of the statute's provisions were 
subject to rather small fines, although there was the potential 
for license revocation. 
In the fifteen years since its passage, the statute has been 
amended eight times. The statute that exists today has changed 
considerably from the statute as it was originally drafted. 
These alterations are reflected in a number of policies and 
procedures that differ from those in the original statute. The 
nature and implications of these changes for the implementation 
of the COPN program shall be discussed subsequently. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE VIRGINIA CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC NEED PROCESS 
With the passage of the Medical Care Facilities Certificate 
of Public Need statute in 1973, the Commonwealth of Virginia 
entered a new phase of health care policy. Certificate of Public 
Need (COPN) represented the Commonwealth's attempt to rationalize 
the health facility sector of the health care industry by 
constraining health facility development, except where it was 
deemed to be "needed." To that end, Virginia established a 
regional and statewide health planning system to gather 
information concerning state and regional health facility needs. 
These data were used at the state level to determine, within a 
regulatory environment, the efficacy of a proposed project. COPN 
provided Virginia health officials with a vehicle for controlling 
medical facility resource allocation. 
Regulation is an inherently political process. 1 By creating 
the COPN program, Virginia policy-makers transformed what had 
been largely private decisions regarding health facility projects 
into often very political decisions. Decisions as to the 
efficacy of health facility projects were no longer primarily 
private concerns. Instead, final authority regarding the 
worthiness of projects was vested in state officials (most 
notably the Health commissioner) who were required to adhere to 
1 . Meier, p.8. 
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legal and regulatory guidelines, and were often subject to 
political pressure. Also, the promulgation of rules and 
regulations provided opportunities for public input into the COPN 
process. 
The evolution of the COPN process over the last sixteen 
years has not been a tranquil period. As noted in the previous 
chapter, the original statute has been amended numerous times, 
and there have been many non-legislative changes adopted by state 
Health Department officials. Not long after Virginia enacted its 
COPN statute, the federal government enacted a national health 
planning statute (P.L. 93-641), which included a provision that 
each state create its own certificate of need program. P.L. 93-
641 provided federal funds to states for the establishment of CON 
programs, which were subject to broad federal guidelines. 
Through this federal health planning program, the federal 
government also influenced Virginia's COPN program, if only in a 
broad oversight capacity. 
Virginia's COPN program encourages public participation. 
Over the last sixteen years, the COPN process has become less 
restrictive with respect to the groups or individuals who may 
play a role in the process. Virginia politics has not always 
been characterized by openess, however. The public participation 
that legislators and health department officials incorporated 
into the COPN process coincided with a broader movement in 
Virginia politics during the early 1970's to open the political 
process to greater levels of scrutiny and participation than had 
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existed previously. 2 Health care providers, third party payers, 
business groups and governmental agencies are just some examples 
of the participants in the COPN process. The participation by 
these and other parties has helped politicize the process, and 
there are particular features of the process that are especially 
susceptible to political forces. Alford has suggested that the 
rational objectives of CON are mitigated by the political 
activity common to the regulatory process.3 The notion that 
health care should be responsive to the public's needs,4 
contributes further to the politicization of the COPN process. 
The Certificate of Public Need Process 
The COPN process that exists today is quite different from 
the process created in the original statute. Amendments to the 
statute, as well as subsequent regulatory changes adopted by 
Health Department officials have altered the complexion of the 
COPN process. These changes allowed the program to adapt to the 
evolving health care environment. 
2Thomas R. Morris, "From 'Old Virginny' to the 'New Dominion': 
Two Decades of Public Policymaking in Virginia," in A Virginia 
Profile: 1960-2000, Assessing current Trends and Problems, John 
V. Moeser, ed. (Pallisades Park, NJ: Commonwealth Books, 1981), 
p. 76. 
3Robert R. Alford, Health Care Politics (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 204. 
4virginia Department of Health, Division of Resources Develop-
ment, Certificate of Public Need Biennial Report, 1983-1984, 
(Richmond, Virginia: Virginia Department of Health, 1984), p.1. 
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When discussing the COPN process the most important thing to 
recognize is that there is not a single COPN review process. As 
it currently exists, the COPN program consists of three review 
processes, and an appeal process. The Standard Review process is 
designed to handle COPN reviews for most of the projects that 
meet the criteria for reviewability. An abbreviated 
Administrative Review process facilitates the review of projects, 
such as parking garages, which meet some, but not all of the 
criteria for a Standard Review. Then there is an Exemption 
Review process which provides COPN applicants with the 
opportunity to demonstrate that their project should not have to 
undergo a review. Figure 3.1 provides a diagrammatic overview of 
the major elements of each review process and, the time frames in 
which each review process occurs. Figure 3.1 also illustrates 
some of the procedural differences between each process. There 
is also an appeal process, which provides avenues of remedial 
recourse for those parties dissatisfied with the outcome of a 
project review. The appeal process includes provisions for 
administrative, as well as judicial relief. 
Each of the review processes operates within its own time 
frame. Due to the greater amount of time between steps in the 
process, 120 days are required to complete a Standard Review. 
Administrative and Exemption Reviews are simpler processes, 
requiring thirty-five and fifteen days, respectively, for the 
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completion of these review cycles.5 These time frames permit the 
expeditious handling of less significant projects, while 
providing considerably more time to review larger, costlier 
projects that would probably have a greater impact on the cost 
and provision of health care. While it is unnecessary to 
delineate every step of each review process, highlighting 
important stages of each review process can be helpful in 
understanding the process, and may also provide a basis for 
comparison. 
The first step in each of the review processes occurs when a 
prospective applicant files a Letter of Intent with the Division 
of Resources Development(DRD), the state agency responsible for 
administering the program. Those seeking an exemption from the 
COPN process under the Exemption Review procedure must submit an 
Exemption Review Request form to the DRD. A Letter of Intent 
must identify the owner of the facility in question, the nature 
and scope of the proposed project, the project's location and 
costs.6 The information required on the Exemption Review Request 
is much more detailed. Applicants must identify not only the 
owners of the facility, but also, the type of ownership 
(proprietary, non-profit, public, etc.), and the operator of the 
5Division of Resources Development, Certificate of Public 
Need, Annual Report 1985-1986, (Richmond, Virginia: Virginia 
Department of Health), p. 7. 
6virginia Department of Health,Division of Resources Develop-
ment, "Description of certificate of Public Need Procedures," 
Presentation to the Commission on Medical Care Facilities Certificate 
of Public Need, February 16, 1987 (Richmond: Division of Resources 
Development) pp. 1, 6. 
80 
facility. The applicant has to provide a brief description of 
the project, including its capital and financing costs, and the 
proposed method of financing the project. A statement estimating 
the project's impact on the facility's rates, and a projection of 
revenues and expenditures for the first two years of operation is 
also required. The final element of the Exemption Review Request 
is a schedule for completion of the project. 7 It should be noted 
here that both the Standard Review and the Administrative Review 
processes afford applicants the opportunity to consult with 
Health Systems Agency (HSA) or DRD officials prior to the 
submission of the application concerning community health 
facility needs, and the opportunity to provide general assistance 
in completing the applications, which are available upon request 
from the Health Commissioner. 
Once an applicant files the Letter of Intent or Exemption 
Review Request with the Health Commissioner, the application is 
completed by the applicant and submitted to the DRD for a 
completeness review. The DRD has fifteen days to make certain 
that all pertinent information has been included on the 
application.a When the application has been deemed complete, and 
it has been filed with the DRD and the appropriate HSA, the 
7"Description of certificate of Public Need Review Proced-
ures," p. 10. 
Bvirginia Department of Health, Office of Health Planning 
and Resources Development, Rules and Regulations of the Board of 
Health, Commonwealth of Virginia, Virginia Medical Facilities 
Certificate of Public Need, (Richmond, Virginia: Department of 
Health, January 22, 1986) secs. 6.1 and 7.1, respectively. 
formal review process can then begin. 
Standard Review 
The longest, most complex process is the Standard Review 
process (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). Lasting 120 days, the 
Standard Review provides ample opportunity for review at the 
state level, as well as the solicitation of public comment on 
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individual applications. After the DRD has received and approved 
the application, the applicant receives notification that the 
review is about to commence. The tenth day of each month is the 
beginning of the Standard Review cycle, and constitutes the first 
day of the 120 day process.9 
All medical care facility projects that do not qualify for 
Administrative Review are subject to a Standard Review, unless 
they are declared exempt through an Exemption Review. Facilities 
that are subject to review include general hospitals, nursing 
homes, extended care and intermediate care facilities, 
specialized out-patient clinics, mental health and mental 
retardation facilities. Projects that are subject to Standard 
Review include capital expenditures of at least $700,000 that 
also result in an increase in bed capacity and the introduction 
of new clinical health services. Equipment purchases costing at 
9virginia Department of Health,Division of Resources Development 
Virginia Medical Care Facilities Certificate of Public Need 
Program, Biennial Report, 1985 and 1986,( Virginia Department of 
Health: Richmond, Virginia, 1987), p.11. 
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least $400,000 are also subject to standard Review.10 These 
expenditure thresholds have increased substantially over time, as 
noted in chapter 2. 
The HSAs play a major role during the first sixty days of 
the Standard Review process. It is during this time period that 
the HSA must hold at least one, but not more than two hearings on 
an application, allowing applicants the opportunity to respond to 
issues or questions that individuals or medical facility 
spokesman may raise during the hearing.11 In addition to 
notifying the applicant of the review schedule, the HSA must 
notify other health care providers in the area who may be 
affected by the project, as well as identifiable interest groups. 
Notice of a hearing must be published in an area newspaper nine 
days prior to the hearing.12 The HSA has sixty days in which to 
conduct the hearing(s), review the application, and make its 
recommendation to the Health Commissioner.13 These initial 
activities constitute the HSAs' role in the process. However, 
the Commissioner does take into consideration the HSA review and 
recommendation when rendering a decision. 
Public input into the early stages of the process appears 
lOcertificate of Public Need Biennial Report 1985-1986, pp. 
6-7. 
llcertificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 7.6 
(A) • 
12certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 
7.6. (B). 
13certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 7.6(A). 
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to be confined to the public hearings. It is during these public 
hearings that conflicts often arise, to be resolved by the 
antagonists through bargaining and negotiation.14 These 
conflicts may involve competing applicants with similar project 
requests, or the conflict may be between an applicant and members 
of the HSA governing board or staff. 
While the HSA conducts its review, the DRD simultaneously 
conducts its own review. The DRD completes its staff report by 
the seventieth day of the review cycle. An important change in 
the Standard Review process came in 1984, when the statewide 
Health Coordinating Council (SHCC), which was originally 
authorized to review COPN applications was removed from the 
review cycle through an amendment in the COPN statute.15 Even 
though the removal of the SHCC had no effect on the overall 
length of the review cycle, it did seem to streamline the process 
from an administrative standpoint. 
When the DRD finishes its review, it forwards both the HSA 
report and recommendations, and the DRD report and 
recommendations to the Commissioner. If, by the seventieth day 
there is opposition to a project, an Informal Fact-Finding 
Conference (IFFC) is held by the DRD Director. The DRD notifies 
the applicant and any other interested parties of the date of the 
14orew Altman Richard Greene, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, 
I I • • 
Health Planning and Regulation: the Dec1s1on Making Process 
(Washington, n. c. : AUPHA Press, 1981), p. 150. 
15virginia Acts of Assembly, (1984) vol. 2, ch. 740, sec. 
32-102.6. 
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hearing. This date had actually been predetermined in the 
initial communication from the HSA, which allowed time for an 
IFFC in the initial review timetable. In order to participate in 
an IFFC, a party must show that: a) significant relevant 
information was not presented at the public hearing, or,b) 
significant changes in factors relating to the application have 
occurred since the public hearing, or, c) there was a serious 
mistake in fact or law in the DRD's staff report, or the HSA's 
staff report.16 
These conferences are conducted by the DRD Director. The 
HSA and Interested Parties present their positions on the 
project, and the applicant is given the opportunity to respond to 
comments and criticisms. Based on the record of this hearing, 
the DRD Director makes a recommendation to the Health 
Commissioner regarding the COPN application in question. This 
recommendation takes into account the HSA and the DRD staff 
reports, as well as the informal fact-finding conference 
record.17 Since the IFFC must be conducted between the seventy-
first and ninetieth days of the review cycle, the Commissioner 
has at least thirty days in which to arrive at a decision before 
the 120-day review period expires. Thus the IFFC provides yet 
another opportunity for public input into the Standard Review 
process by providing all parties to the original public hearing 
l6 11 oescription of certificate of Public Need Review Procedures," 
pp. 2-3. 
17 11 oescription of certificate of Public Need Review Procedures," 
p. 3. 
the opportunity to participate in the IFFC. However the 
presence of a definite timetable within which the IFFC must 
occur would seem to curb any tendency to prolong the process 
unnecessarily. 
The standard Review process provides ample time and 
opportunity for all of those who wish to comment on a COPN 
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application to do so. Marmor and Marone have suggested that time 
constraints, together with conflict, combine to make the review 
process inefficient.18 While the Standard Review cycle 
facilitates public input into the review process, this input may 
result in delays if an IFFC should be necessary. However, such 
delay is not necessarily to be condemned. Delay is inherent in 
the regulatory process as regulators try to be responsive to the 
actions of those involved.19 In the final analysis, regulatory 
delay may represent a trade-off for procedural fairness.20 
Administrative Review 
An alternative review process exists for those projects that 
meet some of the COPN review criteria, but do not meet all of the 
criteria for a standard Review. For those projects that do not 
18Theodore R. Marmor and James A. Marone, "Representing 
Consumer Interests: Imbalances Markets, Health Planning and the 
HSAs, 11 Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly/Health and Society (58) 1 
(Winter 1980), p. 160. 
19Bruce M. Owen and Ronald Braetigan, The Regulation Game 
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Co., 1978), p. 20. 
20 Meier, p. 279. 
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involve a major service, facility change, or capital expenditure, 
the Administrative Review process exists to expedite the issuance 
of COPNs (see Figures 3.1 and 3.3). 
In order to be considered under the Administrative Review 
process, certain criteria must be met. These criteria have been 
adjusted over time to reflect changes in the health care sector 
as well as inflationary trends. Projects that are eligible for 
Administrative Review include any capital expenditure of at least 
$700,000, but not more than $3 million, that does not result in a 
change in bed capacity or the addition of a new clinical health 
service. COPNs may also be issued under Administrative Review if 
the project involves a capital expenditure of less than $700,000, 
but does result in the addition of a new clinical health service, 
or if the project involves a change in bed capacity, or the 
replacement or relocation of at least ten percent of the existing 
bed capacity, or ten beds, whichever is less. 21 
The primary advantage of the Administrative Review over the 
Standard Review is that the Administrative Review is less time 
consuming. Whereas the Standard Review occurs within a 120-day 
time period, the Administrative Review lasts no more than thirty-
five days. Less time elapses between the various stages of the 
Administrative Review as compared to the Standard Review. As 
with the standard Review, applicants must request application 
forms from the Health Commissioner, and applicants may request a 
pre-consultation conference with representatives of the 
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Once the applicant has submitted copies of the application 
form to the DRD and the appropriate HSA, the Administrative 
Review can commence. Within thirty days of receipt of the 
completed application, the HSA must hold a public hearing, such 
as is required in the Standard Review process. Should the HSA 
fail to hold such a hearing within this time limit, the project 
in question shall receive an automatic recommendation for 
approval from the HSA.23 The DRD also contacts the applicant 
once the application has been received in order to establish a 
review schedule, which includes a tentative date for an IFFC. 
Assuming that there is no need for an IFFC, both the HSA and the 
DRD recommendations must be transmitted to the Health 
Commissioner by the thirtieth day of the review cycle. 24 The 
Health Commissioner then has five days in which to render a 
decision. 
If an IFFC is necessary, the decision-making timetable is 
automatically extended. The justifications for holding an IFFC 
are the same under the Administrative Review process as under the 
Standard Review process. The IFFC is usually held in Richmond, 
within seven days of the decision by the DRD that such a 
conference is warranted. The Health Commissioner then has at 
6.4. 
22certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 6.2. 
23certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 
24Biennial Report, 1985-1986, p. 10. 
least two weeks to arrive at a decision, pending the conclusion 
of the IFFc.25 
There are many similarities between the standard Review 
process and the Administrative Review process. In fact, the 
critical difference between the two processes seems to be that 
the timetable for an Administrative Review is considerably 
shorter than for a standard Review, and thus does not allow as 
much time for the consideration of a project by the Health 
Department. It also does not give opponents or advocates of a 
project as much time to marshal support or opposition to a 
project that is being reviewed under this process. Both 
processes are characterized by a great deal of communication 
between the applicant, the HSA, the DRD, and various Interested 
Parties. All of this often contributes to the need for review 
extensions and the devotion of Health Department resources to 
resolve disputes.26 
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It seems only natural that the Administrative Review period 
would be considerably shorter than the Standard Review period, 
since the projects covered by the Administrative Review are not 
as significant financially. The creation of this abbreviated 
review schedule for projects that do not involve significant 
alterations in the provision of care allows Health Department 
officials to control health facility activities that may still 
have an impact on overall facility costs, even though they do not 
25Biennial Report, 1985-1986, p.10. 
26Biennial Report, 1983-1984, p. 30. 
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involve a significant capital outlay. 
Decision-Making Criteria 
By the time a COPN application finally reaches the Health 
Commissioner's desk, a great deal of information regarding the 
proposed project is available to the Commissioner. Factors that 
the Commissioner must consider when rendering a decision are 
specified in the COPN statute and in the Certificate of Public 
Need Rules and Regulations. This list of factors has changed 
over time in response to changes in the health care environment, 
and the concerns of lawmakers and health officials. Since agency 
heads are often the focal point of group intervention, it is 
important that legislative goals and grants of authority delegate 
as much authority as possible to these individuals. 27 By 
providing a list of decision-making criteria, the General 
Assembly seems to have been cognizant of the importance of 
specific criteria. 
Initially, there were just seven factors that the 
Commissioner had to consider. These factors stressed the 
compatibility of the project with statewide health planning goals 
(identified in the state Health Plan and the State Medical 
Facilities Plan) . In fact, the Commissioner is legally bound to 
consider the state Health Plan (SHP) and the State Medical 
Facilities Plan (SMFP). It is here that all of the need 
27Meier, pp. 16-18. 
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projection methodologies and inventories of existing health care 
facility resources are contained. Also to be considered in the 
initial list of criteria were the availability of less costly and 
more efficient alternatives to the proposed project, and the 
proposed project's relationship to the facility's long-range 
plans.28 These factors seem to have been designed to facilitate 
the incorporation of the COPN program into an orderly, rational 
health planning scheme. 
In the fifteen years since the enactment of the COPN 
statute, thirteen additional factors have been added to the list 
of considerations that the Commissioner must take into account 
when reviewing COPN applications. Where the seven original 
factors stressed state and regional planning goals, more recent 
additions to the list focus on the efficacy of the project, and 
on certain specialized segments of health care, such as health 
maintenance organizations, and research-oriented projects. The 
eighteenth factor on the list is an acknowledgement of changes 
that have occurred in the financing of health care, since it 
encourages competitive forces, quality assurance, and cost-
effectiveness. 29 The emphasis on competition is especially 
significant, since competition in the health care marketplace was 
not as prominent in 1973 as it is today. In light of these 
factors it should be noted that each project is evaluated on its 
28virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) ch. 419, sec. 32-211.6 
(b) • 
29virginia Acts of Assembly, (1984) vol. 2, ch. 740, sec.32.1-
102.3 (B). 
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own merits. 30 However, the Commissioner does have some 
flexibility in the application of these criteria (particularly 
the SHP and the SMFP). The Commissioner is permitted to deviate 
from the SHP and the SMFP, but he must provide written 
justification for such departures. The Health Commissioner is 
thus afforded some latitude in reconciling COPN applications 
with these health planning documents. 
It would appear that the Health Commissioner's decision-
making criteria have evolved in response to changes in the health 
care environment. This is especially true of those criteria 
that focus on specific segments of the health care industry, 
such as reimbursement practices and specific types of health care 
services. As the health care industry became more complex, these 
criteria seem to have been altered to accommodate changes that 
were occurring. However, throughout the life of the COPN 
program, the Health Commissioner has frequently borne the brunt 
of political pressure being exerted by competing applicants and 
HSAs who try to influence his decision on a COPN application. 31 
Indeed, since he has sole decision-making authority on COPN 
applications, the political pressure may, at times, be especially 
acute. However the effects of this activity may be mitigated by 
fairly unambiguous decision-making criteria. 
30Marilyn west, Director of the Division of Resource Develop-
ment, interview by author, 21 September 1988, Virginia Department 
of Health, Richmond, Virginia. 
31west interview. 
Exemption Review 
In addition to the two review processes designed to handle 
most health facility projects, a .third review mechanism - the 
Exemption Review - is also available to review health facility 
projects that may not meet the criteria for Standard Review or 
92 
Administrative Review. The Exemption Review allows medical care 
facilities to circumvent the project review process if the 
project in question meets certain criteria, and does not meet all 
of the Standard or Administrative Review criteria. 
Projects that satisfy any of the four Exemption Review 
criteria which are specified in the Certificate of Public Need 
Rules and Regulations are eligible for a COPN exemption. 
Clinical health services involving a capital expenditure less 
than $700,000 and having operating costs in the first two years 
less than $300,000 are exempt unless they involve specialized 
services, such as CT scanning. Also exempt from the review 
process are equipment expenditures less than $700,000, unless 
this equipment results in the introduction of a new service. A 
capital expenditure less than $1.5 million for construction that 
does not result in new health services is exempt from the COPN 
review process. Finally, any capital expenditure that is 
necessary to meet an emergency situation which threatens patients 
. . . d b th c . . 32 or staff is exempt if so certifie y e ommissioner. 
32certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 
5.1 (A)-(D). 
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Compared to the Standard and Administrative Reviews, the 
Exemption Review process is very simple (see Figure 3.4). In 
order to initiate an Exemption Review, an applicant need only 
file an exemption review request with the ORD and the appropriate 
HSA. This request form must specify the name and ownership of 
the facility, the nature of the project, its costs and its effect 
on the facility's charges for services, the proposed financing 
method, projected revenues, and a timetable for the project's 
completion.33 
No hearings are required for an Exemption Review, and the 
review is conducted entirely at the state level. The ORD reviews 
the exemption request to make certain that all relevant 
information is included, and then forwards the request to the 
Health Commissioner. The Commissioner must render a decision 
within fifteen days of the initial submission of the request. 
Although the ORD forwards a copy of the review request and the 
Commissioner's decision to the appropriate HSA, the HSA is not 
actually involved in the process.34 
The Exemption Review process is much more streamlined than 
the other two review processes. However, if an exemption request 
is denied, then the applicant must file a COPN application, and 
undergo one of the two project review processes. Unlike the 
other review processes, the Exemption Review process does not 
allow for public input regarding prospective projects. This fact 
33certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 5.2. 
34certificate of Public Need Annual Report, 1985-1986, p. 9. 
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undoubtedly helps facilitate the rapid completion of Exemption 
Reviews. 
Actors in the Certificate of Public Need Process 
Over the years, the number of participants in the COPN process 
has expanded. Today there are numerous potential actors in the 
COPN process (Figure 3.5). However the roles of state and 
regional officials have remained essentially unchanged. Each HSA 
is responsible for reviewing every COPN application submitted by 
an applicant within its geographic jurisdiction, or Health 
Systems Area. The HSA reviews the application for completeness, 
and makes a recommendation as to the appropriateness of the 
proposed project. At the state level, the Division of Resources 
Development, is responsible for processing and evaluating all 
COPN applications, conducting hearings, and providing 
administrative support to the Health Commissioner, the State 
Board of Health, and the Statewide Health Coordinating Council 
(SHCC). The SHCC develops the state Health Plan and the State 
Medical Facilities Plan. 35 The State Board of Health promulgates 
the rules and regulations that govern the day-to-day operation of 
the COPN program. Final decision-making authority on COPN 
applications rests with the Commissioner of Health.36 
Throughout much of the Virginia COPN's existence the federal 
35certificate of Public Need Biennial Report, 1985-1986, pp. 
3-4. 
36certificate of Public Need Biennial Report, 1985-1986, pp. 
4-5. 
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government has overseen the program's implementation. As noted 
in the first chapter, Congress appropriated federal funds for the 
establishment and continuing operation of the HSAs, as well as 
assistance to the SHCC and the Department of Health. This 
funding was contingent upon the approval of the State Health Plan 
by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (later the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services). 
The federal government's involvement has not been pervasive. 
Federal activities were intended primarily to ensure compliance 
with broad federal health planning guidelines and goals. The 
federal government did not control the daily operations of 
Virginia's COPN program.37 Virginia was had considerable 
autonomy in the administration and implementation of its COPN 
program. 
Participation in the COPN program is not limited to 
government officials. Private sector groups and individuals have 
a voice in the program. The list of those parties who are 
permitted participate in the COPN program has grown over the 
years. The most obvious participant is the actual applicant, who 
may represent an existing facility, or a concern wishing to 
establish a new facility. Interested Parties Demonstrating Good 
Cause may present information to the effect that changes in the 
nature or circumstances surrounding a project have occurred since 
the application was originally submitted. Third party payers who 
provide coverage to at least five percent of the residents in the 
37west interview. 
applicant's service area are eligible to participate in the 
informal, fact-finding conference.38 Public hearings conducted 
by the HSA's on all COPN applications afford the general public 
the opportunity to comment on individual proposals. These 
opportunities are not limited to the decision-making and rule-
making processes. 
Certificate of Public Need Appeal Process 
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After the Health Commissioner has rendered a decision on a 
COPN application, it is possible to have the decision 
reconsidered. The original COPN statute provided for an appeal 
process, and this element of the program was subsequently 
incorporated into the Rules and Regulations. The appeal process 
allows for the administrative reconsideration and judicial review 
of decisions. 
The initial stage of the appeal process is a formal, 
evidentiary hearing, conducted by the Health Commissioner within 
thirty days of receiving such a request. Parties who have 
standing to request such an appeal are the applicant, the HSA, 
persons demonstrating good cause, as defined previously, and 
third-party payers who provide insurance to at least five percent 
of the people within the facility's geographic service area.39 
38certificate of Public Need Biennial Report, 1985-1986, p. 
7. 
39certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 9.1. 
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This hearing essentially involves a reconsideration by the Health 
Commissioner of the various factors and points of view presented 
during the initial review process. The list of those parties who 
may request an appeal has grown considerably since 1973, when the 
statute granted only the applicant the right of appeal before the 
Board of Health.40 
If any parties to the evidentiary hearing are dissatisfied 
after a formal reconsideration of the decision, they may request 
an appeal to the circuit court in whose jurisdiction the project 
is located. Once the DRD has transmitted all pertinent records 
to the court, the court then either upholds, overturns or 
'modifies the Commissioner's decision.41 Any party to the 
proceeding that is dissatisfied with the circuit court's ruling, 
may appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. 42 By expanding the 
list of parties who may request an appeal, Virginia seems to have 
enhanced the political nature of the COPN process in yet another 
way. The appeal process also increases the likelihood of delay 
in the project's completion, since an applicant would not be able 
to initiate a project until the project is no longer contested. 
40virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) ch. 419, sec. 32-211.9. 
41certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 
9.2. (C). 
42certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 9.2 
(D) • 
98 
Certificate of Public Need Conditions and Characteristics 
There are certain elements that are common to all COPNs, 
regardless of the means by which they are granted. All COPNs are 
valid for the same period of time - one year.43 If requested by 
the applicant, COPNs may be extended beyond this time period. 
Once a COPN has been granted, it is the Health Commissioner's 
responsibility to monitor projects to make certain that the 
original timetable and cost estimates are being met. If the 
Health Commissioner should find that: a) "substantial and 
continuing progress" has not been made, or, b) the capital 
expenditure limit for the project has been exceeded, or, c) the 
applicant "willfully or recklessly misrepresented intentions or 
facts" in order to obtain a COPN, then the Health Commissioner 
may revoke a COPN.44 Other situations that would provide 
justification for the Commissioner to revoke a COPN include the 
applicant's failure to file periodic progress reports with the 
Health Department; making unapproved changes in a project; or, 
the applicant's failure to initiate a project within two years of 
the issuance of a COPN.45 These measures represent the 
Commonwealth's effort to ensure the prompt completion of a 
43virqinia Acts of Assembly, (1984) ch. 740, sec.32.1-102.3 
(B) • 
44virginia Acts of Assembly, (1984) vol. 2, ch. 740, sec. 
32.1-102.4. 
45certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, secs. 
8.4 (A)-(F). 
project, within the expenditure limits set forth in the COPN. 
If an applicant violates the conditions of a COPN, or if a 
facility owner/operator fails to obtain a COPN prior to 
commencing a project, that individual or organization may be 
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subject to sanction. Any project that is commenced without a 
COPN may be subject to the revocation of, or the refusal to grant 
a license for the facility in question. In addition, the Health 
Commissioner, the State Board of Health, or the Attorney General 
may petition the circuit court having jurisdiction to enjoin the 
completion of a project, or to enjoin the utilization of a 
completed project.46 These provisions represent the "teeth" of 
the COPN program. While they do not provide for monetary 
penalties as the original statute did, the potential for 
injunctive penalties would still seem to be a credible punishment 
for violators, and may even serve as a deterrent against 
potential violators. 
Regulatory Promulgation 
A number of health care issues relating to COPN in Virginia 
have arisen over the last sixteen years. However the central 
themes of access, cost containment and quality control are still 
of paramount importance, as they were in 1973. 47 Even so, issues 




emerge that require attention, and may necessitate regulatory 
changes in the COPN program. When such situations arise, there 
is an opportunity for input from a variety of public and private 
sector sources. Just as the review and appeal processes are 
characterized by bargaining and negotiation between various 
interests, so too, is the process of writing regulations often 
influenced by political conflict.48 
Public input into the regulatory promulgation process is 
permitted and even encouraged by Virginia officials. In fact, 
such participation is required by law. The Virginia 
Administrative Process Act governs the promulgation of 
regulations.49 The SHCC has developed guidelines in accordance 
with the Act for facilitating public participation in the 
development of its regulations, which are generally located in 
the State Health Plan. These guidelines pertain to the 
identification and notification of Interested Parties, as well as 
the solicitation of input from those parties. For instance, 
Interested Parties may submit written comments concerning 
proposed regulations, or they may serve on ad hoc advisory panels 
that are established by the SHCC from time to time.SO 
48Drew Altman, "The Politics of Health Care Regulation: 
The Case of the National Health Planning and Resources Development 
Act," Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law (2) 4 (Winter 
1978), p. 567. 
49code of Virginia, (1950) Title 9, ch. 1.1, sec. 9-6.14: 
7.1. 
50statewide Health Coordinating Council, "Guidelines for 
Public Participation in the Development of Regulations," Adopted 
on 19 September 1984 by the Virginia Statewide Health Coordinating 
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Although the SHP contains much non-regulatory information, 
there are particular provisions within it that specify standards 
for review or methods for need determination for particular types 
of projects are considered regulatory material.51 When the SHCC 
desires to make changes in its regulations, there are a number of 
steps that it follows. Some of these steps are mandated by the 
Administrative Process Act, while the SHCC may also institute 
formal requirements on its own. 
The initial step in the regulatory development process 
involves a determination by the SHCC that a change in the COPN 
regulations is necessary. The SHCC may arrive at this decision 
solely of its own accord, or it may receive suggestions from 
other parties, such as government agencies or health care provid-
ers. 52 Once the SHCC determines that a change in its regulations 
is warranted, it notifies the public.53 
The designation and notification of Interested Parties 
occurs in the same manner for regulatory changes as it does for 
the IFFC. The SHCC also publishes a Notice of Intended 
Regulatory Action in a major Richmond newspaper, and in the 
Council (Richmond, Virginia), pp. 2-3. 
Slstatewide Health Coordinating Council, "Standards for 
Evaluating Certificate of Public Need Applications to Establish 
or Expand Nursing Horne Services," Adopted 19 September 1984, by 
the Virginia Statewide Health Coordinating Council (Richmond, 
Virginia),p. 1. 
52John P. English, Health Planning Consultant, Division of 
Health Planning, Virginia Department of Health, interview by 
author, 25 August 1988, Richmond, Virginia. 
53English interview. 
Virginia Register. This notice includes the title of the 
regulation in question, a brief description of the proposed 
change or new regulation, the identification of a SHCC contact 
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person, and the deadline for notifying the SHCC of a desire to 
participate in the process. The SHCC maintains a list of parties 
who have been active in the regulatory process in the past, and 
at least once each biennium it publishes an open invitation to 
persons or parties who may wish to participate in the regulatory 
development process to so notify the SHCC of their desire to 
participate. 54 
Once the SHCC has provided appropriate notification of its 
intent to make regulatory changes, it proceeds to develop the 
proposed new regulations or regulatory changes. It is also at 
this stage that the SHCC compiles a Regulatory Review Summary. 
This summary contains the proposed new regulations or regulatory 
changes, as well as a notice of a hearing date and a public 
comment period. After the hearing is held, and the public 
comment period has expired, the SHCC considers the results of the 
oral and written public comments that it has received and decides 
on the final form that the regulatory change should take.55 
Having decided on the final form that the regulation is to 
take, the SHCC publishes a Final Regulatory Review Summary. 
There are a number of components to this final summary. A 
54 11 Guidelines for Public Participation in the Development of 
Regulations," sec. 3.02. 
55English interview. 
103 
Summary of Comments, which includes the oral and written comments 
that the SHCC has received is incorporated into the Final 
Regulatory Review summary. 
Each Summary of Comments includes general comments on the 
overall proposal, as well as questions that were raised by the 
various interested parties during the hearing. Some of the 
persons who chose to comment on changes to the regulations 
governing CT and MRI scanners, and nursing homes include Governor 
Baliles, health facility administrators from around the state, as 
well as officials from Blue Cross-Blue Shield.56 A SHCC response 
to each question raised is also included in the Summary of 
Comments. This format provides anyone who is interested with an 
overview of the exchanges that took place during the hearing. 
Such information may be useful to parties attempting to gauge the 
political climate at a given time. For instance, prospective 
COPN applicants and Health Department officials might be able to 
use. these comments as a way to test the acceptability of a 
particular type of facility, service, or piece of equipment. 
A statement of purpose for the proposed regulation, and an 
impact assessment statement are incorporated into the Final 
Regulatory Review Summary.57 The impact assessment statement 
56 11 List of Persons That Commented on Proposed Standards for 
Evaluating Certificate of Public Need Applications to Expand CT 
or MRI Services," Final Regulatory Review Summary, pp. 1-2. Also 
memo from John P. English, Acting Director, Division of Health 
Planning, to the Virginia Statewide Health Coordinating Council, 
re Nursing Homes, 26 March 1987. 
57English interview. 
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projects the anticipated effect that the proposed regulation will 
have on the service or services in question. If approved, the 
regulation becomes effective no earlier than thirty days after 
the final regulations are published in the Virginia Register. 
This signifies the conclusion of the regulatory promulgation 
process. As with the decision-making process, the promulgation 
of regulations governing review standards permits considerable 
public input into this aspect of the COPN program, and may permit 
certain groups or individuals to manipulate this aspect of the 
COPN program. However the influence of such groups may be 
mitigated by the presence of the SHCC which, acting as a 
committee, may be less susceptible to political pressure than the 
Health Commissioner. 
Conclusion 
Virginia's COPN program has a number of points of entry for 
public participation. The actual decision-making process, as 
well as the regulatory promulgation process offer opportunities 
for public access, and for political pressure to be brought to 
bear upon Health Department officials. The concentration of 
decision-making authority in the hands of the Health Commissioner 
make him especially susceptible to political pressure. Need 
criteria and regulations are also influenced by public input, 
since hearings are held prior to their implementation. Through 
these avenues, health care providers and other interested parties 
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have helped to shape the COPN program by influencing the daily 
decision-making process as well as the rule-making process that 
governs the COPN program. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE VIRGINIA CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC NEED ENVIRONMENT 
The health care environment is considerably more complex 
today than it was fifteen years ago when Virginia's COPN statute 
was enacted. Technological advances have revolutionized 
diagnostic and surgical medicine, and the concepts of health 
maintenance organizations, home health care, and ambulatory 
(outpatient) surgicenters are just a few examples of the changes 
that have taken place with respect to the provision of health 
care in the U.S. 
Health care reimbursement practices have also changed during 
this period. Until fairly recently, third-party payers paid 
whatever providers charged for services rendered. In response to 
rapidly escalating medical bills however, public and private 
sector insurers have begun to introduce their own brands of cost 
control. one such effort is Medicare's prospective payment 
system, which pays providers according to negotiated fee ceilings 
for specific services. 
National and state political developments have also impacted 
upon Virginia's COPN program. Throughout much of the 1970's 
regulation was viewed as a reasonable response to perceived 
deficiencies in the economy. With the ascension of the Reagan 
administration, national public policy assumed a decidedly pro-
competitive posture. This philosophy appears to have been a 
significant factor in the ultimate demise of federal health 
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planning. Confusion emerged over the proper relationships 
between the federal, state, and local institutions that were 
developed under the federal health planning program (P.L. 93-
641). Not long after the passage of P.L. 93-641, North Carolina 
challenged the constitutionality of the health planning program 
on the grounds that the statute infringed upon states' rights by 
requiring a CON program. Although the state's case was upheld by 
the North Carolina Supreme Court, the federal district court 
hearing the case ruled that the law's CON provision was not a 
violation of state sovereignty since states could elect to forego 
the federal funds that would be at stake. The court also found 
that the federal government had a legitimate interest in pursuing 
a national health program.1 Intergovernmental tensions were 
further exacerbated by the fact that state and local government 
officials believed that the federal government was insensitive to 
their concerns.2 
In Virginia, the notion of health planning and regulation 
through COPN has also undergone change. Lawmakers and health 
department officials altered the program in response to federal 
initiatives, as well as changes that were occurring in the health 
care environment. Health care providers, public and private 
lNorth Carolina ex rel Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 
(E.D.N.C. 1977), 435 U.S. 962 (1978). For a more complete discussion 
of this case, see Roberta Roos, "Certificate of Need for Health 
Care Facilities: a Time for Reexamination," Pace Law Review, (7) 
2 (winter 1987), pp. 491-530. 
2Institute of Medicine, Health Planning in the United States: 
Selected Policy Issues, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C. : National 
Academy Press, Inc., 1981), pp. 38-40. 
insurers, governmental agencies, and citizens' groups are 
examples of the types of groups that have entered the fray 
surrounding COPN. 
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Medical, political, and regulatory issues have been at the 
forefront of these discussions. Yet it is cost control, in light 
of massive public and private expenditures, that has been the 
dominant issue. Indeed, Virginia officials, including Governor 
Baliles, have regarded the continuing efficacy of COPN as a 
function of its effect on health care costs. 
National Health Planning and Resources Development 
Amendments of 1979 
The first major development to impact upon Virginia's COPN 
actually was the result of federal government action. Even 
though federal regulations pertaining to the implementation of 
the P.L. 93-641 program were not finally issued until 1978, 
Congress had, by 1978, become dissatisfied with the progress that 
was being made toward the goal of a national health planning 
system.3 
There were several issues that were of particular concern to 
members of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, which 
held hearings on proposed amendments to P.L. 93-641. First there 
was the continuing problem of consumer representation on HSA 
boards. Various consumer groups began to bring suit on the issue 
of underrepresentaton of population segments on HSA boards short-
3Budrys, p. 20. 
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ly after the national health planning program had been 
implemented. In Texas ACORN v. Texas Area 5 Health systems 
Agency, Inc., the plaintiffs argued that low-income groups were 
inadequately represented on HSA boards. The federal district 
court held that low-income groups must be proportionally 
represented. However the Circuit Court reversed the District 
Court opinion, but ordered HEW to develop HSA selection 
regulations.4 
The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee felt that 
consumers were still inadequately represented on HSA boards, even 
though P.L. 93-641 mandated that between fifty and sixty percent 
of a board's membership be comprised of consumers (see chapter 1 
for the definitions of consumers and providers). While "mirroring 
the community", the Committee believed that consumers on the HSA 
boards should also reflect more fully specific population 
segments, such as low income groups. 5 However, Marmor and Morone 
argue that there was no relationship between HSA representational 
structure and the HSAs' health planning duties. 6 
In addition to concerns about consumer representation, the 
4Texas Association of Community Organizations for Reform 
Now v. Texas Area 5 HSA, U.C.A. No. S-76-102-CA (E.D. Texas, 
Sherman Div., 1 March 1977). 
5west Publishing co.,National Health Planning and Resources 
Development Amendments of 1979, U.S. Code Congressional and 
Administrative News, 93d Congress, 1st sess. (1979) (St. Paul, 
MN: West Publishing Co.), pp. 1361-1368. 
6James Morone and Theodore R. Marmor, "Representing Consumer 
Interests: The Case of American Health Planning," in Citizens 
and Health care, Participation and Planning for Social Change, 
Barry Checkoway, ed. (New York: Pergamom Press, 1981), p. 27. 
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Committee also believe that consumers possessed insufficient 
information about the highly complex issues surrounding the 
provision of health care.7 As a result, Congress still 
considered consumers to be at a disadvantage relative to provider 
HSA board members. In an effort to address this inadequacy, the 
1979 Amendments provided for the education of HSA members on 
health concepts and issues.a 
Lastly, the Committee wanted to make the health planning 
program more responsive to changes that were taking place in the 
health care industry. Of particular concern was the notion that 
health planning should recognize and encourage the emergence of 
competitive forces whenever possible.9 To that end, specific 
mention is made in the 1979 Amendments of the need to encourage 
competition.lo For example, the 1979 Amendments call for the 
exclusion of health maintenance organizations (HMO) from CON 
reviewll, since HMOs are considered to be organizations that 
encourage competition, and respond to classic market forces of 
supply and demand. 
7west Publishing co., National Health Planning and Resources 
Development Amendments of 1979, p. 1312. 
8National Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments 
of 1979, statutes at Large, vol. 93, sec. 149, p. 620 (1979). 
9west Publishing Co., National Health Planning and Resources 
Development Amendments of 1979, p. 1358. 
lONational Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments 
of 1979, statutes at Large, sec. 103, pp. 594-595 (1979). 
llNational Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments 
of 1979, Statutes at Large, (1979), sec. 117 (b) (1), p. 615. 
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This provision is significant for a number of reasons. It 
was a tacit acknowledgement that economic regulation of health 
services is neither the norm nor the ideal, as far as Congress 
was concerned. Secondly, this declaration in favor of 
competition laid the conceptual foundation for the eventual 
dismantling of the national health planning program. 
There were other important provisions of the 1979 
Amendments. For instance, the minimum federal grant level for 
HSAs was raised from $150,000 to $250,000 in an attempt to lessen 
the burden on smaller, less populous HSAs.12 Also, Congress 
added medical facility accessibility and quality control to the 
list of national health planning priorities. 13 In a further 
attempt to reduce excess capacity in the interests of 
constraining costs, Congress included in the 1979 Amendments a 
program to encourage the voluntary discontinuance or conversion 
of unneeded services.14 
The National Health Planning and Resources Development 
Amendments of 1979 represent some conflicting themes. On the one 
hand, it seems clear that Congress was generally supportive of 
the health planning program. The 1979 Amendments represented a 
congressional attempt to strengthen and improve the effectiveness 
of the HSAs. At the same time, the provision encouraging the 
12west Publishing Co., National Health PLanning and Resources 
Development Amendments of 1979, p. 1375. 
1342 u.s.c., sec. 300m-l(c) (E) (14). 
14National Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments 
of 1979, sec. 301, p. 636. 
facilitation of competition suggests that Congress yearned for 
non-regulatory solutions to the problems of medical facility 
accessibility, quality control, and especially, high cost that 
still beset the health care industry. 
Even with the changes mandated by the 1979 Amendments, it 
would not be long before the national health planning program 
would come under political attack at the national level. As 
noted earlier, the Reagan Administration entered office 
proclaiming an anti-regulatory, pro-competitive economic 
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philosophy that included the health care industry. The enactment 
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 exemplified this 
anti-regulatory approach by slashing health planning 
appropriations. Federal grants to HSAs fell from $120 million to 
$65 million.15 
Then in 1982, the federal government dealt the national 
health planning program a devastating blow. In that year, 
Congress discontinued formal health planning appropriations.16 
Also, each year thereafter, Congress attached a rider to the 
appropriations bill that prohibited the Secretary of Health and 
Human services from penalizing states that failed to comply with 
15omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Statutes at 
Large, (P. L. 97-35) vol. 95, Title 9, Subtitle E, sec. 1537, p. 
570 (1981). 
1642 u.s.c. (1982) sec. 300n-6. 
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P.L. 93-641. 17 Congress maintained partial funding for the P.L. 
93-641 program through the passage of continuing resolutions.18 
The national health planning program eventually expired on 
September 30, 1986 when Congress failed to renew appropriations 
for the program. 
With the demise of national health planning, states were 
left to decide for themselves the value of maintaining a CON 
program. Some states have chosen to modify their CON programs to 
more effectively address special concerns, while other states 
discontinued CON altogether. Since Virginia's COPN program pre-
dated P.L. 93-641, Virginia has maintained its program. 
The sudden absence of the federal health planning program 
did impact upon Virginia's COPN program. The federal government 
had been funding Virginia's HSAs at a rate of 30 cents per 
capita, prior to its significant cutback in 1981. When the 
federal government discontinued its program, the Commonwealth and 
the HSAs were compelled to find alternative funding sources. The 
HSAs' initial reaction to the loss of federal funds was to reduce 
their staffing complements. Three Virginia HSAs, such as the 
Northern Virginia HSA, had financial reserves or nonfederal 
funding sources, such as private sector or local government 
17James B. Simpson, "Full Circle: the Return of CON Regulation 
of Health Facilities to state Control," Indiana Law Journal, 19 
(Fall 1986), p. 1056. 
18Monroe Lerner, Ph.D., Davids. Salkever, Ph.D., Stephen 
s. Mick Ph.D. and Gregory V. de Lissovoy, Ph.D., Investigation 
of Cert~in Iss~es in Connection With the Virginia Certificate of 
Public Need Program, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
School of Public Health and Hygiene, 1987), ch. 2, p. 8. 
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contributions. 19 However, the Southwest and Eastern HSAs were 
unable to continue their operations. Therefore, from the fall of 
1986 to the present, the ORD staff has had to assume health 
planning responsibilities for those two regions.20 
Virginia has since increased its HSA funding from three 
cents per capita to nine cents per capita in an effort to 
compensate for the loss of federal funding.21 And as noted in 
chapters 2 and 3, Virginia lawmakers have altered the scope and 
threshold levels of the program over time. While the Virginia 
health planning program lost its federal financial support, the 
Commonwealth did have greater flexibility to develop its COPN 
program to meet Virginia's needs. The COPN review process is now 
shorter overall, and the program's scope is somewhat narrower 
than in the statute.22 
The cessation of federal health planning, and Virginia's 
efforts to adjust to this change are but one facet of the 
volatile environment in which COPN has existed in Virginia. The 
interplay among various private and public sector groups, and the 
changes that have taken place within the health care economy have 
all contributed to the development of COPN in Virginia. 
19English interview. 
20Biennial Report 1985-1986, p.3. 




Group Positions Regarding Certificate of Public Need 
Throughout COPN's fifteen year history, numerous groups have 
commented on the worthiness of COPN. To simplify the forthcoming 
discussion, and to allow for more meaningful comparisons among 
various groups, the groups to be discussed below shall be 
organized according to the following headings: providers 
(institutional and professional); third-party payers; 
government agencies; citizens' groups. These headings are 
consistent with relevant literature in the health policy field. 
Before examining and comparing group positions, some rather 
general comments are in order. A group's perception of COPN may 
be motivated by economic self-interest, or economic or political 
ideology.23 However this observation assumes that there is 
unanimity within a group. And as shall be seen, this is not 
necessarily the case. While a group may be outwardly 
homogeneous, it may be inwardly heterogeneous. 24 There may also 
be instances where a group's perceptions of COPN and a group's 
goals my be in conflict.25 This tension may threaten the unity 
23Governor's commission on Medical Care Facilities Certificate 
of Public Need, Report of the Governor's Commission on Medical 
Facility Certificate of Public Need to the Governor and General 
Assembly of Virginia, (Richmond, VA: Commonwealth of Virginia, 
1987), p.13. 
24Alford, p. 192. 
25Monroe Lerner, Ph.D. and George Vlasak, Ph.D., "The Political 
Theory Aspects of CON in Virginia," presented at the Annual 
Convention of the American Pubic Health Association, New Orleans, 
LA, October 19, 1987, p.6. 
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of a group or weaken its resolve. 
Providers 
Health care providers are the most important and most 
powerful of the groups concerned with health care facility 
policy. 26 Within the health care community there are different 
types of providers. Primary care physicians and surgeons, and 
hospital and nursing home administrators are some of the more 
obvious examples of health care provider groups. Largely as a 
result of the highly complex, technical nature of many medical 
services, providers have been the dominant actors within the 
health care policy arena, although there may be divisions within 
each category stemming from differences in type of ownership, 
location, or services rendered.27 That health care providers 
have a direct stake in health care policy developments because 
these individuals depend upon the provision of services for their 
income enhances the likelihood that they will be active in health 
planning activities.28 
26Alford, p. 194. 
27Lerner and Vlasak, p.3. 
28Lawrence o. Brown, "Some Structural Issues in the Health 
Planning Program," in Institute ~f Medicine, Health Planning in 
the United states: Selected Policy Issues, vol. 2, (Washington, 
D.c.: National Academy Press, Inc., 1981), p. 15. 
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Institutional providers 
Differences among health facility representatives regarding 
their organizations' opinions on COPN provide an example of such 
diversity. At first blush, one might easily assume that 
hospitals and nursing homes would be unified in their opinions 
regarding COPN. Such is not the case, however. Due largely to 
differences in reimbursement practices and the nature and scope 
of services rendered, hospitals in Virginia have generally 
opposed COPN while nursing homes have supported the program. 
The principal group representing hospitals in Virginia is 
the Virginia Hospital Association (VHA). The VHA's views toward 
COPN have fluctuated considerably over the last fifteen years. 
COPN was initially supported and promoted by the VHA because it 
was seen as a useful cost containment mechanism in the face of 
cost-based reimbursement.29 This reimbursement practice results 
in the payment of health providers after a service is rendered, 
based on to the fee charged by the provider. However, the VHA 
became "philosophically and ideologically opposed" to COPN in the 
late 1970's as the scope of the program was "deliberately" 
expanded with little regard for the initial legislation. 30 
The VHA modified its position on COPN yet again in the early 
29Katharine M. Webb, Vice President for Government Relations, 
Virginia Hospital Association, statement, Governor's Commission 
on Medical Care Facilities Certificate of Public Need, hearing, 
Minutes, 9 March 1987, (Richmond, Virginia), p. 2 
30webb Governor's commission on Medical Care Facilities 
' . Certificate of Public Need, hearing, Minutes, 9 March 1987, p. 2. 
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1980's. By this time, competition within the industry was on the 
rise, but the VHA saw COPN as a way to protect hospitals. Since 
November 1986, however, the VHA has opposed COPN on the grounds 
that the program favors physicians by allowing them to purchase 
some medical equipment without first obtaining a COPN.31 More 
recently, the VHA has assumed a decidedly pro-competitive 
posture. It is the VHA's position that " .•. competition can 
produce the optimal mix of price, quality, and variety for 
consumers. 11 32 
Nursing homes in Virginia, on the other hand, have generally 
supported COPN. Whereas hospital leaders tend to regard COPN as 
having a stifling effect on competition within the industry, 
nursing home administrators feel that COPN is beneficial, and 
helps ensure that beds and facilities are located according to 
need.33 The Virginia Health Care Association (VHCA), which 
represents 130 nursing homes in Virginia, has been active in the 
debate surrounding COPN. The VHCA believes that the elimination 
of COPN would have adverse consequences for quality control, 
accessibility concerns and Medicaid costs. 34 
31Lerner, Salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch. 5, p. 8. 
32Katharine M. Webb, Vice President for Government Relations, 
Virginia Hospital Association, statement, Governor's Commission 
on Medical Care Facilities Certificate of Public Need, hearing, 
Minutes, 13 April 1987, (Richmond, Virginia), p. 10. 
33peter Clendinin, Director, Virginia Health Care Association, 
statement Governor's commission on Medical Care Facilities , . . 
Certificate of Public Need, hearing, Minutes, 13 April 1987 
(Richmond, Virginia) p. 6. 
34Lerner, Salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch. 5, p. 13. 
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Non-profit nursing homes in Virginia also support COPN but, 
with some reservations. The Virginia Association of Non-Profit 
Homes for the Aging (VANHA) seems to have a less unified stance 
toward COPN than the VHCA. There is little unanimity among its 
members, except on the feeling that the COPN process is 
"inequitable and inefficient. 11 35 The VANHA is in favor of the 
simultaneous review of similar applications ("batching") and of 
vesting final decision-making authority for COPN applications in 
a commission rather than the Health Commissioner.36 The VANHA 
believes that new construction is unnecessarily restrained by 
COPN, since institutions lending capital for such projects would 
require that marketing and feasibility studies be conducted in 
advance.37 
Medical professional societies 
Because physicians are often dependent upon unrestrained 
access to hospitals in order to sustain their practices, they 
tend to favor maintaining as much control over health care 
resources as possible.38 Both Virginia Medical Society and the 
35Nathan Bushnell, III, Chairman, Virginia Association of 
Non-Profit Homes for the Aging, statement, Governor's Commission 
on Medical care Facilities Certificate of Public Need, hearing, 
Minutes, 11 May 1987, (Richmond, Virginia), p.1. 
36Report of the Governor's Commission on Medical Facilities 
Certificate of Public Need, p. 16. 
37Lerner, salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch.5, p. 12. 
38Alford, p. 191. 
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Old Dominion Medical Society favor the discontinuation or 
dilution of COPN. Citing the highly volatile and complex nature 
of the health care industry, Virginia Medical society (VMS) and 
the Old Dominion Medical Society (ODMS) feel that COPN is ill-
equipped to operate effectively in such an environment.39 These 
societies argue that COPN stifles creativity and technological 
innovation by making it difficult for new technologies and new 
providers to enter the market.40 On the basis of these 
arguments, the VMS favors total repeal of COPN, while the ODMS 
would like to see medical services and equipment that have become 
standards of care exempted from COPN requirements. 41 
Third-Party Payers 
This category is composed of private health insurance 
companies, Blue cross/Blue Shield, Medicare and Medicaid. For 
the most part, organizations in this category favor COPN. There 
is a sense within the insurance industry that COPN acts as a 
restraint on wasteful, unnecessary spending by health 
facilities.42 Largely due to a shift toward a more price-
sensitive health care market, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Virginia 
39Lerner, Salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch. 5, p. 10. 
40c.M. Kinloch, M.D., Governor's Commission on Medical 
Facilities certificate of Public Need,statement, hearing, Minutes, 
11 May 1987, (Richmond, Virginia), p.3. 
41Lerner, Salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch.5, p. 16. 
42Lerner, salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch.5, p. 30. 
does not believe that COPN has much impact overall on the 
insurance industry.43 
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Third-party payer support of COPN is hardly universal. The 
Virginia Association of Health Maintenance Organizations favors 
the weakening or total repeal of COPN. This association's 
objections stem from the view that, contrary to the competitive 
philosophy underlying HMOs, COPN hinders competition among 
medical facilities by creating state-sanctioned franchises or 
cartels.44 There is thus some diversity among third-party payer 
organizations with respect to their views on COPN. All of these 
organizations share a desire to constrain costs but, they differ 
according to the means by which they feel such a goal should be 
achieved. 
Government Agencies 
Another significant class of participants in the COPN debate 
is comprised of public agencies. Government's role in health 
care is unique in that it may act as a payer, provider, or plan-
ner/regulator of health care services. Government agencies 
concerned with health care in Virginia generally view COPN as a 
means of rationalizing and stabilizing the medical facility 
market. 
43Blue cross-Blue Shield, statement, Governor's Commission 
on Medical care Facilities Certificate of Public Need, hearing, 
Minutes, 11 May 1987, (Richmond, Virginia), P· 9. 
44Lerner and Vlasak, p.9. 
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Concerns about quality control, distribution of facilities 
and services, and cost containment are of paramount importance to 
those governmental agencies concerned with the provision of 
health care. The Statewide Health Coordinating council believes 
that the health care industry cannot be self-regulating, and that 
COPN is sufficiently flexible to deal with an ever-changing 
health care market.45 The state Board of Health sees COPN as 
being especially important for ensuring that remote or 
impoverished areas have adequate facilities and services.46 The 
Health Services Cost Review Commission recognizes a need to 
balance competition and regulation and, the Commission sees COPN 
as an important planning too1.47 
Other public sector organizations in Virginia are less 
sanguine about COPN. The Board of Medical Assistance Services 
holds the position that, while providers are still not overly 
concerned about excess capacity and costs, COPN does little to 
reduce existing excess capacity. Yet the Board is apprehensive 
about the total repeal of COPN.48 The Virginia Association of 
Health Systems Agencies believes that there is an "inevitable" 
45Lerner, Salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch.5, p. 20. 
46Lerner, Salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch.5, p. 23. 
47virginia Health Servi~es Cost Revi7w,c~uncil, ~t~tement, 
Governor's commission on Medical Care Facilities Certificate of 
Public Need, hearing, Minutes, 11 May 1987, (Richmond, Virginia), 
p. 12. 
48Robert Lambeth Virginia Board of Medical Assistance 
Services, statement, Governor's Commission on Medical Care Facilities 
Certificate of Public Need, hearing, Minutes, 8 June 1987, (Richmond, 
Virginia), p.l. 
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tension between the regulator and the industry being regulated. 
VAHSA members also feel that COPN administration at the state 
level is ineffective and unenthusiastic.49 Here too, there 
appears to be a marked difference of opinion within one of the 
major classes of groups interested in COPN. One gets the 
impression that these state agency groups view COPN as the best 
available response to the problems that beset the health care 
industry, but that they long for a more optimal solution. 
Consumer Organizations 
The last class of organizations that interact within the 
COPN arena is, in many ways, the most diffuse. Consumer 
organizations, such as common Cause and the American Association 
of Retired Persons generally represent a wide range of concerns, 
such as consumers' rights issues and policy issues affecting 
retirees and the elderly. Health care issues do not tend to 
attract much attention from these groups. Indeed, Merone found 
that narrowly focused provider groups were more likely to be 
politically active in health planning than more diverse consumer 
organizations.50 Schlozman and Tierney believe that 
49oean Montgomery, Executive Director, Virginia A:so~iation 
of Health systems Agencies, statement, Governor's Commission on 
Medical care Facilities Certificate of Public Need, hearing, 
Minutes, 8 June 1987 (Richmond, Virginia), P· 6. 
50James A. Merone "Models of Representation: Consumers 
and the HSAs" in Institute of Medicine, Health Planning in the 
United states; selected Policy Issues, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academy Press, 1981), p. 224. 
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organizations with narrow, technical political objectives tend to 
be more influential politically than those groups with broad 
goals. 51 Whelan found that citizens' groups in Virginia tend to 
have a fragile organizational base, and that the consumer 
movement in Virginia has been in some disarray in recent years.52 
There are a number of factors that contribute to the lack 
of attention paid to health care issues by consumer 
organizations. Most significant among these factors is the 
prominence of third-party reimbursement, which tends to insulate 
consumers from the direct costs of their health care.53 Because 
individual consumers represent such a wide array of needs, and 
have differing priorities it is probably difficult for an 
organization to represent very many of them. 54 Another possible 
explanation for the lack of consumer group involvement in health 
care issues is that many issues and concepts surrounding health 
care are so complex that only someone with training in a specific 
health field can analyze the highly technical information that is 
often associated with health care. 55 
There does appear to be some public ambivalence toward 
51Kay Lehman schlozman and John T. Tierney, Oraanized Interests 
and American Democracy, (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), p. 396. 
52John T. Whelan, "Interest Groups in Virginia: a New Look 
for a 'Political Museum Piece'," presented at the 1986 Annual 
Meeting of the southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, 
Georgia, 6-8 November 1986. 
53Morone, p. 224. 
54Lerner and Vlasak, P· 5. 
55arown, p. 18. 
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health care. On the one hand, consumers want a full range of 
services that is readily available to them. on the other hand, 
this desire is tempered by concern about high costs.56 
Even in the face of such obstacles to group unity, a few 
consumer groups have been active in the discussion about COPN. 
Two of these groups are based in Richmond, and the third is a 
national citizens' group. The National Alliance of Senior 
Citizens favors a competitive, free-market to the health care 
industry, and is, therefore, opposed to COPN on principle.57 The 
Richmond Chamber of Commerce is also ideologically committed to 
free-enterprise and those of its members who were knowledgeable 
about COPN opposed it.58 It may seem odd that a group 
representing business leaders is categorized with consumer 
organizations. However business leaders purchase health 
insurance for their employees, and are thus quite interested in 
policies that may affect the cost of their employees' health 
care. In this way, businesses are themselves purchaser of health 
care. The Richmond Area Business Group on Health, on the other 
hand, has consistently supported COPN, but its support has begun 
to waver more recently as members are uncertain whether they will 
56Don Colburn, "Hospital Regulation.Giving Way to.competition 
as a Means of Determining Growth of Hospitals and Services," 
Washington Post, 9 December 1986, HE-8. 
57Report of the Governor's Commission on Medical Care Facilities 
Certificate of Public Need, p. 17. 
58Report of the Governor's Commission on Medical Care Facilities 
£ertificate of Public Need, p. 17. 
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benefit more from regulation, or from a free-market approach.59 
The views of these consumer groups tend to stress the potential 
economic impact of COPN over questions of access and quality, 
suggesting once again that it is the issue of cost control which 
has the most political salience for the public. 
The foregoing discussion illustrates the diverse societal 
groups which, to varying degrees, affect or are affected by COPN. 
This is not to say that each group articulates its position with 
equal conviction relative to other groups. On the contrary, it 
stands to reason that institutional and professional providers 
would be the most vocal groups on this issue since their 
livelihood is at least partly dependent upon the availability of 
services and facilities for their patients. 
Since third-party payers directly pay providers for much of 
the medical care rendered nationally and in Virginia, it is not 
difficult to understand this group's preoccupation with cost 
control. The positions of the government agencies noted above, 
while emphasizing cost control also stress the need for the 
rational distribution and control of health facilities by way of 
planning and regulation through COPN. Even agencies not entirely 
satisfied with COPN are reluctant to dismantle the program. 
The reactions (or lack thereof) from consumer groups provide 
an interesting contrast to the other types of organizations that 
have been discussed. While it is true that we place great value 
on our health, there is also some truth to the notion that we do 
59Lerner, salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch. 5, p. 19. 
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not generally concern ourselves with health care until we are in 
need of it. The other types of groups can afford to be more 
myopic with respect to health care issues because this is their 
primary area of concern. For most consumers, however, health 
care is but an intermittent concern as opposed to a number of 
concerns ( family, education, occupation) that must be confronted 
daily. This fact helps to validate the notion that groups with 
narrow goals tend to be more effective than groups with broad 
goals.60 Regardless of their positions on COPN, these groups and 
society at large have been influenced by changes occurring within 
the health care industry. It is to these changes that the next 
section shall be devoted. 
Changes in the Health Care Industry 
Since the enactment of the Virginia COPN statute in 1973, a 
number of changes have taken place in the health facility sector 
of the health care industry. These changes have altered the 
complexion of the industry and, have provided the impetus for the 
current debate among Virginia lawmakers over the continued 
efficacy of COPN in the current health care environment. Over 
the last fifteen years health facility costs have risen 
dramatically, while occupancy rates have tapered off, due in part 
to the emergence of outpatient care. National expenditures for 
medical facility care have risen from $28 billion in 1970, to 
60schlozman and Tierney, P· 396. 
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$179 billion in 1986. 61 Third-party payers have also taken a more 
active role than they had previously, often questioning the need 
for services as well as the fees charged for those services. 
Changes have not been limited to the supply side of the care 
equation. The elderly population has increasingly required 
greater levels of sophisticated care, while the indigent 
population has strained hospital resources through a substantial 
uncompensated care burden. The total Medicaid bill in Virginia 
for FY 1989 is $908 million, with the Commonwealth paying 
approximately 50 percent of these costs. For FY 1990, Virginia 
has appropriated $520 million for Medicaid care. All of these 
factors have compelled many facilities to enter health "systems" 
or large, proprietary hospital chains in order to strengthen 
their financial positions. It is in this environment that COPN 
currently exists. 
Health care costs 
Rising health care costs have overshadowed the issues of 
access and quality control for some time. Medical facility care 
costs in Virginia have risen from an average of $184.10 per day 
in 1979 to $434.75 per day in 1987. 62 The underlying theme that 
emerges from the debate over the reasons for the high cost of 
611988 u.s. statistical Abstract, no. 131, p. 88. 
62virginia Health services Cost Review cou~cil, Annual 
Report, 1984-85, and Annual Report, 1986-87, (Richmond, VA: 
Commonwealth of Virginia). 
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health care and, how best to control these costs ultimately turns 
on the issue of competition versus regulation. 
Proponents of the position that competition will address the 
inequities and inefficiencies within the health care industry 
base their argument on the assumption that the marketplace is a 
better allocator of health care resources than the 
regulatory/planning arena. Free-market advocates maintain that 
the rise in health care costs emanates not from a lack of 
competition but, from a lack of price competition.63 As a 
result, prices are artificially high, since hospitals are often 
not compelled to restructure because COPN is said to protect 
existing providers from market forces.64 Advocates of 
deregulation also point to econometric studies which indicate 
that CON has little or no effect on costs.65 
Advocates of CON and other forms of regulation argue that 
the health facility marketplace does not respond to the 
63James A. Bacon and James Schultz,"Gridlock," Virginia 
Business, (3) 6 (July 1988), p. 45. 
64James A. Bacon and James Schultz, "Competition or Compas-
sion?," Virginia Business (3) 8 (August 1988), p. 8. 
65John Ashby, Jr., "The Impact of Hospital Regulatory Reforms 
on Per Capita costs, Utilization, and Capital Investment," Inquiry, 
(21) 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 50-58. See also Salkever and Bice, 
Hospital Certificate of Need controls: Impact on Investment, 
Cost and Use, (Washington, D.C.: A~erican.Ente:prise ~nstitute, 1978) 
and; Virginia General Assembly, Joint Legislative Audit and 
Review Commission certificate-of-Need In Virginia, (Richmond, 
Virginia 1979).; 1 Lerner, Monroe, Ph.D., Salkever, David, Ph.D., 
Mick, st~phen, s., Ph.D., and de ~issovoy, .Gr7g~ry V .. I~vestigation 
Qf Certain Issues in Connection With the V1rg1n1a Certificate of 
Public Need Program, (Baltimore! MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
School of Public Health and Hygiene,1987). 
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traditional market forces of supply and demand. The prevalence 
of third-party reimbursement, and the highly technical nature of 
many medical services mitigate market forces.66 According to Dr. 
Robert G. Petersdorf, dean of the University of California-San 
Diego School of Medicine, the "duplication of services is often 
motivated by nothing more than a drive for prestige and the 
preservation of the professional or administrative ego. 11 67 This 
comment illustrates some of the justification for CON regulation. 
However Louis Rossiter, professor of Medical Economics at the 
Medical College of Virginia, is not sure that "anyone's 
unequivocally shown the link between equipment and health care 
costs. 11 68 
By the early 1980 1 s it had been well established by 
insurers, scholars, and providers that the excess capacity and 
concomitant rise in health care costs were at least partly due to 
the retrospective, fee-for-service reimbursement practices that 
insulated consumers from high costs, and provided incentives to 
health care facilities to expand, since facilities were 
reimbursed whatever they were charged. 69 Under such a practice, 
66west Publishing co., u. s. congress. Senate Report on s 2994, 
U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 93d Congress, 
2nd sess., vol. 4, (1978) p. 7878. 
67Don Colburn, "Technology's High Price," The Washington 
Post, 26 December 1984, B-7. 
68James A. Bacon and James Schultz, "Competition Anxiety," 
Virginia Business, (June 1988), P· 38. 
69Elaine A Anderson and Mark R. Ginsberg, "The Health Care 
Marketplace: P~rspectives on a System in Transition," Policy 
Studies Review, (5) 3 (Fall 1986), P· 656. 
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hospitals were free to expand their facilities and services 
knowing that they could expect full payment for services 
rendered, without having to be concerned about efficiency of 
operation. There was little incentive for health facilities to 
economize. 
Before long, third-party payers began to take matters into 
their own hands. The development of Medicare's prospective 
payment system, the expansion of HMOs, and the creation of 
preferred provider organizations (PPO) heralded a new, 
competitive approach to solving the problem of escalating health 
care costs. HMOs have actually been in existence since the early 
1970's. However, they have become a prominent part of the health 
care landscape only since the early 1980's. HMOs are attractive 
to consumers because they hold down prices by charging plan 
members a single, flat, annual rate that covers all medical 
services rendered, provided the member utilizes providers 
affiliated with the HMO. HMOs may enter into contractual 
arrangements with individual providers, or they may establish a 
system of their own facilities and providers. In any event, the 
emphasis is on cost effectiveness, and on minimizing the 
utilization of hospital services as much as possible.70 
A second third-party initiative in the war on health care 
costs is known as the preferred provider organization (PPO). 
Under these plans, consumers are provided incentives by their 
insurer to utilize providers who are part of the plan. A 
70Anderson and Ginsberg, p. 658. 
132 
consumer may enter such a plan through an employer and, the plan 
pays nearly all of the costs that are incurred if the consumer 
visits a participating provider. Should a consumer go to a non-
participating provider, the consumer is obligated to pay a 
certain percentage of the bill - perhaps twenty percent - and the 
plan pays the remainder of the bill. The ultimate goal of PPOs 
is to reduce the out-of-pocket expenditures for its membership.71 
The reimbursement mechanisms just discussed are both private 
sector responses to high health care costs. The federal 
government has also taken some steps to hold down hospital care 
costs. 
In 1983 the federal government enacted significant 
legislation designed to rein in the spiralling costs of its 
Medicare program by introducing a prospective payment system 
(PPS). This new wrinkle in the Medicare program is significant 
for two reasons. PPS is significant simply because it is 
associated with Medicare, which is the largest public sector 
source of medical insurance funds in the nation. In 1986 alone, 
Medicare accounted for $77.7 billion in public health insurance 
expenditures.72 PPS is also significant because it represents a 
fundamental change in medical reimbursement philosophy. 
Previously, providers routinely submitted their charges to 
Medicare and collected their fees, often encountering little 
resistance from Medicare. Under this new system however, 
71Anderson and Ginsberg, p. 658. 
721988 U.S. Statistical Abstract, no. 130, p. 88. 
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Medicare negotiates an acceptable fee ceiling with providers for 
specific kinds of services, which are referred to as diagnosis-
related groups (DRG). Providers whose bills exceed these limits 
are not reimbursed for that portion of the bill which exceeds the 
DRG ceiling.73 This new reimbursement structure has prompted 
providers to become more cost-conscious and efficiency-oriented. 
Delivery systems 
Changes in health care reimbursement practices seem to have 
occurred at about the same time as the transformation in health 
care delivery was occurring. For much of this century, hospitals 
have been the dominant force in health facility care in the U.S. 
However there has been a relatively recent shift away from 
inpatient facility care, toward medical care that is provided in 
an outpatient or ambulatory setting.74 Outpatient facilities are 
attractive to consumers because these facilities do not have the 
overhead that would be found at a hospital, and can, therefore 
offer many services at rates that are less expensive than those 
charged by hospitals. 
This surge toward outpatient care has also provided 
hospitals with the opportunity to improve their standing in this 
new market. Not long after the movement toward outpatient care 
73Anderson and Ginsberg, pp. 656-657. 
74Joyce Riffer, "Can Surgicenters Stand Alone?,'' Hospitals 60 
(20 July 1986), p. 44. 
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began in the early 1970 1 s, hospitals themselves entered the 
market as a way to accommodate consumer and insurer demands for 
less expensive care, and also to react to what may have been 
perceived by hospital administrators as a threat to their 
institutions. In Virginia and elsewhere, for example, outpatient 
facilities are often owned by hospitals.75 Hospital entry into 
the outpatient market gave these institutions flexibility in the 
face of declining occupancy.76 
As a reaction to the trend toward outpatient care, health 
facilities, especially hospitals, began to merge with one another 
under the banner of health "systems". Increasing competition 
among health facilities has prompted proprietary, for-profit 
institutions as well as non-profit facilities to consolidate 
their resources.77 such resource consolidation does help to 
reduce service duplication but, it also permits system member 
institutions to dominate local markets. 78 Some of the more 
prominent hospital systems in Virginia include Inova Health 
Systems (Fairfax), Sentara Health Systems (Hampton Roads), and 
Carillon Health System (Roanoke).79 
Concentrations of market power also have implications for 
the COPN program. The length of the process is a financial 
75Bacon and Schultz, "Gridlock," p.54. 
76Lerner, Salkever, Mick and de Lissovoy, ch. 8, p. 10. 
77Anderson and Ginsburg, p. 657. 
78Bacon and Schultz, "Gridlock," p. 46. 
79Bacon and Schultz,"Gridlock," p. 47. 
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hardship for many institutions because of the financial resources 
that facilities they may expend during the process. Large 
institutions do have an advantage over small institutions.BO 
Large institutions, or those affiliated with health care systems 
tend to have greater resources, and are thus better able to 
endure the length of the process, even in a protracted appeal 
situation. Bacon and Schultz contend that institutions with 
large financial resources and a great deal of political clout are 
able to apply pressure, and manipulate the COPN system. Smaller 
institutions are at a disadvantage in such instances; especially 
where COPN applications are competing.Bl 
Hospitals have also sought entry into another major health 
care market - that of extended care. As their occupancy rates 
have fallen in recent years, hospitals have looked longingly 
toward the market for extended, skilled nursing care beds, which 
has traditionally been the exclusive domain of nursing homes. 
The ability of hospitals to convert unused acute (general) bed 
space has been a source of some contention between hospitals and 
nursing homes. 
On the one hand, hospitals want the flexibility to be able 
to convert general, acute care beds to skilled nursing care beds 
without having to undergo a COPN review. For their part, both 
proprietary and non-profit nursing home associations are willing 
to allow hospitals to convert bed space, so long as they are 
BOwest interview. 
BlBacon and Schultz, "Gridlock," p. 52. 
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still required to undergo a COPN review before doing so.82 
Critics of COPN charge that, in instances such as this, COPN acts 
as a state-sponsored nursing home carte1.83 Whichever position 
is taken, one thing is certain - the changing face of health face 
of medical facility care is affected by COPN. 
Demographic influences 
Two recurring themes that are evident in the current 
discussion surrounding COPN, and the provision of health care in 
Virginia generally, are the needs of the elderly and medically 
indigent segments of Virginia's population. The special needs 
and financial vulnerability of the elderly and the indigent mean 
that any drastic alteration of the health care industry should 
not be undertaken without first assessing the probable impact 
that such change might have on these groups. While the elderly 
and the indigent often require special kinds of care, or 
financial assistance, these needs place various demands on 
Virginia's health care system. 
The questions of COPN's franchising effect and its 
implications for the distribution of health facilities pose 
difficult problems for Virginia lawmakers. While certainly not a 
new concern, the provision of health care for the indigent has 
82Lerner, Salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch. 5, pp. 12-14. 
83Karl Rhodes,"In the Pink," Virginia Business, (2) 2 (February 
1987), pp.23-24. 
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become a major health priority under Governor Baliles. In 1986, 
$576 million was either spent by the Commonwealth on indigent 
health care, or assumed as uncompensated care by health care 
facilities.84 Not all of those who are medically indigent are 
impoverished, however. As insurance rates have risen, small-
business employers and low-paid working people find it 
increasingly difficult to afford health insurance.85 The Joint 
Subcommittee on Health Care For All Virginians reported that many 
of the working uninsured are employed in the retail, 
construction, and service industries, or for small businesses 
(those with fewer than 51 employees) because many of these 
employers do not offer health insurance, in spite of state 
mandated benefits.86 
Also contributing to the problems that the indigent have in 
obtaining health facility care is the population shift away from 
cities. With Virginia's affluent population gravitating toward 
the suburbs, hospitals find it increasingly difficult to operate 
in cities and rural areas where a greater proportion of indigent 
are likely to be found.87 Through its capacity to influence the 
84Bacon and Schultz, "Competition or Compassion?," p. 8. 
85James A. Bacon and James Schultz, "Metastasis," Virginia 
Business (July 1988), p. 55. 
86virginia General Assembly, Joint Subcommittee on Health 
Care for All Virginians, Interim Report of the Joint Subcommittee 
on Health Care For All Virginians to the Governor and the General 
Assembly of Virginia, Senate Document No. 18, (Richmond, VA: 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 1989), p. 12. 
87Bacon and Schultz, "Metastasis," p. 56. 
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location and services offered by facilities, COPN can have some 
influence on indigent health care. Health Department officials 
may use COPN to prevent a facility from moving out of an area 
where there may be a medically needy population to an area where 
there may be a greater number of paying patients. 
Even though uncompensated indigent care is a strain on all 
hospitals, it is especially burdensome on small, non-profit 
hospitals. While all non-profit health facilities receive tax 
exemptions, many smaller facilities are in dire need of immediate 
reimbursement.88 Since Medicaid negotiates per diem charges with 
institutional providers, facilities are constrained in the amount 
that they may charge Medicaid recipients. While individual 
hospitals do not write off uncompensated care, they usually 
absorb uncompensated care costs by shifting costs to services for 
which they can receive full reimbursement.89 Uncompensated care 
thus poses a special problem for hospitals, since they must find 
alternative sources of revenue to compensate for uncompensated 
care. 
A program has existed in Virginia for more than forty years 
that is designed to assist medical facilities that provide 
uncompensated care. In 1946 the Virginia General Assembly 
enacted the State-Local Hospitalization Program to provide funds 
88Bacon and Schultz, "Metastasis," p. 55. 
89steve Fargis, Vice President for Operations, Virginia 
Hospital Association, 16 March 1989, telephone interview by 
author, Richmond, Virginia. 
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for the hospital care of the medically indigent.90 This program 
involves a state-local partnership such that the state enters 
into voluntary agreements with localities wishing to receive 
state funding for indigent health care. The state appropriates 
funds to participating localities on a per capita basis, 
sufficient to cover 75 percent of the program cost, and 
participating localities contribute the remaining 25 percent. 
The state develops recommended eligibility standards as a guide 
for localities to follow, but each locality is actually 
responsible for establishing its own eligibility criteria.91 The 
Department of Social Services is responsible for administering 
the Hospitalization Program at the state level. The Department 
of Social Services has developed an income scale for determining 
medical indigency, as well as an income scale for determining the 
extent of coverage that each individual who is accepted into the 
program should receive. For instance, if a person's income 
exceeds the amount that is specified in the scale ($850 per 
month), then that individual may only be eligible for partial 
coverage. If an individual's income exceeds the income scale 
ceiling by at least $600 but not more than $1200, coverage for 
that individual would not begin until after the third day of 
hospitalization. Individuals whose income exceeds the income 
scale ceiling by $4000 or more are ineligible for coverage under 
90virginia Acts of Assembly, (1946) ch. 197, pp. 336-338. 
91virginia Department of Social Services, Assistance Programs 
Manual. Revised, vol. 2, part 5, ch. A, (Richmond, VA: Commonwealth 
of Virginia, 1986), p. 3. 
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the program.92 
Those localities wishing to participate in the 
Hospitalization Program designate an authorizing agent who 
develops the locality's eligibility criteria, and determines the 
eligibility of individual applicants. The authorizing agent also 
determines the appeal process to be followed in those instances 
when an applicant is denied inclusion into the program.93 It is 
up to localities to enter into contracts with area medical 
facilities, although these contracts are subject to state 
approval. Localities are also responsible for documenting each 
individual case, and submitting copies of this documentation to 
the state and the facility providing the care in each individual 
case. 
Although the State-Local Hospitalization Program has 
operated in the manner described above since its inception, the 
General Assembly passed legislation in 1989 that will 
significantly alter the character of the program. Under the new 
law, the Department of Medical Assistance Services will assume 
administrative responsibility for the program, and localities 
will be required to participate. 94 The Director of Medical 
Assistance Services shall also be responsible establishing 
92Assistance Programs Manual, Revised, vol. 2, part 5, ch. 
B, p. 3. 
93Assistance Programs Manual, Revised, vol. 2, part 5, ch. 
A, p. 3. 
94virginia Acts of Assembly, (1984), (HB 1854), secs. 32.1-
333-334, (Uncertified Copy). 
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uniform eligibility standards, in addition to defining the scope 
of services to be covered under the program.95 By mandating 
local government participation in the State-Local Hospitalization 
Program, the General Assembly is sending a clear signal that the 
problem of indigent health care requires participation not only 
by institutional providers and the state, but localities, as 
well. 
Just as indigent health care issues are related to COPN, so 
too, is health care for the elderly. Indeed the elderly 
population's demands will continue to be an important factor 
influencing health care in Virginia, and COPN.9 6 The elderly's 
demands for health care have implications for hospitals and 
nursing homes alike. With hospitals facing declining occupancy 
rates, many wish to convert unused beds to skilled nursing (long-
term) beds. In order to undertake such conversions, hospitals 
must first secure a COPN. This would seem to be a significant 
factor contributing to the divergence of opinion between nursing 
homes and hospitals regarding the future of COPN in Virginia. 
Hospitals seeking to adapt their facilities in response to the 
growing need for nursing care beds probably view COPN as a 
needless constraint, while nursing homes need COPN to protect 
their status in the market. 
It is evident from this discussion that COPN has become part 
of an increasingly complex health care environment. A 
95virginia Acts of Assembly, (1989), secs. 32.1-335-336. 
96west interview. 
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fundamental shift in the philosophy behind reimbursement 
practices now places greater emphasis on prospective 
reimbursement than on fee-for-service reimbursement, thereby 
compelling health facilities to become more efficient and 
competitive. This philosophical shift occurred at approximately 
the same time that consumers and insurers began searching for 
less costly alternatives to hospital care, such as ambulatory 
surgical clinics. Renewed concern among Virginia government 
officials for the health care needs of the elderly and the 
indigent mandates that Health Department officials and lawmakers 
consider the ramifications of future health policy shifts on 
these vulnerable segments of the population. 
Within the policy arena a number of public and private 
sector groups have interacted with one another to influence the 
direction of the COPN program. Along the way, these provider, 
payor, governmental and consumer organizations were surely 
influenced by changes taking place in Virginia's health care 
industry. The most conspicuous case in point is the 120-member 
Virginia Hospital Association, headquartered in Richmond, which 
had originally supported COPN but, because of increased 
competition within the industry and the shift toward prospective 
reimbursement, the VHA now opposes COPN.97 All of these factors 
contributed to the creation of a state-level commission in 1986 
97Katharine M. Webb, Vice President for Government Relations, 
Virginia Hospital Association, statement, Governor's Commission on 
Medical Facilities Certificate of Public Need, hearing, Minutes, 
13 April 1987 (Richmond, Virginia), p. 14. 
to study and make recommendations regarding COPN. 
The Governor's Commission on Medical Care Facilities 
Certificate of Public Need 
Much of the recent discussion among Virginia lawmakers is 
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rooted in political developments that actually occurred in 1986. 
In that year two separate but related investigative efforts were 
initiated by Governor Baliles and the General Assembly. During 
the 1986 General Assembly session, legislators created the Task 
Force on Indigent Health Care, which was directed to undertake a 
comprehensive study of the problems and issues surrounding health 
care for the indigent.97 
A second study commission was created in 1986 by Governor 
Baliles. The Governor established the Commission on Medical 
·Facilities Certificate of Public Need to undertake a 
comprehensive study of COPN, and to make recommendations as to 
whether the program was still serving a useful purpose. If the 
Commission's investigation determined that COPN was no longer 
effectively controlling medical facility costs, or ensuring 
quality and accessibility, then the Commission was to make 
recommendations to the Governor and the General Assembly 
97 Virginia Acts of Assembly, (1986) vol. 2, Senate Joint 
Resolution 32, pp. 2070-2071. 
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regarding the future of COPN.98 
In reaching his decision to form_ a COPN study commission, 
Governor Baliles appears to have been motivated by a recognition 
of the many changes in the health care environment that have 
occurred within the last decade, such as were noted in the 
previous section. Speaking before the Virginia Health Care 
Association in February 1987, Governor Baliles acknowledged the 
vulnerability of the medical facility industry to society's 
philosophical mood swings, such as the current emphasis on free-
market solutions to economic problems. The Governor stated that 
"··· if we attempt to apply yesterday's remedies to future 
problems - then we do a disservice to our people." Suggesting 
that COPN had outlived its usefulness Governor Baliles said, "I 
am increasingly concerned that Virginia's regulatory apparatus -
called the certificate of need process - may be falling short of 
its desired ends. 11 99 The increased level of economic competition 
and changes in the delivery of medical facility care undoubtedly 
helped to influence the Governor's decision to investigate COPN. 
However the Governor was not alone in sensing that the 
medical facility industry might be ready for some degree of 
deregulation. By this time, there was a general feeling within 
98Gerald L. Baliles, Governor of Virginia, Executive Order 
Thirty-One, 19 December 1986, in Report of the Governor's Commission 
on Medical Care Facilities Certificate of Public Need (Richmond, 
VA: Commonwealth of Virginia, 1987), pp. 1-2. 
99Gerald L. Baliles, Governor of Virginia, "The Remarks of 
the Honorable Gerald L. Baliles, Governor of Virginia, Virginia 
Health Care Association, Richmond, Virginia, 4 February 1987, p. 
2 
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the health facility policy community in Virginia that the health 
care industry had changed considerably since COPN's inception, 
and that perhaps some degree of deregulation was appropriate in 
light of the prevailing deregulatory atmosphere at the time. 
However, this desire to deregulate the health facility industry 
was tempered by concerns over the effect that deregulation would 
have on inner-city hospitals that provide a great deal of 
uncompensated care to the medically indigent.100 While state 
level policymakers were interested in giving health facilities as 
much freedom from regulation as possible, there was still a 
lingering fear that complete reliance on the marketplace would 
leave inner city facilities with a declining pool of paying 
patients. These concerns underscore the linkage between COPN and 
the indigent care issue and illustrate the common threads that 
bound the work of the two commissions together. 
The COPN Commission's membership reflected a cross-section 
of legislators, health care providers, third-party insurers, 
state health department officials, and the general public.101 
lOOc. M. G. Buttery, M. D., Commissioner of Health, Virginia 
Department of Health, telephone interview with author, 28 March 
1989, Richmond, Virginia. 
101The Governor's Commission on Medical Care Facilities 
Certificate of Public Need consisted of the following individuals: 
Chairman, Maston T. Jacks, Esq., Deputy Secretary of Human Resources; 
Senator Stanley C. Walker CD-Lynchburg); Senator Elliot s. Schewel 
(D-Norfolk); Delegate J. Samuel Glasscock CD-Suffolk); Delegate 
Warren c. Stambaugh CD-Arlington); Delegate Mary Marshall (D-
Arlington); c. M. G. Buttery, M. D., M. P.H., commissioner of 
Health; Ray T. sorrel!, Director, Department of Medical Assistance 
Services; George T. Drumwright, Jr., Virginia State Board of 
Health; Ann Y. McGee, Director, Virginia Health Services Cost 
Review Council; Mrs. Samuel J. Ailor, Virginia Statewie Health 
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During the course of its investigation, the Commission 
established formal relations with health care provider and 
insurer groups, health regulatory and planning bodies, and other 
organizations "which have an interest in the orderly growth and 
development of the Commonwealth's health care system. 11 102 With 
such a wide range of participants in the commission's work, it is 
clear that Governor intended to have the Commission engage in 
wide-ranging dialogue with those interests most concerned with 
medical facility care issues. 
Throughout 1987 the Commission held twelve monthly hearings 
across the state in Salem, Abingdon, Harrisonburg, Norfolk and 
Richmond. To aid in its deliberations, the Commission contracted 
with The Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public 
Health to conduct a comprehensive study of COPN in Virginia. The 
team of researchers from Johns Hopkins conducted a detailed 
analysis of the COPN program with the goal of ascertaining the 
program's impact on the costs, quality, and accessibility of 
medical services. The Commission also directed the Johns Hopkins 
researchers to consider alternative means that Virginia might 
employ to pursue "the public interest in the area of medical 
services delivery today. 11 103 
Coordinating Council; Richard S. Blanton, Cumberland, Virginia; 
The Reverend Carl T. Tinsley, Roanoke, Virginia; Rhoda Whiteacre 
Maddox, Winchester, Virginia; Delores Zachary Pretlow, Ed. D., 
Richmond, Virginia; Drew B. Williams, Richmond, Virginia. 
102Baliles, Executive Order Thirty-One, p.2. 
103Report of the Governor's Commission on Certificate of 
Public Need, p. 11. 
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With input from the Johns Hopkins study, as well as 
testimony gathered from the Commission's hearings, the Commission 
had a wealth of information from which to draw conclusions 
regarding COPN. In December the Commission published its 
findings, and submitted its report to the Governor and the 
General Assembly in time for the 1988 legislative session. 
The Commission came to several conclusions regarding the 
effectiveness of COPN. The data pertaining to COPN's effect on 
health care costs were found to be inconclusive, but the 
Commission considered COPN to be an inappropriate cost 
containment mechanism for hospital care.104 Likewise, the 
Commission did not find that COPN had much impact on the 
accessibility of hospital care, and that COPN's effect on the 
quality of hospital care was inconclusive.105 
The Commission reached rather different conclusions 
regarding COPN's relationship to the nursing home industry. The 
Commission deemed COPN necessary to prevent a rapid increase in 
long-term beds, which would then drive up Medicaid costs. 
Conversely, too few beds would limit consumer choice and inhibit 
competition.106 In the face of such findings, the Commission 
recommended that the hospital industry be substantially 
104Report of the Governor's Commission on Certificate of 
Public Need, p. 20. 
105Report of the Governor's Commission on Medical Care 
Facilities Certificate of Public Need, pp. 22-23. 
106Report of the Governor's Commission on Medical Facilities 
Certificate of Public Need, p. 23. 
deregulated while COPN should be retained for the nursing home 
industry.107 
During the course of its investigation, the Commission 
14R 
became aware of the relationship between its work and that of the 
Governor's Task Force on Indigent Health Care. These two 
investigative bodies determined that COPN and the problems facing 
the indigent impact upon one another in a number of ways. For 
instance, the provision of health care for the indigent places a 
considerable burden on providers in the form of uncompensated 
care. on the other hand, COPN affects the indigent population to 
the extent that it influences the location and mix of services 
provided by hospitals and other facilities.108 As the financial 
costs of providing health care for the indigent population grows, 
so does Commonwealth's stake in ensuring the continued 
availability of health care for the medically indigent. 
Certificate of Public Need Moratorium 
The Governor's Commission on Medical Care Facilities 
Certificate of Public Need published its findings just in time 
107Eva s. Teig, Secretary of Human Resources, and Maston T. 
Jacks, Deputy Secretary of Human Resources, letter to Governor 
Gerald L. Baliles and the General Assembly, 1 December 1987, Richmond, 
Virginia, in Report of the Governor's Commission on Certificate 
of Public Need. 
108Eva s. Teig, Secretary of Human Resources, and Maston T. 
Jacks, Deputy Secretary of Human Resources, letter to Governor 
Gerald L. Baliles and the General Assembly, Richmond, Virginia, 1 
December 1987. 
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for the 1988 General Assembly session. As in 1973, opponents and 
supporters of COPN lined up for the confrontation early. One 
important difference between the debate over COPN that took place 
in 1973 and the one that occurred in 1988 concerns the role of 
the Office of the Governor. 
In 1973, Governor Holton did not play a very active role in 
the development of the COPN statute. Governor Baliles, on the 
.other hand, took a very active role in the effort to repeal COPN. 
Indeed, his participation in the activity surrounding COPN was 
characteristic of the manner in which he governed. By the end 
the first General Assembly session during his term, Governor 
Baliles had established a reputation as a very active official, 
who worked hard behind the scenes to advocate his agenda.109 His 
industriousness has helped him to establish an impressive record 
of legislative successes. Indeed, it is this style that the 
Governor employed during the 1987, 1988 and 1989 sessions in 
pursuit of his health care policy goals. 
The renewed controversy over COPN stemmed, in part, from 
Virginia lawmakers' attempts to grapple with the state's Medicaid 
expenditures. Shortly before the start of the session, the 
Baliles Administration proposed that a bed tax be levied on 
Virginia hospitals and nursing homes. Hospitals were to be taxed 
at a rate of $5 per bed per day, and nursing homes would have 
been subject to a tax of $1 per bed per day. These revenues were 
109R. H. Melton, "Lawmakers, Governor Tally Achievements," 
The Washington Post, 2 March 1987, E-1. 
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then to be earmarked for the State's Medicaid budget.110 
On December 30, 1987, the Secretary of Human Resources 
briefed hospital and nursing home representatives on the 
Governor's proposa1.lll Thus, by the time the 1988 General 
Assembly session began, the hospital and nursing home lobbies had 
mobilized their forces in opposition to the proposal. On the 
other side of the issue, Senator Dudley J. Emick, Jr. (D-
Botetourt) argued that without the bed tax, the General Assembly 
would be compelled to raise taxes in order to fund Medicaid.112 
A rather acrimonious confrontation developed between Governor 
Baliles and the hospital industry over COPN and the Governor's 
bed-tax proposal. Governor Baliles accused the health care 
industry of being more concerned with profits than with providing 
care. The Governor tried to instill a sense of obligation on the 
hospital industry by differentiating between these institutions 
and manufacturing corporations. "Hospitals and nursing homes 
should adhere to a distinctly different and more rigorous 
standard [of moral obligation than most corporations]. 11 113 
The hospital lobbying efforts proved to be decisive. Having 
initiated an intensive letter-writing campaign, these groups were 
llOMichael Hardy, "Emick Sees Tax Rise Unless Assembly Acts 
on Medicaid", Richmond Times-Dispatch, 24 January 1988, p. A-6. 
lllR. H. Melton, "Hospitals Outflank Baliles on Hospital 
Plan," The Washington Post, 31 December 1988, p. B-1. 
112Hardy, A-6. 
113Bill Wasson, "Baliles Aims to Force Bed-Tax Issue With 
Two Proposals," Richmond News Leader, 11 February 1988, p. 6. 
able to mount such a potent political offensive that the Governor 
withdrew his proposal before it had been formally introduced in 
the General Assembly.114 This defeat was particularly irksome to 
the Governor, because he had wanted to have a free-flowing 
discussion of health care financing issues. Although this defeat 
of the Governor's bed-tax plan represented a setback to his 
health care agenda, it was not the final chapter of the unfolding 
saga. 
Not long after he withdrew his bed tax proposal, Governor 
Baliles countered with yet another proposal for dealing with the 
Medicaid crisis. This time the Governor's proposal centered on 
COPN. Sponsored by Senator Emick, the proposal called for a one-
year moratorium on granting new certificates of need while a 
legislative subcommittee considered alternative solutions to the 
Medicaid funding dilemma. After the defeat of his bed tax 
proposal, Governor Baliles seemed more determined that this 
second proposal should pass, commenting that he planned to "force 
• 
the issue. 11 115 The measure received early endorsements from 
Delegate Richard c. Cranwell (D-Roanoke Co.), House Finance 
Committee Chairman, and Delegate Samuel Glasscock (D-Suffolk), 
House Health, Welfare, and Institutions Committee chairman.116 
In order to help ensure passage of the moratorium-and-study 
1 14Hardy, A-6. 
115Bonnie V. Winston, "Baliles Likely to Win Lull in Hospital 
Construction," Richmond News Leader 11 February 1988, A-11. 
116winston, A-11. 
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plan, the Governor included the measure as an amendment to the 
fiscal 1990 budget. By doing so, he circumvented normal 
procedures, since budgetary matters are generally not open to 
public hearings.117 Partly as a result of this maneuvering, and 
partly as a result of the nature of the moratorium itself, the 
moratorium proposal encountered resistance from within the 
General Assembly and the health facility community. Senator 
Emick, who introduced the Governor's proposal, was especially 
disenchanted with the Governor's move to include the moratorium 
in the budget. Senator Wiley F. Mitchell, Jr. (R-Alexandria) 
contended that the Governor was trying "to browbeat the hospitals 
into submission", and existing nursing homes would be "able to 
profit under the moratorium." For their part, hospital and 
nursing home representatives objected to provisions that would 
have prevented facilities from replacing defective equipment or 
from purchasing new high-tech equipment.118 While these 
questions surrounding the moratorium were difficult, they were 
not insurmountable. 
By early March 1988, a compromise was in sight. The 
conference committee report on the budget included provisions in 
the moratorium plan that addressed the health facility lobby's 
concerns. Exempt from the moratorium were projects for the 
replacement or renovation of existing facilities or equipment; 
117Betty Booker, "Hospitals, Regulators Reach Truce," Richmond 
Times-Dispatch, 6 March 1988, B-5. 
118 Booker, B-1, 5. 
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projects necessary for compliance with federal research grants; 
projects needed to meet emergency situations; and non-clinical 
projects, such as parking lots.119 Having reached this 
compromise, Laurens Sartoris, president of the VHA indicated that 
the VHA would give its "full support" to the study.120 
While the moratorium essentially suspended the COPN program, 
the Division of Resources Development was deluged by a flood of 
applications submitted by health facilities in the hope of 
attaining approval prior to the initiation of the moratorium on 
July 1, 1988. The deadline for filing Standard Review 
applications was March 5, 1988, while the filing deadlines for 
Administrative and Exemption Review applications were May 24 and 
June 14, respectively.121 
As one might suspect, health facility administrators rushed 
to file their applications before the moratorium went into 
effect. From March through June 1988, 193 hospital and nursing 
home applications were submitted to the DRD.122 By comparison, 
health facilities submitted 157 projects in all of 1986.123 This 
119Acts of Assembly (1988) Joint Conference Committee Report 
on House Bill No. 30, 11 March 1988, p. 123. 
120wasson, p. 6. 
121Marilyn H. West, Director, Division of Resources Development, 
Memorandum to Chief Executive Officers and Administrators of 
Virginia Medical Facilities Subject to Certificate of Public Need 
Requirements, 22 April 1988, Richmond, Virginia. 
122sandra Evans, "Health Plans Beat Deadline," Washington 
Post, 8 July 1988, D-1,4. 
123certificate of Public Need Biennial Report, 1985-1986,p. 
14. 
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deluge of applications prompted some observers, such as Dean 
Montgomery, executive director of the Northern Virginia Health 
Systems Agency, to charge that the Department of Health would 
rush approval of applications in order to meet the July 1 
deadline.124 Of 193 applications submitted to the Health 
Department, 153 were approved, including 26 of 58 nursing home 
project requests.125 Of course the COPN moratorium was but one 
facet of lawmakers' attempts to address the Medicaid funding 
issue. The General Assembly also created a joint subcommittee to 
study a wide range of health care issues, including COPN. 
The Joint Subcommittee to Study Health Care For All Virginians 
Introduced by Senator Stanley Walker (D-Norfolk), Senate 
Joint Resolution 99 (SJR 99) established the Joint Subcommittee 
to study Health Care For All Virginians.126 Of particular 
importance was the continued escalation of health care costs 
generally, and the burden that these costs place on the public 
and private sectors. The language of SJR 99 also directed the 
Subcommittee to consider the accessibility of health care, 
especially for the elderly and the medically indigent. 
The Subcommittee consisted of seventeen individuals 
124Evans, D-1. 
125Evans, D-4. 
126virginia Acts of Assembly, (1988) vol. 2, Senate Joint 
Resolution 99, pp. 258-261. 
representing a broad spectrum of interests.127 Four Senators, 
appointed by the Privileges and Elections Committee, and five 
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Delegates appointed by the Speaker of the House represented the 
General Assembly. The Governor appointed six individuals to the 
Subcommittee representing physicians, hospitals and nursing 
homes, the commercial health insurance industry, and the Virginia 
Board of Medical Assistance Services. The joint resolution 
stipulated that the Subcommittee consider alternative policy 
mechanisms to alleviate the State's Medicaid woes, such as 
stronger rate setting and a fund to equalize the indigent care 
burden currently assumed by providers.128 The joint resolution 
also instructed the Subcommittee to study "other related matters 
that the joint subcommittee may deem appropriate. 11 129 It was 
under this rather broad grant of responsibility that the 
Subcommittee also examined COPN during the course of its 
deliberations. The Subcommittee transmitted its findings and 
recommendations to the Governor and the General Assembly in time 
for the 1989 legislative session. 
127The following individuals served on the Subcommittee: 
Senator Stanley C. Walker, chairman; Delegate Ford c. Quillen, 
vice chairman; Senator Hunter B. Andrews; Senator Clarence A. 
Holland; Delegate Roberts. Ball, Sr.; Delegate George H. Heilig, 
Jr.; s. Wallace stieffen; Samuel B. Hunter, M.D.; Robert G. 
Jackson II; Bette o. Kramer; Charles B. Walker; Gerald L. Good; 
Eva s. Teig, Secretary of Health and Human Resources; Stuart W. 
Connock; Elliot s. Schewel; Delegate J. Samuel Glasscock; J. 
Bland Burkhardt, Jr. 
128virqinia Acts of Assembly, (1988) Senate Joint Resolution 
99, p. 259. 
129virginia Acts of Assembly, (1988), Senate Joint Resolution 
99, p. 3. 
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The Subcommittee held meetings throughout 1988. At the 
initial meeting in August, Delegate Robert B. Ball, Sr. (D-
Henrico) urged the Subcommittee to totally deregulate the health 
care facility industry. Said he, "Eliminate the certificate of 
need and let free enterprise solve the problem of high medical 
costs." However, Delegate Samuel Glasscock (D-Suffolk) sounded a 
more cautionary note, suggesting, "Let's not vote on it yet, 
let's get all the facts. 11 130 In September, Deputy Secretary of 
Health and Human Resources, Maston T. Jacks presented the 
Governor's Commission study to the Subcommittee. In his summary 
of the report, Jacks noted its generally deregulatory tone.131 
The Subcommittee did in fact ultimately advocate substantial 
deregulation of the health care industry. 
Deregulation of the Virginia Health Care Industry 
The Walker Subcommittee recommendations played a significant 
role in the 1989 General Assembly session. The Subcommittee did 
incorporate COPN into its examination of health care in Virginia. 
The SJR 99 combined its work with that of the House Joint 
Resolution Subcommittee which was studying Medicaid eligibility 
130olivia Winslow, "Ball Offers Health Care Suggestion," 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, 4 August 1988, B-3. 
131olivia Winslow, "Cost Study Backs Less Regulation," 
Richmond Tmes-Dispatch, 21 September 1988, B-1. 
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requirements.132 The fundamental issue for the Commission to 
decide was whether or not COPN was still an appropriate 
regulatory mechanism in the current health care environment.133 
In its report to the Governor and the General Assembly, the 
Subcommittee adopted an essentially deregulatory posture. The 
report recommended that medical facilities, except for 
psychiatric and rehabilitative facilities be deregulated from 
COPN. The Subcommittee drew a distinction between most health 
care facilities and psychiatric and rehabilitative facilities 
because these facilities are reimbursed differently from most 
medical facilities. The Subcommittee also proposed the 
continuation of the nursing home bed moratorium, as well as the 
creation of an indigent care trust fund to alleviate the 
financial burden that many hospitals now face.134 
Reactions to the Subcommittee report were varied. The VHA 
advocated deregulation except for bed use conversions.135 
Hospitals had guarded enthusiasm for the Subcommittee's plan, 
although they felt that business should also be required to 
132virginia General Assembly, Joint Subcommittee on Health 
Care for All Virginians. Interim Report of the Joint Subcommittee 
on Health Care For All Virginians to the Governor and the General 
Assembly of Virginia, Senate Document No. 18, (Richmond, VA: 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 1989), p. 2. 
133Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians,Interim 
Report, p. 3. 
134Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians, 
Interim Report, p. 10. 
135Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians, 
Interim Report, p. 40. 
contribute to the trust fund, since many do not provide health 
insurance for their employees.136 The Hospital Corporation of 
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America(HCA) adopted a neutral position on the COPN recommenda-
tions, but suggested that if alterations to the program were to 
be made, the HCA wanted COPN requirements for new facilities and 
bed relocations to remain intact.137 The Humana hospital chain 
did not express an opinion on COPN, but did feel that it would be 
unfair to have tax-paying hospitals contribute to the indigent 
trust fund, since they already paid taxes that went toward 
Medicaid.138 
There were several groups that opposed deregulation. Free-
standing dialysis centers believed that to deregulate hospitals 
while continuing to regulate non-hospital facilities would be 
discriminatory.139 Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Virginia felt that 
deregulation would lead to higher health care costs.140 The 
Virginia Association of Health Systems Agencies feared that 
deregulation would lead to higher health care costs because of 
continued expansionist incentives. These organizations were also 
136Bonnie v. Winston, "Health Care Pay Plan for Poor Proposed," 
The Virginia-Pilot and Ledger-Star, 17 December 1988, B-5. 
137Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians, 
Interim Report, p.42. 
138Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians, 
Interim Report, p. 41. 
139Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians, 
Interim Report, p. 44. 
140Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians, 
Interim Report, p. 42. 
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concerned that unregulated facility, equipment, and service 
expansion would lower quality, since a high volume of service per 
procedure helps to maintain quality.141 
Even within its own ranks, the Subcommittee's 
recommendations did not receive unanimous support. Delegate 
Samuel Glasscock wrote a dissent in which he argued that 
facilities which provide large amounts of indigent care would be 
at a competitive disadvantage in an unregulated market, relative 
to those facilities which did not provide much indigent care. He 
was also fearful that, left to their own devices, hospitals would 
abandon needy, inner-city areas in search of paying patients.142 
Subcommittee member J. Bland Burkhardt also dissented from the 
report. Most of his objections centered on the implementation of 
the indigent trust fund. However he favored deregulation for new 
beds and relocation of existing facilities, a continued nursing 
home bed moratorium, and allowing hospitals to convert beds to 
skilled nursing care beds to meet the growing demand.143 
At the outset of the session, Governor Baliles made plain 
his stand on the COPN and indigent health care issues. Delivering 
his state of the Commonwealth address to the General Assembly, 
Governor Baliles stated that: 
141Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians, 
Interim Report, pp. 43-44. 
1 42Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians, 
Interim Report, p. 33. 
143Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians, 
Interim Report, pp. 36-38. 
Medical costs continue to skyrocket, placing new 
burdens on families, businesses, and governments .... I 
urge you to review the Joint Subcommittee on Health 
Care's interim report, which proposes that a new pubic 
and private partnership be established to set up a 
trust fund for indigent health care. I agree . 
.•. the subcommittee recommends that regulation of 
hospitals under the Certificate of Public Need program 
be ended •.. and that the moratorium on nursing home 
expansions be continued until January 1, 1991. I 
concur with that as we11.144 
The Governor's remarks suggest a deregulatory position on the 
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COPN program, stressing medical costs and the impact that medical 
facility costs have had on Virginians trying to obtain health 
care. Cost control was clearly the predominant consideration, 
since health care costs would affect whatever measures would be 
devised to alleviate the indigent health care crisis. 
During the course of the 1989 session, legislators dealt 
with several bills that pertained to COPN. Delegate Ford c. 
Quillan (D-Scott) introduced a bill on behalf of the Governor 
that would have deregulated the medical facility industry, except 
for psychiatric and rehabilitative facilities.145 A carryover 
bill originally introduced by Senator Wiley F. Mitchell (R-
Alexandria), that would have totally deregulated the health care 
industry, died in committee, and Senator Johnny s. Joannou (D-
Portsmouth) introduced SB 373 to deregulate the industry for bed 
relocations, while continuing to regulate hospital size, 
144nportions of the Governor's Speech to Legislators," 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, 12 January 1989, A-8. 
145Betty Booker, "Health Care Trust For Poor is Aim," Richmond 
Times-Dispatch, 25 January 1989, A-5. 
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location, and services. Delegate Glasscock also introduced a 
bill that would have continued to regulate hospital construction, 
expansion, and bed additions, while deregulating equipment and 
services (HB 1975).146 
In the end, legislators from these competing pro and anti-
regulation factions were able to reach a compromise, however the 
path to that compromise was not a smooth one. In early February 
the House Health, Welfare, and Institutions Committee voted 
unanimously to send the Glasscock measure to the House floor 
while the Senate approved the Joannou proposal to deregulate the 
medical facility industry only for bed relocations.147 The 
Governor's proposal to deregulate the medical facility industry 
was defeated in the House, Health, Welfare, and Institutions 
Committee. Having waged a protracted struggle over COPN that 
spanned three General Assembly sessions, the defeat of the 
Governor's proposal to deregulate the medical facility industry 
represented an uncharacteristically harsh def eat for a governor 
who tended to enjoy considerable success in enacting his 
legislative agenda. It may also have been a sign that the 
General Assembly was not yet ready to completely deregulate the 
health facility industry. 
146commonwealth of Virginia,Cumulative Index of Senate and 
House Bills, Resolutions, and Joint Resolutions Introduced in the 
1989 Session of the Virginia General Assembly, (Richmond, VA: 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 1989), p. 139. 
147Jeane Cummings and Michael Martz, "Move to Deregulate 
Loses Favor in Committee Discussion," Richmond News Leader, 3 
February 1989, A-4. 
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There were two central issues that overshadowed the General 
Assembly's activities in this area. Members of the General 
Assembly were concerned that medical facilities would abandon 
inner-city areas in a deregulated market. Secondly, there was a 
feeling among legislators that the Health Care for All Virginians 
Subcommittee had not completed its work.148 Without a final set 
of recommendations from the Subcommittee, many members may well 
have been reluctant to opt for a completely deregulatory solution 
to the medical care industry dilemma. In the face of such 
uncertainty, a compromise was inevitable. 
That compromise came in the form of a bill introduced by 
Senator Stanley c. Walker (D-Norfolk), who also chaired the 
Subcommittee. He introduced SB 762, which deregulated medical 
facilities services and equipment while continuing to regulate 
new facility construction, expansion and bed relocation. The 
bill also included an expiration date for the COPN program on 
July 1, 1991, at which time the General Assembly will determine 
whether or not the program continues to serve the public's inter-
ests.149 
Lawmakers reached a compromise that appears to satisfy many 
of the concerns of parties on both sides of this issue. The 
stipulation that will continue COPN regulation for much of the 
industry should assuage the fears of those individuals who feared 
148Buttery interview. 
149R. H. Melton and Donald P. Baker, "Most in Virginia 
Assembly Going Home Happy," The Washington Post, 26 February 
1989, D-1,8. 
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that total deregulation would lead to the curtailment of hospital 
services in needy inner-city areas. However this restraint on 
the industry may be short-lived. Should the General Assembly 
decide in 1991 that COPN no longer serves a useful purpose, then 
the medical care industry may well be free of this form of state 
regulation. 
By simultaneously passing legislation to create an indigent 
care trust fund, the General Assembly has created a program that 
will help to mitigate the effects of deregulation on facilities 
that serve large numbers of indigent patients. For his part, 
Governor Baliles' efforts in the health facility policy area have 
yielded him a significant achievement at the expense of a modest 
setback. Even though he was unable to secure the immediate 
deregulation of the medical facility industry, the General 
Assembly's creation of an indigent care trust fund represents a 
significant achievement. Advocates of regulation have bought 
themselves a little more time to come up with alternative 
solutions to the health care cost and indigent health care 
issues. Although opponents of COPN may not have gotten the 
complete package that they had sought, the door toward a 
substantially deregulated health care industry has been left 
open. 
Conclusion 
Regardless of the General Assembly's eventual decision 
concerning COPN, it is clear that the environment in which the 
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program now operates is vastly different from the health care 
environment that existed fifteen years ago when lawmakers created 
COPN. Indeed, it is these very differences which have prompted 
Virginia lawmakers to once again examine COPN in the broad 
context of Virginia health care policy. Of particular concern to 
the Governor and the General Assembly are the State's burgeoning 
Medicaid bill, and the provision of health care for the medically 
indigent. Since the medically indigent are often dependent upon 
Medicaid, the Commonwealth has a vested financial interest, as 
well as a humanitarian concern, in alleviating their plight. 
Both of these concerns are affected by the rising costs of 
medical care generally, which precludes many individuals from 
obtaining adequate health care, and which serves to inflate 
Virginia's Medicaid budget. This increase in the state's 
Medicaid budget and the general rise in medical facility care 
costs have prompted lawmakers and the Governor to tie the fate of 
COPN directly to its ability to constrain medical facility care 
costs. 
In fact it is the cost of health care that has overshadowed 
concerns about health care quality and accessibility. Even 
though state lawmakers have elevated the prominence of Medicaid, 
this development is as much a function of the program's cost as 
it is a function of lawmakers' concern for the plight of the 
medically indigent. 
The changing face of health care delivery and medical 
technology have accentuated cost control concerns, as officials 
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have altered the program in an effort to address the challenges 
posed by these changes. Just as the health planning and 
regulatory community has striven to address new health care 
issues and concepts, public and private sector organizations have 
introduced measures of their own (such as prospective payment) as 
a means of enhancing the competitiveness of the health care 
industry. 
Throughout COPN's history, a variety of public and private 
sector organizations have been active in the discussion 
concerning COPN. Whether motivated by economic, professional, or 
ideological factors, providers, insurers, government agencies, 
and consumers have all taken positions on COPN. This is not to 
say that there has always been unanimity within a group, or that 
a group's position has remained consistent with respect to the 
efficacy of COPN. Nonetheless, the interaction among these 
groups has contributed to the evolution of COPN in Virginia. 
These groups will doubtless assume an active role in the coming 
deliberations regarding certificate of public need in Virginia. 
The pattern that emerges from the interaction of various 
groups on the COPN issue is consistent with more general 
observations regarding the interaction of groups in American 
politics. All groups do not fair equally well in American 
politics. Those groups with narrow goals and substantial 
resources tend to be more influential than groups with broad, 
diffuse goals.150 Those groups that represent business or 
150schlozman and Tierney, p. 400. 
economic interests are more likely to be influential than 
citizens' groups.151 These observations help explain the 
dominance of medical provider groups on the Virginia political 
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scene in comparison to the more broad-based, diffuse consumer groups. 
151Ronald J. Hrebenar and Ruth K. Scott, Interest Group 
Politics in America, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1982), p. 197. 
CONCLUSION 
Health facility public policy is in the midst of a 
transitionary phase. This transition is driven by the three 
separate but related impulses of cost, access, and quality. With 
the federal government altering its role in this policy area, 
state and local governments must redefine individually the proper 
level and nature of intervention that they will pursue. 
Lawmakers are also currently redefining other salient health 
issues that require attention. While health care costs still 
dominate health care policy discussions, officials in Virginia 
have become increasingly concerned about the availability and 
affordability of health care for the elderly and medically 
indigent. Central to these concerns is the issue of government's 
proper role in the health care facility industry. 
During the sixteen years that Certificate of Public Need has 
existed in Virginia, Health Department officials have relied on 
the three basic issues of quality, and especially, the 
accessibility and cost of medical facility services as 
justification for the program. Accessibility and quality of 
medical facility services have long been significant policy 
considerations. More recently, cost control has grown to 
overshadow these longer-standing concerns. It was not until the 
late 1960's and early 1970's that health care costs became a 
significant issue on the national political landscape. Mirroring 
168 . 
this phenomenon, Virginia lawmakers began to closely scrutinize 
health care costs in Virginia during the early 1970 1 s. 
To meet the new challenge posed by rapidly rising health 
care costs, lawmakers in Congress and the states revised health 
facility policy prescriptions. New York and several other states 
experimented with certificate of need controls during the early 
1960's as a means of achieving achieving health planning 
objectives. By 1972 almost half of the states had established 
capital expenditure review programs. Relying heavily on the 
experiences of these states, the Virginia General Assembly 
created a certificate of need program in 1973. A year later, 
Congress enacted a federal health planning statute that all but 
required states to develop capital expenditure review programs. 
The passage of this federal statute signalled a clear shift away 
from simply the provision of medical facility resources toward 
the rational planning and utilization of medical facility 
resources. 
As certificate of need gained prominence, some analysts, 
political leaders, and health care providers questioned the 
desirability of CON regulation in the health facility industry. 
In fact, Virginia's COPN statute was quite controversial when it 
was introduced. At issue was the proper role of government in 
the medical facility industry. Proponents of a free-market 
approach to medical facility care, such as the Richmond Metro 
Chamber of Commerce have taken the stance on ideological and 
economic grounds that the free market is a better allocator of 
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health care resources than regulation. By subjecting prospective 
capital expenditure decisions to CON review, the decision became 
highly politicized, as the review process has often been marked 
by negotiation between the applicant, competing applicants, and 
the state agency having final decision-making authority. 1 Other 
groups, such as the Virginia Health Care Association and Virginia 
Blue Cross have supported COPN as a reasonable response to the 
problems within the health care facility industry. The Virginia 
Hospital Association has altered its position on COPN several 
times in response to the perceived effect that COPN has had on 
its member institutions. Initially supportive of the program, 
the VHA currently opposes COPN on ideological and economic 
grounds. 
Group interaction has played an important role in the 
development of COPN in Virginia. It is often the case in 
American politics that groups which are well-organized and well-
financed, and have narrow concerns are more active politically 
than those groups which are not. Health care provider and payer 
groups in Virginia have been much more active in the COPN 
dialogue than citizens' groups. The Virginia Hospital 
Association and the Virginia Health.Care Association have been 
two of the most active groups on the COPN issue. Groups have not 
only been active in the formulation of legislation pertaining to 
COPN, but also in the daily operation of the program. Interested 
1Roberta M. Roos, "Certificate of Need for Health Care 
Facilities: a Time for Reexamination," Pace Law Review (7) 2 
(Winter 1987), p. 509. 
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parties participate in the decision-making process on COPN 
applications, as well as in the promulgation of the regulations 
that govern the program. 
Over the period of fifty or sixty years that government has 
been active in this policy area, the locus of activity shifted 
from the private sector, to local and state governments, and then 
to the federal government. Tensions arose under the federal 
health planning program between the various levels of government 
and the quasi-public HSAs. The focal point of these disagreements 
concerned the proper role of each level of government and the 
HSAs. 
More recently, states and localities have resumed the 
dominant role in health planning in the wake of the dismantling 
of the federal health planning program. The absence of a federal 
health planning program has provided Virginia and other states 
with the opportunity to redefine their health planning goals. In 
Virginia, this development has meant that lawmakers have been 
able to give the needs of the medically indigent a much more 
prominent position on the political agenda than had previously 
been the case. 
The indigent health care issue has accentuated concern about 
medical facility care costs in Virginia. Virginia lawmakers have 
tied COPN's fate to its ability to constrain costs. That 
Virginia's Medicaid budget has grown considerably has heightened 
officials' concerns about health care costs, since these costs 
influence the state's Medicaid budget. It is the effect that 
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health care costs have on Virginia's Medicaid budget which has 
prompted lawmakers to partially deregulate the health facility 
industry while creating a trust fund to assist institutions that 
provide substantial amounts of indigent care. 
The federal government impacts upon the health care 
facility industry in a number of ways. The federal government 
provides incentives to employers to provide employee health 
insurance. Broad Medicare and Medicaid eligibility requirements 
are established by the federal government as are standards for 
nursing home care.2 
state and local governments continue to be active in the 
health facility industry. Virginia and thirty-eight other states 
maintain active health planning and CON programs. states and 
localities are also responsible for health care facility 
licensing and, health and safety inspections. There are rate 
regulation programs in Virginia and elsewhere. Under a rate 
regulation plan, facilities work together with regulators to 
reach an agreement on revenue limits while regulators attempt to 
distribute equitably the indigent care burden among facilities. 3 
Virginia also continues to maintain its State and Local 
Hospitalization Program as a way to help ensure health care for 
the medically indigent. 
2John F.Hoadley, "Health Care in the U. s.: Access, Costs, 
Quality," PS (20) 2 (Spring 1987), p. 198. 
3carl J. Schramm, Steven c. Renn, and Brian Biles, "Controlling 
Hospital Cost Inflation: New Approaches to Rate Setting", Health 
Affairs (Fall 1986), p.30. 
1n 
Reduced to its most fundamental elements, the question of 
government intervention in the medical facility industry really 
reverts back to the long-standing debate over the relative merits 
of regulation and the free market. This question is still as 
hotly contested today as it was fifteen or twenty years 
ago. Yet today, there is a new wrinkle in this issue. Since all 
levels of government are, to varying degrees, involved in the 
medical facility industry, the current dilemma centers on the 
character that such intervention should take. 
Medical facility public policy in this country is clearly at 
a crossroads. Public and private sector leaders continue to 
search for solutions to the deficiencies in the health care 
industry. Sixteen years ago the Virginia General Assembly enacted 
a certificate of need program in the hope that it would address 
the problems of access, cost, and quality. Access and cost are 
still at the forefront of political discussions sixteen years 
later, as the General Assembly has decided to scale back 
Virginia's COPN program in an effort to allow competitive market 
forces to work to achieve the Commonwealth's health care policy 
objectives. The quality of medical facilities is not as 
prominent a factor in the COPN program as it was originally, 
however. As the Governor and the General Assembly have struggled 
to deal with these issues and the fate of COPN they have received 
input from a variety of groups representing various segments of 
the health care industry and society at large. These groups have 
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played an important role in the development of medical facility 
policy in Virginia. 
Governor Baliles and the General Assembly have made the 
issue of access to affordable health care for all Virginians a 
high priority, however concern over the cost of this care still 
overshadows the issue of the accessibility of medical facility 
care for many Virginians. Lawmakers' decisions regarding the 
continued efficacy of COPN are also motivated by these two 
issues. As long as these concerns remain high political 
priorities in Virginia, the Commonwealth will continue to play an 
active role in this ever-changing industry. 
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